Ralph Thompson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate a void sentence.
1
This appeal follows this court’s earlier affirmance of Thompson’s convictions in his initial appeal. See
Thompson v. State,
The denial of a motion to correct a void sentence is directly appealable,
Williams v. State,
The facts underlying Thompson’s convictions are fully set out in
Thompson v. State,
supra,
1. Thompson first alleges that the State improperly reused one previous conviction to enhance his punishment because it was “used up” when the State offered it to establish an element of the firearm possession by a convicted felon charge that resulted in a directed verdict. Thompson correctly assеrts that this court has held that when “the State proves a defendant’s prior felony convictions for the purpose of convicting him of being a convicted felon in possession of
*769
a firearm, it may not alsо use those prior convictions in aggravation of punishment.” (Citation omitted.)
Caver v. State,
And this Court has previously determined that the legislature did not intend that the allegation and evidence of a prior felony necessary for a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon could also be used to punish the defendant as a repeat offender under OCGA § 17-10-7. King v. State,169 Ga. App. 444 , 445 (313 SE2d 144 ) (1984). Thus, the state must elect whether it intends to use such evidence to support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or for recidivist sentencing. See Caver v. State,215 Ga. App. at 713 (4); State v. Freeman,198 Ga. App. 553 , 555-556 (2) (402 SE2d 529 ) (1991).
Allen v. State,
This rule is not implicated in this appeal, however, becausе the State did not “use up” evidence of his prior felony conviction to establish the firearms charge. Instead, for whatever reason, the prosecutor only offered evidence during this trial of Thompsоn’s previous felony
indictment
and not evidence of his previous felony
conviction.
That is why the trial court granted Thompson a directed verdict on the charge of firearms possession by a convicted felon. In that regard, this case is similar to
Caver v. State,
supra,
Although this appeal differs from
Caver
in that the trial court directed a verdict on the firearms charge rather than the State nolle-prossing it, we find no reason for the result to differ. Here, like
Caver,
the evidence of Thompson’s earlier felony
conviction
was not introduced in evidence before it was used to enhance Thompson’s punishment. As explained by our Supreme Court in
Walker v. Hale,
King and its progeny stand for the limited proposition that the fеlony used to convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon cannot also be used to enhance the defendant’s punishment as a repeat offender under *770 OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). See Morgan v. State,277 Ga. App. 670 , 672-673 (627 SE2d 413 ) (2006) (priоr conviction may be used both in guilt-innocence phase as evidence of similar transaction and to enhance punishment under recidivist statute); Carswell v. State,263 Ga. App. 833 (589 SE2d 605 ) (2003) (court may use prior conviction as impeachment evidence during guilt-innocence phase and to support sentencing defendant as a recidivist).
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. (conviction for felony murder based on firearm possession by convicted felon was vacated by operation of law and no conviction on that charge was entered; prior conviction supporting underlying firearms possession charge could be used to enhance punishment). “Accordingly, unlike in King, the trial court did not use the prior felony conviction both to support a conviction on the [firearm] possession charge and to enhance [the defendant’s] sentence.” Id. at 133 (l). 3 As thе same is true in Thompson’s case, the trial court did not err by considering that conviction in imposing punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), and by denying Thompson’s motion to vacate the sentence.
2. Next, Thompson contends the Statе gave him defective notice that a prior conviction for criminal damage to property would be used to enhance his sentence
4
because the indictment number of the prior convictiоn recited in the current recidivist count and notice was his co-defendant’s, not his. But Thompson received notice, albeit imperfect, that his conviction would be used against him, and the transcript of the sentеncing hearing shows that Thompson neither objected to the trial court considering this prior conviction, nor contended that he was surprised or confused by the error on the notice. Under these circumstances, Thompson waived any objection he might have had to the trial court considering these convictions in aggravation of his punishment.
Armstrong v. State,
*771
3. Thompson further contends the trial court erred by considering what he tеrms “constitutionally infirm” prior convictions. By this he means that the State did not prove that he properly waived his rights before pleading guilty as required by
Boykin v. Alabama,
Thompson argues that the State had the burden of producing evidеnce that he waived his rights when he pled guilty because he was convicted and sentenced before our Supreme Court, in
Nash v. State,
4. Thompson again alleges that two of his prior convictions only should have been counted as one conviction, see OCGA § 17-10-7 (d),
5
and he acknowledges that this issue was decided against him in his earlier аppeal.
Thompson v. State,
supra,
is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal. See genеrally South Georgia Medical Center v. Washington,269 Ga. 366 , 367 (1) (497 SE2d 793 ) (1998) (an appellate ruling in a case is binding in all subsequent *772 proceedings); Llewellyn v. State,252 Ga. 426 (2) (314 SE2d 227 ) (1984) (litigation must come to an end).
Jackson v. State,
Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Thompson’s motion to vacate a void sentence.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
When the present appeal was before the court initially, it was dismissed, but the Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari, and remanded the сase to this court to consider Thompson’s appeal on the merits.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, any person who, after having been convicted under the lаws of this state for three felonies or having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States of three crimes which if committed within this state would be felonies, commits a felony within this state оther than a capital felony must, upon conviction for such fourth offense or for subsequent offenses, serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge based upon such conviction and shall nоt be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.
We note also that in Walker v. Hale our Supreme Court stated that it had not been called upon to consider the validity of the rule announced in King and found it unnecessary to do so to decide Walker v. Hale. Id. at 132. We do not speculate on whether this comment portends disapproval of the King rule when or if the Supreme Court considers the issue in the future.
Although Thompson’s first appeal included an issue about improper notice being given, that allegation concerned a variance between the allegations of the indictment and proof at the sentencing hearing because the indictment did not include an allegation that Thоmpson had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. This court rejected that argument, finding that “it is not required that the prior convictions be included in the indictment but only that the accused receive notice of the state’s intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Thompson v. State,
supra,
“For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction.”