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Thompson v. State
295 Ga. 96
Ga.
2014
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*1 rоbbery, murder, 2. Gibbs’s convictions for malice armed and possession during ofa firearm the ofmurder are commission affirmed. possession However, the trial court erred it sentenced for when Gibbs during robbery Boyd of a firearm of the commission the armed of sentencing possession during addition to commission of against for a firearm the

Boyd’s underlying The murder. crimes were both person Boyd, possessed and the evidence is that Gibbs handgun accomplish felony, same commission of each part one that each was and the same fatal encounter. State v. 69) (2003). Accordingly, Marlowe, 277 Ga. Gibbs’s possession during sentence for of a firearm the commission of armed robbery (3)(596 867, 869 must be vacated. See Carero v.

Judgments part part. and vacated in All the Justices affirmed concur. April 22,

Decided 2014. Meyers, appellant.

Sara E. Ashley Wright, Attorney, Little, District Madonna M. Assistant Attorney, Attorney Olens, General, District Samuel S. Patricia B. Attaway Deputy Attorney Burton, General, Smith, K. Paula Senior Attorney Ryan Attorney General, Kolb, Assistant A. Assistant Gеn- appellee. eral, for

S14A0235. THOMPSON v. THE STATE.

NAHMIAS, Justice. Appellant Rodney Thompson felony was convicted of the murder Marjorie Lynch. appeal, mother, of his On he contends that evidence at trial was insufficient to his conviction excluding expert regarding and that the trial court erred in evidence admitting prior IQ his low and in evidence of his difficulties police custody. victim of certain statements he made while As explained below, we find no contentions, merit to these and we therefore affirm.1 12, 2008, August The victim killed was on June 2008. On was indicted on

charges murder, felony murder, aggravated 17-20, malice August assault. trial on After guilty guilty charges. malice murder other two felony prison murder; court aggravated sentenced him to serve life in assault verdict, to the favorable light in the most (a) 1. Viewed who was following. Appellant, trial showed the presented family Lynch old, living with Ms. then 39 killed, Ms. before she was About a week County. in Barrow members with the helping if he not start Lynch told bills, out. have move household wоuld 911 and said Lynch Ms. called of June morning On *2 run of the house. her in the back and out just had stabbed that her son later, finding at the five minutes deputies arrived house Sheriffs asked who he a When porch smoking cigarette. on the Appellant the house. her son” motioned toward was, said “I’m Appellant mother, he first if stabbed his Appellant asked had deputies When the had; that he he was then no, again, when he said said asked put police car. handcuffed house, Lynch Ms. floor deputies lying

Inside She sticking with а crossbow bolt out her back. was her bedroom alive, asleep and she one of the that she had been deputies still told paramedic told a who arrived at the scene when she was shot. She also Lynch hospital, “he me.” was to a where she died that shot Ms. ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‍taken bolt operating on the table. The cause of death was crossbow wound tip,” killed had a “field which Lynch the back. bolt that Ms. tip,” used for rather than a “broad fairly generally practice, blunt for hunting. which is used bedroom, they searched found a investigators

When bolt; A and a the crossbow was in “fire” mode. sales associate crossbow Pro at Shop Appellant purchased the Bass testified trial that had two to two before he killed his mother. The the crossbow weeks months explain he to customers explained generally associate that would how get that could also use the crossbow and customers demonstrations archery use the at an The associate range. how to crossbow in-store pounds that Appellant’s crossbow and found it took 150 had examined fire, make explained to cock bow. He that to the crossbow force mode, it it not manually to be switched fire could had Although acknowledged cocked while safe mode. the associate that malfunction, safety Appel- can he mechanism of crossbows tested unable to the bow when it was in safe lant’s crossbow and was shoot mode, even when he tried to make it malfunсtion. 16, Appellant September merged motion for a trial on

verdict into conviction. filed a new February 15,2013. Appellant timely the trial filed a notice of which court denied 8,2013. Appeals, properly appeal to this on October to the Court of which transferred the Court January on the was docketed here for the 2014 term and submitted for decision briefs. The case Appellant office, taken house to s was from the the sheriff where rights waiving after under Miranda Ari- he was interviеwed 694) (1966). Appellant zona, 16 LE2d 384 U. S. 436 gone up had to his mother’s her his claimed he room show though asleep, crossbow, in, even she he walked was when accidentally crossbow, loaded, which went offand the bolt hit her was in the back. that this the first had ever He said was time he used the bought hunting (although crossbow, he which to use for he later hunting Appellant license). admitted he have a admitted pay rent, that his mother sometimes asked which made him mad, but he claimed that he was not mad at her the time of the why help incident. did not When asked his mother after Appellant calling her, heard her said he had so he went cigarette. outside smoke ended,

