17 Ala. 362 | Ala. | 1850
The first question presented for our consideration is, whether the declarations of one of the plaintiffs, in reference to the contract between them and Weir, should have been admitted as evidence? They were made after the contract had been completed, but whilst the plaintiffs were in possession of the land, and tended to show that the title and control of the cotton that should be raised was exclusively theirs; that Weir was not to hold or have any control over it, but was to receive one half the proceeds when it was sold. Where the declarations of a party are offered as evidence in his favor, in order to entitle them to be received, they must form a part of the res gestee — that is, they must form a part of the act done or be so connected with it as to be inseparable from it, and being thus connected with the transaction itself, they become evidence explanatory of the act. But if the declarations are merely a narrative of a past occurrence, they cannot be received as evidence. — Greenl. Ev. §§ 109-10; Cox v. Easly et al. 11 Ala. 862; McBride & Wife v. Thompson, 8 ib. 650. It is true that the declarations of a party against his interest are evidence against him, and declarations or admissions made by one in possession of property descriptive or explanatory of such possession are usually admitted, but whilst it is permissible to prove the statements of one in possession as explanatory thereof, his declarations in regard to the contract by which he acquired possession cannot be received as evidence. — McBride & Wife v. Thompson, supra. Such declarations would not be merely explanatory of the possession, as that the party in possession was the agent or tenant of another, or that he only had a life
The charge of the court complained of is predicated upon the following facts: In 1845 the plaintiffs entered into a contract with Weir by which it was agreed that they with two minor sons of Weir should cultivate his farm during that year in corn and cotton. The corn was tobe equally divided between Weir and the plaintiffs, but the cotton was to be sold by them, and after paying the expenses the nett -proceeds were to be equally di- . vided between the plaintiffs ,and Weir. The corn had been gathered and divided, the cotton had been ginned and hauled to the river and was marked in the plaintiffs’ names. The court charged the jury that if they believed that Weir was to receive one half of the proceeds of the cotton, and not one half of the cotton, that then he had not such an interest as was subject to levy and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. We think it depends on the legal effect of . the contract whether Weir had such an interest in the cotton as was the, subject of levy and sale at law. If the contract could be construed as creating a tenancy between Weir and the plaintiffs, it -would then be very clear that he had no title to the product raised upon the land, for it is of the very nature of a lease that the tenant shall have the possession of the land and the title to the profits or products grown upon it. What the nature of this contract is and what rights the parties took under it to the product raised on the land is best solved by a reference to the authorities. In the case of Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill, 234, the faets were that the owners of a farm agreed with two persons by contract under seal, that the latter should occupy and work it for a year, the occupiers agreeing to yield and pay the owners one half of the grain grown upon it; the court held that until there was a division of the product the parties were tenants in common of it. In Bradish v. Schenck, 8 Johns. 118, Curtiss took the land of the plaintiff to work it one year on shares and planted it in corn. The hogs of the defendant broke into the enclosure and
Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.