208 Conn. 656 | Conn. | 1988
In this action the plaintiff, Morris Thompson, administrator of the estate of Frieda Sousa, owner of a mobile home, sought monetary damages against the defendant, Merlino Enterprises, Inc., which owns the lot on which the home was located before the defendant removed it in January, 1985. The administrator alleged in his complaint that the defendant had interfered with his right to sell the decedent’s mobile home in violation of General Statutes § 21-79.
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding: (1) that the administrator of an estate is a “resident” as defined in General Statutes §§ 21-64 (5)*
I
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in determining that the administrator of an estate can qualify as a “resident” under §§ 21-64 (5) and 21-79. The referee in his report determined that “[a]fter the death of the [plaintiffs decedent], the [administrator] became the owner of the mobile home and paid rent to the Defendant, which was accepted.” The court accepted this determination.
We conclude that the administrator of an estate may qualify as a “resident” of a mobile home park under these statutes. Section 21-79
In Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., supra, 628-29, the plaintiffs, owners of a mobile home, had moved out of their home before they attempted to sell it and this court concluded that they were entitled to compensatory damages under § 21-79 because the mobile home park owner had refused to permit an on-site sale of their home at a time when they no longer resided in it. The owner of a mobile home, such as the administrator of an estate, need not actually reside in the park to qualify as a resident under § 21-79. There is no logical basis under this statute for depriving the owner of a mobile home of the greater sales price that is usually obtained when it is sold on-site rather than off-site
II
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in determining that § 21-79 is constitutional, as applied
This case was argued on the same day as Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., supra. The mobile home park owner in each case made virtually the same arguments in contending that § 21-79 violates the takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant in this case did not contend that he could prevail even if this court should conclude that § 21-79 was constitutional as applied to the facts in Eamiello.
The primary contention of the defendant is that § 21-79 violates the takings clause in two ways. First, the entering into a lease by a park owner virtually grants to the tenant a leasehold in perpetuity so long as he pays rent and obeys reasonable regulations established by the park owner. Second, the tenant may resell his home on-site to a new tenant who gains the same perpetual leasehold rights, although the park owner enjoys limited authority under subsection (d) of the statute to reject a prospective buyer who is financially unqualified or intends to use the home for an improper purpose. In Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., supra, 638-50, we rejected these same contentions and concluded that § 21-79 did not violate the takings clause. We need not repeat the analysis put forward in Eamiello. Id.
We conclude that for the purposes of the takings clause it makes no difference that the rights provided by § 21-79 benefit the estate of a decedent rather than a living person. The plaintiff administrator in this case enjoys the same rights under the statute as his dece
There is no error.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 21-79. owner prohibited from restricting resident’s RIGHT TO sell, (a) No owner or operator of a mobile manufactured home park shall require a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home which is safe, sanitary and in conformance with aesthetic standards to remove the home from the development at the time such mobile manufactured home is sold or a mortgage on such a home is fore
“(b) A mobile manufactured home shall be presumed to be safe and sanitary if it is established that the mobile manufactured home was constructed in accordance with any nationally recognized building or construction code or standard. Failure to meet any such standard or the provisions of any such code shall not automatically raise a presumption that the mobile manufactured home is unsafe or unsanitary. Such failure shall not be used as a reason for withholding approval of an on-site sale unless such failure renders the mobile manufactured home unsafe or unsanitary.
“(c) The owner of a mobile manufactured home park shall bear the burden of showing that a mobile manufactured home is unsafe, unsanitary, or fails to meet the aesthetic standards of the development. No aesthetic standard concerning those physical characteristics such as size, original color or original building materials, which cannot be changed without undue financial hardship to the resident, shall be applied against a mobile home.
“(d) Any purchaser of a mobile manufactured home sold by a resident may become a resident of the mobile manufactured home park provided he meets the entry requirements for said park and such requirements are equally applied by the owner to all purchasers and prospective residents and the owner approves such entry. Such approval may not be withheld except for good cause. For the purposes of this section good cause means a reasonable cause for the owner to believe (1) that such purchaser intends to utilize the purchased mobile manufactured home for an illegal or immoral purpose or for any purpose that would disturb the quiet enjoyment of the other residents of the park or (2) that the purchaser is or will be financially unable to pay the rent for the space or lot upon which the purchased mobile manufactured home is located. If the owner denies approval to a purchaser, he shall, in writing, state any reason for such disapproval. Such statement shall be delivered to the resident and the purchaser or prospective resident within ten days after the owner receives the completed application of the purchaser or prospective resident. Failure to deliver such notification within ten days shall be deemed to be approval.
“(e) Any resident wishing to sell his or her home shall request a written statement of the owner’s intentions regarding the condition of the home. Within twenty days after receipt of such a request, the owner shall approve the home’s condition for resale or deliver a written statement to the resident specifying the reasons why the home is not safe, sanitary, or in conformance with aesthetic standards. Failure of the owner to respond within twenty days shall be deemed to be an approval of the home’s condition for resale. If the resident disputes the owner’s response, he may seek a declara
General Statutes § 21-64 (5) provides: “definitions. As used in this chapter . . .
“(5) ‘Resident’ means a person who owns, or rents and occupies, a mobile manufactured home in a mobile manufactured home park.”
See footnote 1, supra.
In Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Horne Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 646-50, 546 A.2d 805 (1988), this court discusses a number of factors that result in the value of a mobile home being considerably less if it is sold off-site rather than on-site in a mobile home park. The primary reason is the scarcity of mobile home sites, resulting largely from zoning ordinances that bar the establishment of new mobile home developments. Id., 649.