After the interview to a moved conference guarded by Investigator Although room, where he was Matt Guthas. question Appellant began talking. him, Guthas did not Guthas “got thing my testified at trial that said: into this with mom morning”; “gun”; “good thing this back”; “shot her in the it wasn’t steel”; and “not bad.” At trial State also evidence that pled guilty Jersey threatening in his mother. had in New to kill *3 (b)Appellant pointed contends that the evidence to an accidental shooting legally support was thus insufficient to his conviction. “ jury credibility However, ‘[i]t for the to was determine the of the any witnesses and resolve conflicts or in inconsistencies ” Vega (673 223) (2009) State, 32, evidence.’ v. 285 Ga. 33 SE2d (citation omitted). light When in viewed most favorable to the presented verdict, the evidence trial and summarized above was reject Appellant’s sufficient to authorize a rational accidеnt guilty beyond felony defense and find a reasonable doubt of aggravated Virginia, murder based on assault. See v. Jackson 443 (99 560) (1979); 307, 2781, U. S. 319 61 LE2d State, Smith v. 292 456 (740 158) (2013); 620, State, Ga. 621 SE2d Brown v. 292 454, Ga. (738 SE2d permitted

2. The trial court ruled that would not be expert testimony introduce IQ 67, which, that he has an his counsel argued, was relevant his defense that the was accidental disability prevented understanding because his mental him from properly. how to use the crossbow enumerates error this ruling, but the court trial decided the issue in accordance with settled Georgia law. disability may

Evidence a criminal defendant’s mental support insanity compulsion ofa defense of or delusional to stand incompetency claim of 16-3-3); 16-3-2 and (see OCGA §§ authorized, were or, pleas such 17-7-130); since (see OCGA § (see retarded mentally ill but mentally guilty or guilty plea — For in this case.2 raised none of which 17-7-131) OCGA § consistently upheld however, has this Court years, more than 150 condition mental diminished a defendant’s evidence of exclusion of the intent negate defenses or to when offered 603, 607-608 Abernathy, 289 Ga. State v. See, e.g., a crime. element of unless it amounts abnormality, 48) (2011) (“ (715 SE2d ‘[M]ental State, v. Wallace ”) (quoting to a crime.’ not a defense insanity, State, 601, v. 274 Ga. Paul 255, 325) (1981)); SE2d (282 Ga. that “he argument the defendant’s 716) (2001) (rejecting SE2d (555 impairment of his mental expert evidence entitled to introduce was kill,” expert because “the of intent to to show his lack tending guilt necessary mind to determine irrelevant state or that insanity an defense refusal to assert of the dеfendant’s light Selman question”); the conduct in ill at the time of mentally he was State, v. Reece State, v. 198, 200 (475 892) (1996) (same); 267 Ga. alone 212 723) (1956) (“Weak-mindedness (94 609-610 in the record that the defendant crime. The evidence is no defense to relieve him ten old does not of a child nine or mentality had the State, v. omitted)); McKethan (citation for crime.” responsibility accused, able to though 15) (1946) (“That 201 Ga. be unable to evaluate wrong, might right between distinguish or as a normal degree of his act to same consеquences quality State, 496, hn. Goosby v. 153 Ga. individual, defense.”); is no average [1] SE 467) (1922) (holding the trial court err in the defendant was “weak- testifying a witness from prohibiting immaterial, as weak minded,” would have been because “the answer defense nor excused have constituted a ness of mind would not (affirming SE crime”); Rogers 128 Ga. defendant, ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‍time of his from the evidence that “the the exclusion of childhood, intelligence,” feeble intellect and weak had been of person, or an insane that he “was either an idiot the defense was not homicide, under form of labored, any time at the or that delusional insanity”); Studstill [6] (1849) (“It is not *4 2 addition, (d) (2), in authorizes relevant which was enacted In OCGA 16-3-21 offense, testimony regarding the time of the expert condition of mind at the defendant’s family relating or child abuse that including to the violence facts and circumstances relevant prosecution support justification expert’s opinion, defense in a to a the bases of the are State, manslaughter. v. 247 Ga. murder or See also Smith spouse justification testimony on battered (holding expert of defense based in a that fact”). improper opinion syndrome “ultimate he an on an would not

