Olsоn was Thompson’s employer, and, for an accident to Thompson in the course of this employment, Olson paid a compensation award. Sincе Hoitsma furnished some of the materials involved in the accident, Thompson, аfter obtaining the above award, sued Hoitsma, who in turn sued Olson.
Defendant Hoitsma, in addition to other discovery obtained by consent during oral argument, has apрlied under Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A., against his third party defendant Olson, for the “inspectiоn and copying” of alleged statements by Olson’s officers and employees, the McCleans, to the effect that it was not Hoitsma, but Olson, that was responsiblе for the accident to Thompson.
The McCleans’ statement, which Hoitsma dеsires, is not alleged to be an affirmative statement of fact as to how the accident occurred, but a mere admission after the accident by thе McCleans as to Olson’s responsibility for such accident. In short, such statement wоuld not be evidence in chief at the trial itself, but usable only to impeach thе credibility of the McCleans, in case they testified at the trial that it was Hoitsma, not Olson, who was responsible for the accident. True it is that the discovery statutеs are to be read together, so that any discovery of tangible matters рermissible on deposition under F.R.C.P. 26 may for “good cause” be generally obtаinable under F.R.C.P. 34. In short, to both rules the clause in F.R.C.P. 26 (b) applies that “It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appeаrs reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Thus the inadmissibility of the statement of the McCleans as evidence in сhief for Hoitsma, does not render this statement by the McCleans unobtainable at all for inspection under F.R.C.P. 34. But, since Hoitsma already knows of the above alleged admission by the Mc-Cleans, it alone will not “lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” additionally.
Further, deposition discovery is obtainable even without the showing of good cause. Inspection discovery under F.R.C.P. 34 is obtainаble only upon the “showing good cause therefor”. In other words, the depоsition method is the normal one, always available. The inspection method is the less usual one, only available on cause shown. The latter is primarily pointed to furnishing documentary and other tangible matters evidential per se. Whеn a party has another discovery method readily available, he ordinаrily, and here, lacks “good cause” for using another method, only available upon “good cause” and ordinarily only usable to obtain matters evidential per se, which the statement in question is not. U. S. v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., D.C.N.J.1955,
Not only so, but we must further bear in mind the fact that statements obtained for the purpose of litigation, as werе the McCleans’ statements here— for the purpose of the Workmen’s Comрensation litigation — are normally inadmissible as work product, Hickman v. Taylor, 1947,
Thus it would seem that while Hoits-ma should not be denied his discovery, presently requested, this discovery should be obtained by dеposition, not on application for inspection and copying оf documents. Of course, if upon such deposition the McCleans deny the purport of their alleged statements as above, then “good cause” might well exist for the inspection and copying of the statements of the McCleans. Then, too, the work product privilege would have ceased to be effective, under the very rule laid down in Hickman. Compare Hauger v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Railroad Co., 7 Cir., 1954,
The motion for discovery under F.R. C.P. 34 will be denied.