Mаble L. Thompson initiated this contempt action against Harry R. Thompson, seeking to enforce an earlier decree entered on the dissоlution of the parties' marriage. The trial court found Harry in contempt and entered judgment accordingly. Harry appeals, raising several issues. Bеcause we find that the court's order exeeed-ed the scope of its contempt power, however, we need only address the proper use of contempt in enforcing dissolution decrees.
We reverse.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Harry and Mable's marriage was dissolved on June 24, 1981. The final dissolution decree, entered on that date, gave Mable custody of the parties' daughter, Kim. It also awarded Mаble the marital home, requiring Harry to pay the mortgage. Further, the decree required Harry to maintain health insurance for Mable and his daughter, to pay $50.00 per week in child support, and to pay Mable $100.00 per week for maintenance. Finally, the decree allowed Mable and Harry to keep their personal property and ordered that certain business property be sold by commissioners to pay the marital debts, with any remaining profits to be split between Mable and Harry. Neither party appealed from this judgment.
On November 12, 1981, Mable filed a contempt petition charging that Harry had not paid support and maintenance, made past due mortgage payments, or maintained health insurance for Mable and Kim. After a hearing, the court found Harry had indeed disobeyed the decree as charged in the petition and found Harry in contempt of court. The court then made the following order:
The Court now further finds that to prevent further harm to the Petitioner as a result of the Respondent's contempt that the dissolution decree of June 24, 1981, must be modified to provide for additional assets to be awarded to the Petitioner so that Petitioner may have a better possibility of paying debts and obligations incurred. The Court now therefore orders that the decree of June 24, 1981, be modified, and that all propеrty listed therein to be taken and sold by Co-Commissioners that is remaining and still in Commissioners' possession, now be awarded to the original Petitioner, Mable L. Thomрson, for her use and benefit.... Court now further modifies the original decree and orders the respondent to assume and pay all medical, doctоr, hospitalization, and prescription expenses incurred by the Petitioner, and not paid since June 18, 1980, and he is to save and hold Petitioner freе and harmless from any further liability thereon. Court further orders Respondent to assume and pay all medical, doctor, hospitalization and prescription expenses incurred by the Petitioner as bills and receipts are *300 submitted to him. Court orders that Respondent's obligation for medical related expenses incurred and to be incurred by the Petitioner are for the support and maintenance of the Petitioner in addition to the weekly рayment heretofore ordered by this Court.... Court now confirms the decree of June 24, 1981 in all other respects.
It is from this order that Harry appeals.
Harry's first contention on appeаl is that contempt is not a proper remedy for his failure to provide insurance, pay the mortgage, or pay support and maintenanсe. We disagree. Because the Indiana Constitution art. 1, § 22 forbids imprisonment for debt, it has been held that contempt may not be used to enforce a dissolution decree ordering one party to pay the other a fixed sum of money, either in a lump sum or installments. State ex rel. Shaunki v. Endsley, (1977)
A remaining question is whether the court's order to pay maintenance to Mable under Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-9(c) was also еn-foreceable by contempt. Although no Indiana case has decided this question, it seems clear that an order to pay maintenancе is enforceable by contempt. Unlike the money judgments in Neal and State ex rel. Shutz, supra, maintenance orders differ from ordinary judgment debts in that they аre open-ended and subject to modification. Orders to pay maintenance are thus very similar to child support orders, which have long beеn held enforceable by contempt notwithstanding Ind. Const. art. 1, § 22. Perry v. Pernet, (1905)
Harry next аrgues that, even if he was in contempt, the trial court had no authority to modify its prior property division to give Mable all the remaining marital property. Harry contends that this order violates Ind.Code 81-1-11.5-17(a), which provides that "orders as to property disposition [under Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-9] may not be revoked or modified, except in case of fraud...." We agree. Because the trial court made no finding that Harry was guilty of fraud, it clearly had no authority under Ind.Cоde 81-1-11.5-17(a) to modify its original property division decree.
Nor does the trial court's inherent contempt power justify its ruling here. The only proper goal of a civil contempt proceeding such as this is to protect the rights, under the original court order, of those it was meant to benefit. Chadwick v. Alleshouse, (1968)
The trial court, however, chose instead to modify its original decree to give Mable most of the marital assets. Although the court's reason for doing so was to give Mable "a better possibility of paying debts and obligations incurred," such an order bears little relation to the purpose of a civil contempt proceeding-enforeement of the trial cоurt's original order. Faced with similar facts, our supreme court has held that the trial court in a contempt proceeding has no authority to modify the dissolution decree it was called upon to enforce. State ex rel. Dale v. Boone Superior Court, (1973)
The trial court's judgment is reversed.