competent prove mind, to that the defendant is of weak where it is insane.”), idiot, that is neither lunatic nor admitted overruled grounds (1855).3 other in See Armistead also Bryant 836) (1999) (affirming 99, 101 expert testimony of exclusion that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stemming from stress disorder childhood sexual abuse Bryant’s mental state was “not relevant to defense of victim). accident” Georgia position

It should be noted that takes a more restrictive many jurisdictions, on this issue than of where admission relating evidence support to a defendant’s deficient mental condition other than based

defenses those on diminished mental capacity negate required or to element of a crime has been autho- judicial by rized statute or in at decision least some circumstances. generally See § ah, Defenses, Paul H. Robinson et Criminal Law Vol. (a) (2013). Georgia, jurisdiction, however, is not such a and if the by longstanding precedent change, law established our is to it would public policy legislated by be better done as matter the General Assembly.

3. next contends that the trial court it erred when prior admitted, as evidence of difficulties between him and his showing previously mother, records that he had threatened to kill his disagree. We mother. request dire, voir

After the trial court addressed the State’s present pled guilty Jersey evidence had in New making proffered 1994 mother; terroristic threats including police report, copies evidence was certified records provided Appellant’s pre-trial discovery. which had been counsel in point, At the court admissible, ruled that the would evidence be during trial, the court decided exclude the ground police report that the officer who had written the was not testify appear available and the other records did not to be of the type required prove a conviction.

Subsequently, day trial, on the second the State had the attorney’s Jersey overnight district office in New send fax copies delivery Appellant’s guilty plea certified accusation, prosecutor form, conviction, and sentence. The showed faxed day; day, documents to counsel that next after receiv- ing overnight delivery, newly the State advised the court obtained records and moved their admission into evidence to recognize descriptions may We mental-condition older defenses these cases jarring to modem ears. *5 trial the victim. Appellant between difficulties prior prove that objection over records the certified court admitted as trial days ten before the documents provided had not the State ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‍occurred difficulties prior the OCGA 17-16-4 required by § arguments again those two He raises to be admissible. long ago too appeal.4 attorney prosecuting (a) (3) (A), 17-16-4 Under OCGA

(a) § than no later inspect copy, the defendant must allow generally its has within trial, the State all documents prior to days ten evidence at intends to use as control and custody, or possession, not the State did assuming in rebuttal. Even case-in-chief or its actually admitted to the records respect with requirement meet that 17-16-4 OCGA difficulties, comply the failure to with prior to show the § at issue. the documents result in exclusion of automatically does not introduсing evidence from Instead, may prohibited the State to the prejudice of both upon showing only disclosed timely was not Bryant v. 17-16-6; See OCGA by and bad faith the State. defendant § State, 362) (2011). 888-889 288 Ga. timely Appellant

Here, provide the State although admit- ultimately that were certified records particular notice of the that the prior difficulties ted, in advance of trial of he was aware him in provided the State had present State intended to to use originally planned that it fashion with the documents timely Thus, any not shown Appellant has the 1994 terroristic threats. prove day before the certified records on receiving prejudice real admitted, any bad faith nor has he demonstrated were of the lesser request any did not note that State. We also continuance, discovery remedies, available to address such as a the trial court did not Accordingly, See OCGA 17-16-6. violations. prior difficulties declining to exclude its discretion abuse Bryant, at 889. See 288 Ga. ground. evidence on this difficulties evidence prior also contends that (b) Appellant incident occurred Jersey the New been excluded because should have in this case. Evidence charged before the crimes more than under proffered records that were witness to cross-examine confrontation lapse argument waived review of the Confrontation time between the New prove appellate andinstead made clear also any actually arguеs Confrontation prior review. about the documents. Clause, admitted into difficulties, Appellant expressed Jersey During see U. S. Const. Sanders Clause claim. See that his conviction and his mother’s that the admission of these the discussion of the documents evidence, objections However, amend. were based on OCGA § when the State offered VI, concern made no mention of his but he did not death. documents violated his Accordingly, Appellant that the State there would be no 17-16-4 and preserve that the certified initially right rights prior prior difficulties is admissible because “the defendant’s acts quarrel, prior assault, threat,... victim, be it a or a toward are relationship the victim and between the defendant may motive, intent, and show the defendant’s bent mind in committing charges the act the victim which results in the being prosecuted.” which the defendant is Wall (1998).5 explained We have that remoteness in prior charged time between the conflict and now the crime does not lapsе irrelevant; instead, render such evidence prior “the in time between prior difficulties’] acts and the crime at issue on [the bears *6 credibility weight admissibility.” rather than its Faircloth v. (744 Appellant’s prior case, In this the terroristic threats motive, intent, his mother was relevant to show his and bent crossbow, mind when he in shot mother the back with a and to disprove years passed his defense that was it an accident. That 14 the between incidents was fact for the to consider. See Rowe v. 119) (2003) (upholding State, 276 Ga. the admis- testimony fought sion of that the defendant had and hit his wife 10 to 12 before he shot her death and claimed that the unintentional). sum, In the trial court not abuse its admitting Appellant’s prior discretion the evidence of difficulties with the victim.

