21 Or. 171 | Or. | 1891
The deed dated January 27,1891, shows upon its face that so far as money was advanced upon the faith of it, or so far as it became security for any debt of the cable railway company, the same is a mortgage, and all of the incidents of redemption and the right of foreclosure attached to it. (3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1195.) And the deed of April 5,1890, under the allegations in the complaint which stand admitted by the demurrer, is of the same chai’acter. Though its phraseology is somewhat different, its real character must be determined by its object. If its object were to secure a debt whether theretofore or to be thereafter contracted either by the cable company on the faith of- it or by Marshall as trustee for its use and benefit as between the parties to such transaction, and all persons dealing in relation to the property with notice of the facts, such conveyance is a mortgage. But it is said by the appellant that these deeds are deeds of trust with power of sale super-added, and that in such case the power may be exercised without the intervention of a court of equity. Much of the learning on this subject is collected by Judge Dillon in a very exhaustive article (2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 641); hut the learned author treats the subject on the theory that upon the execution of the mortgage or deed of trust the legal title becomes vested in the mortgagee. Reasoning from this premise, his conclusions are no doubt correct, and are sustained by an overwhelming array of authorities. But it was long ago settled in this state that a mortgage does not convey title, but only creates a lien. (Anderson v. Baxter, 4 Or. 105; Sellwood v Gray, 11 Or. 534.) In all the states that follow this line of decisions, so far as I have been able to discover, a deed of trust designed as security for money has no other or greater effect than a mortgage. Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308; 19 Am. Rep. 638, is a case in point. There, the conveyance was absolute with power of sale in case of default; but the court held the equity of redemption existed and could not be cut off by an attempted exercise of the power conferred by the deed. And it was observed by the
I am aware that the cases cited on the subject of foreclosure and sale were largely influenced and probably controlled by statutory provision, but substantially the same statutory provision prevails here. Section 414, Hill’s Code, provides: “A lien upon real or personal property other than that of a judgment or decree, whether created by mortgage or otherwise, shall be foreclosed, and the property adjudged to be sold to satisfy the debt secured thereby, by suit.” This language is too plain and direct to be misunderstood. Its import cannot admit of discussion. The lien shall be foreclosed by suit. This cuts off every other method of foreclosure. Upon the argument the learned counsel for the appellant referred to this section of the code and claimed this language was used simply for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction over the subject of foreclosure. But this construction seems unsatisfactory for the reason that the use of such language was wholly unnecessary for that purpose. The creation of a court of equity, and vesting in it general equity jurisdiction would be all that was necessary. It could then take cognizance of every subject of equity jurisdiction that might be brought before it. To give full effect to the language of the code under consideration, it must be given a wider import, and that is, to render imperative a foreclosure by suit of the liens specified and provided for in the section.
What effect later legislation had upon the foreclosure of chattel mortgages, it is not now necessary to consider further than to say that that act may be regarded as a legislative interpretation of this section. After the enactment of the code by a subsequent act, the legislature directed in effect, if the mode of foreclosing a chattel mortgage were provided in the mortgage, it should be foreclosed as therein provided and not otherwise. This last enactment was wholly unnec? essary if the appellant’s contention were sound, for the reason that the parties could have provided for a sale of the
Let the decree appealed from be affirmed.