146 U.S. 240 | SCOTUS | 1892
THOMPSON
v.
SAINT NICHOLAS NATIONAL BANK.
Supreme Court of United States.
*243 Mr. Lewis Sanders for plaintiffs in error.
*247 Mr. William Allen Butler (with whom was Mr. John A. Taylor on the brief) for defendant in error.
*246 MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Federal question involved is the only one which we can consider on this writ of error. It arises under the act of March 3, 1869, 15 Stat. 335, c. 135, which was the statute in force on April 18, 1874, and read as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk or agent of any national bank to certify any check drawn upon said bank, unless the person or company drawing said check shall have on deposit in said bank, at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check; and any check so certified by duly authorized officers shall be a good and valid obligation against such bank; and any officer, clerk or agent of any national bank violating the provisions of this act shall subject such bank to the liabilities and proceedings on the part of the comptroller as provided for in section fifty of the national banking law, approved June third, eighteen hundred and sixty-four." 13 Stat. 114, c. 106. The provisions of that § 50 were that the comptroller of the currency might forthwith appoint a receiver to wind up the affairs of the banking association. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1869, are now embodied in § 5208 of the Revised Statutes.
In regard to the Federal question involved, namely, the certification of checks by the defendant for Capron & Merriam without having on deposit an equivalent amount of money to meet them, and the contention that the defendant did not become a bonâ fide holder of the bonds in virtue of payments made in pursuance of the agreement with that firm, the Court of Appeals remarked, in its opinion, given by Ruger, C.J., that the statute of the United States affirmed the validity of the contract of certification, and expressly provided the consequences which should follow its violation; that the penalty incurred was impliedly limited to a forfeiture of the bank's charter and the winding up of its affairs; that it was thus *248 clearly implied that no other consequences were intended to follow a violation of the statute; and that it would defeat the very policy of an act intended to promote the security and strength of the national banking system, if its provisions should be so construed as to inflict a loss upon the banks and a consequent impairment of their financial responsibility. The court then cited, to support that view, National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, and National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U.S. 676.
The Court of Appeals further said that it was of opinion that the statute in question had no application to the question involved in this suit, which concerned only the relations between Capron & Merriam and the defendant; that, by the deposit of the bonds, the former secured the promise of the defendant to protect their checks of a certain day for a specified amount; that the certification of the checks was entirely aside from the agreement between Capron & Merriam and the defendant, and was a contract between the defendant and the anticipated holders of the checks; that Capron & Merriam had received the consideration of their pledge, when the defendant agreed with them to honor their checks, and that would have been equally effectual, between the parties, without any certification; that the certification was simply a promise to such persons as might receive the checks that they should be paid on presentation to the defendant, in accordance with its previous agreement with Capron & Merriam; that the legal effect of the agreement was that the defendant should loan a certain amount to Capron & Merriam, and would pay it out on their checks to the persons holding such checks; that it was entirely legal for the defendant to contract to pay Capron & Merriam's checks, and it did not affect the legality of that transaction that the defendant also represented to third parties that it had made such an agreement and would pay such checks; that Capron & Merriam could not dispute their liability for the amount paid out in pursuance of such agreement, nor could any other party, standing in the shoes of Capron & Merriam; that the fact that the defendant, in connection with the agreement to *249 pay such checks, had also promised third parties to pay them, could not invalidate the liability previously incurred, or impair the security which had previously been given to the defendant upon a valid consideration; that the fact of the certification was entirely immaterial in respect to the liability incurred by Capron & Merriam to the defendant; that there was no evidence impairing the title to the bonds acquired by the defendant through the transfer of them to it by Capron & Merriam; that the purpose for which the bonds were transferred by the testator of the plaintiffs to Capron & Merriam contemplated their transfer and sale by the latter to third persons; that the defendant acquired a valid title to them by their transfer to it; that the transaction between Capron & Merriam and the defendant was in the ordinary course of business pursued by the latter; that it received the bonds in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and within all the authorities this gave it a good title to the bonds; that it was authorized to deal with them for the purpose of effecting the object for which they were transferred to it; that its right to hold the bonds continued so long as any part of its debt against Capron & Merriam remained unpaid; that the testator of the plaintiffs could at any time have established his equitable right to a return of the bonds, and could have procured their surrender, by paying the amount for which they were pledged, but he refrained from doing so, and impliedly denied any right in the defendant by demanding the unconditional surrender of the bonds; and that he never became entitled to such surrender, and of course was not authorized to recover possession of them. We regard those views as sound, and as covering this case.