4. About 40 office, minutes into his interview at sheriffs Appellant say going anything you said, “I’m not .... I told everything already.” investigators, ques- however, continued to Appellant. Conceding Appellant tion invoked his could deemed to have

right silent, to remain could which make his statements during the remainder of Miranda, interview inadmissible under try present portion the State elected not to of the interview at present Investigator did, however, trial.6 The State Guthas’s testi- mony Appellant about what said in the conference room to which he was moved when the interview ended. contends that admitting asserting statements, court erred in those that the Georgia’s Code, This case was tried under old Evidence Code. Under the new Evidence applies beginning January whiсh admissibility to trials after or this sort of crimes, wrongs, governed by (b). “[e]vidence or acts” is OCGA 24-4-404 by Because this decision the trial court did not rule on whether rights during either, Miranda had been violated the interview. We need not address that issue assumption because this enumeration of error even fails on the that a Miranda violation - during noted, however, occurred It interview. should be that there is no indication - ruling questioning obtained no below whatever occurred after say anything subsequent indicated that he did not during want more rendered his statements involuntary. the interview coerced and during the statements interview tainted Miranda violation by the by induced the statements were and that later heard Guthas investigator’s presence room.

in the conference 1682, LE2d Innis, U. S. 291 Island v. In Rhode explained Supreme “the (1980), Court United States custody person play safeguards is into whenever come Miranda equivalent,” express questioning subjected functional or its to either likely reasonably policе practice meaning is should know that the “[a] suspect.” response incriminating Id. at 300-301. from a an to evoke principle explained as follows: has This Court voluntary statement without makes a pressured a defendant When being questioned interrogator, the state- an or Miranda warn- in the absence of admissible even ment is spontaneous voluntary ings; outburst not a defendant’s interrogation questioning response or to custodial made do not Indeed, officers law enforcement at trial. admissible talking duty prevent about a defendant have they so; must to do if the defendant wishes incident criminal interrogate refuse to listen. need not Velazquez 871, 877-878 State, 282 Ga. interroga- omitted).

(citation the result of a statement was Whether question court, offact for the trial is a instead volunteered tion or was ruling it is unless not be disturbed the court’s will *7 clearly id. at 877. erroneous. See hearing pursuant ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‍conducting Denno, 378 to Jackson v. a

After 908) (1964), in this case 1774, 12 the trial court SCt LE2d U. S. 368 by Investigator Appеllant’s Guthas heard statements found interrogation, product voluntary the record and and not the were fully supports finding. did discuss that he Guthas testified guarding Appellant even ask and did not he was the case when follow-up questions talking. Appellant began mere Guthas’s after guard presence room where in the conference as a questioned may improperly temporarily have been after detained and did not evoke was not coercive in another room other officers Appellant’s the crimes. about statements controlling the “functional excludes from case law

[T]he police interrogation equivalent” those statements custody. normally a After to arrest and attendant actions suspect may rights, police in situation be his invokes safely appropriately can, to, and choose where police may suspect, need in other situations but leave suspect transport the crime or scene arrest interrоgation center, or detention from an room a deten- suspect arrange lawyer center, tion or contact family, logistical or or deal with other issues. (citation Brown,

State omitted). Accordingly, punctuation trial court not err admitting Investigator testimony Guthas’s about state- ments. Judgment except concur, Melton, J., All Justices affirmed. judgment only

who concurs in toas Division 2. concurring.

