30 App. D.C. 352 | D.C. Cir. | 1908
delivered the opinion of the Court:
(1) The contention on behalf of the United States, that this evidence is admissible by virtue of sec. 1067 of the Code [31 Stat. at L. 1357, chap. 854] is untenable. That section is found in chapter 25 of the Code, which relates to evidence, and reads as follows: “No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, * * * but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde; and the party cross-examining him shall not be concluded by his answers as to such matters. In order to prove such conviction of crime it shall not be necessary to produce the whole record of the proceedings containing such conviction, but the certificate, under seal, of the clerk of the Court wherein such
(2) It remains to consider whether there are other grounds upon which the competency of the character of the cross-examination permitted in this case can be sustained. Undoubtedly, a wide latitude has been permitted in the cross-examination of witnesses, generally for the purpose of testing their credibility ; and on account of the difficulty of laying down a general rule of observance in all cases, much has been left to the discretion of the trial court. It is also true that one offering himself as a witness on his own behalf subjects himself to the general rules that apply in the case of an ordinary witness offered on behalf of another. There is, however, a marked difference between the relations of the two to the case on trial, that must be taken into consideration. Inquiries that may tend to disgrace an ordinary witness, and thereby discredit his testimony, can prejudice him in no other way; they operate to the prejudice of the party on trial only in that they may lessen the weight of testimony on which he relies. As was well said by Chief Judge Church in an analogous case:
“By taking the stand as a witness, while he may subject himself to the rules applicable to other witnesses, he is not thereby deprived of his rights as a party. * * * Especially ought this protection to be afforded to persons on trial for criminal offenses, who often by a species of moral compulsion are forced upon the stand as witnesses, and, being there, are obliged to run the gauntlet of their whole lives on cross-examination, and every immorality, vice, and crime of which they may have been guilty, or suspected of being guilty, is brought out, ostensibly to effect credibility, but practically used to produce a conviction for the particular offense for which the
The prejudicial effect of the admission forced from the defendant by the cross-examination permitted in this case is apparent. He had been shown to be an unlicensed and irregular practitioner, the sign on whose office door gave only a part of his name. The only direct testimony to his commission of the offense was that of the woman, who said she went to his office of her own motion, and asked to have the unlawful act performed. He met this by his practically unsupported denial. It is therefore quite probable that the balance may have been turned against him by the admission that he had not only before been charged with the same offense, but also that the evidence against him had been sufficiently strong to induce two separate juries to find him guilty of the charge.
Proof of the actual commission of the first offense would not be admissible as furnishing evidence of motive in the perpetration of the one for which he was being tried. While such proof, or his admission of the former verdicts, might tend to discredit him as a witness in his own or another’s case, its chief and necessarily damaging effect was to furnish the jury ground for an inference that he was guilty of the offense on
While the statute permitting an accused person to testify in his own behalf in a criminal case is a humane one, the. exercise of the privilege is attended with some dangers, and these should not be increased by such a latitude of cross-examination as was permitted in this case. We are of the opinion that reversible error was committed in overruling the defendant’s objections to this evidence.
The offense of procuring the miscarriage of a woman in this District is defined in sec. 809 of the Code [31 Stat. at L. 1322, chap. 851] as follows:
“Procuring Miscarriage. — Whoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, prescribes or administers to her any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or with like intent uses any instrument or means, unless when necessary to preserve her life or health, and under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be imprisoned for not more than five yeai’s; or, if the woman or her child dies in consequence of such act, by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than twenty years.”
Under similar statutes, in many States, it has been held that they do not apply to the woman whose miscarriage has been produced, though with her consent, but solely to the person whose act produced it. She is regarded as his victim, rather than an accomplice. Com. v. Wood, 11 Gray, 85, 93; Com. v. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274, 277, 29 N. E. 471; State v. Murphy, 27 N. J. L. 112, 115; State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. L. 598, 601; Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 490, 9 S. W. 509, 810; State v. Owens, 22 Minn. 238, 244; State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 230, 57 N. W. 652, 1065; Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237, 244; Hunter v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 61, 41 S. W. 602.
The supreme court of Ohio takes a like view of the statute defining the offense, but holds the woman an accomplice by virtue of another provision of the Code, which provides that “whoever aids, abets, or procures another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he was the principal offender.”
The appellant contends that the same rule applies here by •virtue of sec. 908 of the Code [31 Stat. at L. 1337, chap. 854], which reads as follows: “In prosecutions for any crimina] offense, all persons advising, inciting, or conniving at the offense, -or aiding or abetting the principal offender, shall be charged as principals, and not as accessories, the intent of this section
For the error pointed out, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with direction to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Reversed.