160 Iowa 403 | Iowa | 1913
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant National Cable & Manufacturing Company, of Niles, Mich., and also against M. G. Mitchell, upon an alleged parol contract made in April, 1909, under which he was to act in the capacity of salesman for the Cable Company in Iowa; the alleged contract having been made with Mitchell as the secretary and agent of the defendant, Cable Company. The defendant Mitchell in answer denied that either for himself or for his eodefendant had he entered into a contract with plaintiff for his employment, and denies that plaintiff rendered any services for or in behalf of himself or the Cable Company, or that he expended any money in behalf of either of the defendants. The National Cable & Manufacturing Company for its separate answer admitted that Mitchell was its agent at the time charged, but denied knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the services alleged to have been performed by the defendant, and said if services
I. For a proper understanding of the questions presented it is necessary to go beyond the general averments of the pleadings. It appears, without dispute, in the evidence that, at the time it is alleged the contract was made between plaintiff and defendant, there was in existence a contract between appellant and E. D. and J. J. Walrath, of Clarksville, Iowa, under which the latter became the agents for the sale of the manufactured articles of appellant in Iowa, excepting the two north tiers of counties in the state, and they were to be allowed a commission on all sales made in their territory. The Walraths were to be at whatever expense was necessary to assist local dealers. The claim of the appellant is that whatever contract was entered into was between the Walrath Bros, and the appellee, and that Mitchell assisted only in bringing about an agreement between them. It is further claimed that appellee, prior to entering into the contract, knew of the Walrath agency, and reeognzied that his employment was by them. An issue of fact, therefore, arose as to the parties to the contract.
III. As will be noted by the summary of the claims of the parties, and the evidence stated, plaintiff’s measure of recovery, if at all, was the reasonable value of his services, together with such expenses as might be properly shown.
V. Defendant submitted instructions which were refused by the court, and now claims error in the refusal and in giving instructions. The instructions given fairly and correctly stated the law which should be applied to the ease, and included the substance of every request which defendant had the right to have submitted. Without in detail considering them here, we find no error in the respects thus charged.
Because of the errors noted, the judgment of the lower court is Reversed.