BENHAM, Justice, fully opinion interpretation I concur in the itas is an accurate only expound the current state of the I law. write on the rеference concerning persons capacities in Division 2 with diminished which any change persons *8 without such disabilities. joins

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein in this concurrence. April 22, 2014.

Decided Anderson, appellant. for Kathleen J. Skelton, Deborah E. Smith, Samuel Attorney, District Bradley

J. Olens, Attorney S. Attorneys, Samuel Wilbanks, District Assistant S. General, Paula Burton, Attorney Deputy General, Attaway PatriciaB. Iannuzzi, General, L. Katherine Smith, Attorney Assistant Senior K General, appellee. for Attorney Assistant v. THE STATE. CASTRO

S14A0300. THE STATE. PARKER v.

S14A0301. (757 SE2d Justice. Melton, оf guilty ‍‌​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌‌​‍found trial, (“Castro”) was Eric Castro

Following murder, various and murder, felony of two counts malice Parker. Kailee two-year-old the death in connection with offenses two mother, guilty found Kailee’s (“Parker”), Parker Heather cruelty on the offenses murder, predicated both felony counts of In for Kailee.1 medical treatment to seek for Parker’s failure children presented that the evidence S14A0300, contends Castro No. Case trial court and that the verdict support insufficient trial was autopsy photographs certain at trial admitting into evidence erred the evidence S14A0301, argues Parker In Case No. of Kailee. her against the verdict insufficient at trial was murder, 7, 2012, two September each indicted for malice and Parker were Castro On cruelty battery, murder, assault, aggravated aggravated two counts of felony counts of children in the first degree. Following cruelty in the degree, to children second and one count of - 2, trial, guilty May joint jury on all counts. Parker was April Castro was found an her, degree cruelty felony of first guilty one count murder of both counts acquitted degree cruelty of the children, children. Parker was and one count of second imprisonment 9, 2013, malice May to life for remaining charges. was sentenced Castro On assault; years for each of murder; aggravated ten consecutive twenty consecutive for felony degree charges. convictions were The two murder cruelty first to children in the (4) by operation 263 Ga. 369 law. See Malcolm vacated purposes. sentencing sentenced to merged Parker was remaining for convictions were Castro’s degree, cruelty during in the first felony to children prison the commission murder life in purposes. sentencing On merged remaining with that conviction convictions were and her trial, trial the motion for new 21, 2013, Castro filed his May motion for new Parker filed a 3,2013, September Parker amended day. for new trial on amended his motion next Castro 12, September 2013. 9, on trial wеre denied September Both motions for new 2013. hers on September October timely their appeals notices of Parker filed Castro and 2013, respectively. January 2014 term and Court for the docketed in this were February orally argued 2014. notes in the treatment of such in the public policy legislature criminal is context a matter of Georgia, person charged felony may determine. In guilty with a be mentally may hospi- temporarily but retarded and as such (OCGA 17-7-131), any talized otherwise treatеd as Supreme criminal defendant. The Court of the United States has already (or, determined that with offenders intellectual disabilities “mentally retarded”) culpability vernacular, dated average more have less Virginia, than criminals. U. Atkins S. 316-320 335) (2002) (ultimately holding LE2d that men- tally subject penalty). retarded offenders are not to the death See also Guilty Charged: Myth Nevins-Saunders, Elizabeth, Not as Rea for Retardation, Mens Defendants with Mental 45 U.C. L. Davis (2012). Rev. 1419 It is therefore not a stretch to conclude that a more approach dealing balanced with offenders with intellectual dis- justice system today’s society. abilities in the criminal is warranted Georgia justice As reforms, moves forward with various criminal Assembly expanding General should consider its treatment of offend- ways ers intellectual disabilities and look for to reform substan- evidentiary sentencing, laws, rules, defenses, tive affirmative punishment light for offenders with intellectual disabilities in of the they may culpable fact that be less for their actions than others

Case Details

Case Name: Thompson v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Georgia
Date Published: Apr 22, 2014
Citation: 295 Ga. 96
Docket Number: S14A0235
Court Abbreviation: Ga.
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