The agreement of December 2, 1873, between Capron & Merriam and the defendant, did not call for any act violating the statute. There was nothing illegal in providing that the securities which the bank might hold to secure the debt to it of Capron & Merriam should be available to make good such debt. The statute does not declare void a contract to secure a debt arising on the certifications which it prohibits.
In addition to that, the statute expressly provides that a *250 check certified by a duly authorized officer of the bank, when the customer has not on deposit an amount of money equal to the amount specified in the check certified, shall nevertheless be a good and valid obligation against the bank; and there is nothing in the statute which, expressly or by implication, prohibits the bank from taking security for the protection of its stockholders against the debt thus created. There is no prohibition against a contract by the bank for security for a debt which the statute contemplates as likely to come into existence, although the unlawful act of the officer of the bank in certifying may aid in creating the debt. In order to adjudge a contract unlawful, as prohibited by a statute, the prohibition must be found in the statute. The subjection of the bank to the penalty prescribed by the statute for its violation cannot operate to destroy the security for the debt created by the forbidden certification.
If the testator of the plaintiffs had pledged the bonds to the defendant, he could not, after receiving the defendant's money, have replevied the bonds; and after possession of the bonds had been given by him to Capron & Merriam, and after they had been subsequently taken by the defendant in good faith, neither he nor his executors can set up the statute to destroy the debt.
This construction of the statute in question is strengthened by the subsequent enactment, on July 12, 1882, of § 13 of the act of that date, c. 288, 22 Stat. 166, making it a criminal offence in an officer, clerk or agent of a national bank to violate the provisions of the act of March 3, 1869. This shows that Congress only intended to impose, as penalties for over-certifying checks, a forfeiture of the franchises of the bank and a punishment of the delinquent officer or clerk, and did not intend to invalidate commercial transactions connected with forbidden certifications. As the defendant was bound to make good the checks to the holders of them, because the act of 1869 declares that the checks shall be good and valid obligations against the defendant, it follows that Capron & Merriam were bound to make good the amounts to the defendant. It necessarily results that the defendant, on paying the checks, *251 was as much entitled to resort to the securities which Capron & Merriam had put into its hands, as it would have been to apply money which they might have deposited to meet the checks.
Moreover, it has been held repeatedly by this court that where the provisions of the national banking act prohibit certain acts by banks or their officers, without imposing any penalty or forfeiture applicable to particular transactions which have been executed, their validity can be questioned only by the United States, and not by private parties. National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621; National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99; National Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U.S. 676.
The bonds in question came into the possession of the defendant before it certified the checks. They were not pledged to it under any agreement or knowledge on its part, or in fact on the part of Capron & Merriam, that subsequent certifications would be made. The certifications were made after the pledge, and created a debt of Capron & Merriam to the defendant, which arose after the pledge. The agreement of December 2, 1873, applied and became operative simultaneously with the certifications, but independently of them, as a legal proposition.
In Logan County Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 77, decided in March, 1891, after the present case was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, this court approved the decision in National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, and said that a disregard by a national bank of the provisions of the act of Congress forbidding it to take a mortgage to secure an indebtedness then existing, as well as future advances, could not be taken advantage of by the debtor, but "only laid the institution open to proceedings by the government for exercising powers not conferred by law."
Judgment affirmed.
