Thompson v. ValentineThompson v. Valentine
{¶ 1} This amended opinion clarifies and supersedes this court’s previous opinion in Thompson v. Valentine, Butler App. No. CA2009-09-231,
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellant, Charles E. Valentine, appeals from an order of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, certifying to the common pleas court’s juvenile division all matters concerning the care and custody of the two minor children of appellant and his former wife plaintiffappellee, Ann Valentine, n.k.a. Ann Thompson.
{¶ 3} The parties were divorced in 2003, and appellant was subsequently named the residential parent of the parties’ minor children. In 2008, appellant, acting pro se, moved to modify the parties’ parenting time and filed a notice of his intent to relocate to Wisconsin and to take the children with him. Appellee responded with several motions of her own, including one to modify the children’s designated custodian.
{¶ 4} In 2009, the domestic-relations court certified the case, including all of the parties’ pending motions, to the Butler County Juvenile Court on the ground that evidence had been presented to it to support allegations that one of the parties’ children may have been subjected to sexual abuse, though it was.not known by whom or when the abuse occurred, and the juvenile court has exclusive
{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals from the domestic-relation court’s decision, assigning the following as error:
{¶ 6} Assignment of error No. 1:
{¶ 7} “Trial court erred by not determining that a change of circumstances had taken place prior to hearing the motion of modifying custody.”
{¶ 8} Assignment of error No. 2:
{¶ 9} “The trial court erred by not surrendering jurisdiction of the case to division of juvenile court before hearing it.”
{¶ 10} Assignment of error No. 3:
{¶ 11} “The trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion of intent to relocate out of state based on evidence, obtained inappropriately, and the failure of the trial court to specify the factual evidence that claimed to have outweighed the advantages of the move.”
{¶ 12} Assignment of error No. 4:
{¶ 13} “The trier of the objection [sic] of the magistrate’s decision erred by ignoring the issues of the 3rd error of the trial court.”
{¶ 14} We are precluded from reviewing the issues raised in appellant’s assignments of error. Appellant had a duty to file a transcript of the proceedings or such parts of it as were necessary to enable this court to review the domestic-relations court’s decision. See Spicer v. Spicer, Butler App. No. CA2005-10-443,
{¶ 15} “Proceedings recorded by means other than videotape must be transcribed into written form. When the written form is certified by the reporter in accordance with
{¶ 16} In this case, appellant failed to provide this court with a transcript of the proceedings or an acceptable alternative, as required by
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} When a domestic-relations court relies upon
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} A juvenile court may also attain jurisdiction over a domestic-relations ease by certification under
{¶ 22} “Any court, other than a juvenile court, that has jurisdiction in any case respecting the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of a child under eighteen years of age and the designation of the child’s place of residence and legal custodian or in any case respecting the support of a child under eighteen years of age, may, on its own motion or on motion of any interested party, with the consent of the juvenile court, certify the record in the case or so much of the record and such further information, in narrative form or otherwise, as the court deems necessary or the juvenile court requests, to the
{¶ 23} Under the plain terms of the statute, the juvenile court’s express consent is required before a domestic-relations court may transfer a case pursuant to the first paragraph of
{¶ 24} The second paragraph of
{¶ 25} “In eases in which the court of common pleas finds the parents unsuitable to have the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the child or children and unsuitable to provide the place of residence and to be the legal custodian of the child or children, consent of the juvenile court shall not be required to such certification.”
{¶ 26} Clearly, then, a finding of parental unsuitability bypasses the need to obtain the juvenile court’s consent prior to transferring a case under the second paragraph of
{¶27} In the present matter, the record indicates that the domestic-relations court did not properly certify the case to the juvenile court under
{¶ 28} In relying upon
{¶ 29} “
{¶ 30} After construing
{¶ 31} With these crucial words inserted in the statute,
{¶ 32} In this case, there was no complaint, indictment, or information that contained allegations of abuse, neglect, or dependency. Instead, the trial court based its finding that one of the parties’ children may have been sexually abused on testimony presented to its magistrate at a hearing held on the parties’ motions. The magistrate, in turn, found that the testimony of appellee, her new husband, and the child’s therapist “are allegations that [the child] may be abused, neglected and/or dependent,” and further found that allegations that this child’s behavior “may impact or be directed” towards the other child also “amounts to allegations of abuse, neglect and/or dependency.” However, for the reasons that follow, these allegations did not amount to allegations in a “complaint, indictment, or information,” for purposes of
{¶ 33} Obviously, the allegations of sexual abuse were not contained in an indictment or information, as the record does not indicate that the allegations were conveyed by a grand jury or by a prosecutor without a grand jury. That leaves a complaint as the only viable medium.
{¶ 34}
{¶ 35} Notably, the plain terms of
{¶ 36} As stated,
{¶ 37} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the domestic-relations court lacked authority to certify this case to the juvenile court under
{¶ 38} Accordingly, the judgment of the domestic-relations court transferring this cause to the juvenile court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the domestic-relations court for further proceedings in accordance with this amended opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
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. In addition, we reiterate that the juvenile court did not attain jurisdiction over the case by consenting to the transfer. As previously noted, certain statutes permit the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction over custody matters by consenting to certification of the case from domestic-relations court. See, e.g.,