Thompson v. Dalton

woman, single THOMPSON, a Helen Plaintiff-Respondent, Defendant-Appellant. DALTON,

Russell

No. 11333.

Supreme of Idaho. Court

March 1974. Wheeler, Hull, Hull & Wheel-

Dennis E. Wallace, defendant-appellant. er, Frazier, home could be taken from her Frazier, A. & mobile with- David McCabe d’Alene, Appellant argues out a court order. plaintiff-respondent. Coeur for order, a Rust not mention but SHEPARD, Chief Justice. compe- this finding based on substantial portion aof appeal This is an from that tent, though conflicting, evidence and will an awarding punitive in judgment Peck, not be Ivie v. disturbed. for action conversion. 625, 626, 1110 (1972). Mrs. summary, Thompson visibly upset The most dis- was and by appellant, by is based disputed not the turbed Dalton’s threat to take findings and of the dis- sion on conclusions of the mobile home. 1965, 17, trict court. On Andrew June 20, 1969, appellant or about On June wife, Burlingham, Bernadine husband and spoke Thompson Dalton with Mrs. at the action, prom- parties to executed going mobile home stated that he was issory in First National note favor of the it, possession pay- to take because se- Wallace, The note was Idaho. Bank mortgage on ments the note and chattel on a by mortgage cured a chattel mobile delinquent. Thompson informed Mrs. were note Burlinghams The executed home. possession Dalton that she claimed purchase of mortgage to finance the mobile home virtue of the lease from Dalton, Russell who mobile home from the Burlinghams. business Kel- a trailer sales conducted appellant There was contact between promis- endorsed the logg, Dalton Idaho. respondent Thompson between Dalton and sory guarantor. note as 20, 1969, 3, 1969, July although June 1969, 5, Burlinghams exe- March On alleges telephone Dalton that he tried lease of the trailer cuted written respondent and reach her. was unable to plaintiff-respondent year term 3, paid owing July Dalton the balance On times, Thompson. pertinent all Helen At Burlinghams’ promissory on the note to the possession of the mobile she in lawful was so, doing bank. After he removed Wallace from terms of lease home under the mobile home from resided Thompson Burlinghams. Mrs. Meanwhile, respondent. July on home, on which was located the mobile Thompson daughter to had taken her Mrs. kept var- real owned her. She Spokane, hospitalization Washington, personal property in the mo- ious items evening of and remained there until food, furniture, dishes, including bile home July 3, found when she returned home and belong- clothing, cash and other the mobile had been removed home ings. per- property, together her her with Burlinghams delinquent became The belongings. to eat sonal She had no promissory payments note

their on the sleep, night slept in her car between the bank. At some time June following night. and the Mrs. Dalton and appellant and June personal belongings again her did not see Rust of Kootenai Deputy Charles Sheriff appellant Dalton July until 1969 when Idaho, spoke respon- County, met and Mrs. them to the home of delivered Depu- home. Thompson at the mobile dent d’Alene, Thompson’s daughter Coeur delinquent tax- ty Rust collect period between During of time Idaho. appellant home, which es the mobile on Thompson was July 3, July then paid Dalton was at that time. clothing. money, food and without her possession and remove take prepared to and her The of the mobile home removal him home, Deputy Rust advised mobile stress possessions great her mental caused as Mrs. attorney he see an should and emotional disturbance. in the mobile living then Thompson was July that on The court concluded also said district that Rust found The court home. balance upon payment of the ow- think that he did not to Dalton that mg note, promissory governed Dal- 45-11102 and 45-11113 which subrogated mortgagee ton became to the the duties of the chattel mortgagee bank as summary proceeding. chattel mobile foreclosure mortgage home.1 Because the chattel be- district court further found that the effective bank was executed before pos- lawfully cause Mrs. in of the Uniform date Commercial Code home, session she mortgaged of the mobile (December 1967), Idaho the law in ef- to right was entitled to Dalton’s contest governed fect the time of execution provisions foreclose under the of I.C. § 28-10-101, procedure. foreclosure I.C. §§ 45-1115,4 and when appellant that Dalton provided that 28-10-102. I.C. 45-1109 § possession took the and of mobile home mortgage by chattel be could foreclosed Thompson’s Mrs. personal belongings, he by two methods. notice and sale One was property rights. violated her summary procedure under a and the other noted, Except where the narrative above court, pursuant by an in action district by appellant is conceded to be correct Dal- to I.C. were the exclusive 6-101. These § ton, including complete his com- failure to mort- methods for foreclosure a chattel ply proper procedures with the fore- gage applicable under the law to closing However, mortgage. the chattel Freeman, Adair 451 P.2d 92 Idaho district court made the further Bank, ; (1969) Hailey Peterson v. Nat. findings appellant assigns error. (1931); 6 P.2d 145 Garrett intentionally engaged wrongful Soucie, P. conduct Thompson, toward Mrs. either (1928). purpose inflicting with the emotional The district court found and concluded distress, or under such circumstances taking the time of home the mobile any person reasonable should have known property respondent from the real that such would result. As a direct and Thompson, comply Dalton failed acts, wrongful natural result of Dalton’s respect requirements with the I.C. respondent shock, § suffered emotional men- party excepted 1. As neither has to this conclu- immediately pro- said sheriff or constable shall sion, accept pur- we will it as for the provided by correct ceed hereunder as the statute for poses opinion. of this by mortgages foreclosure of chattel and notice by sheriff sale the or constable.” “Summary 2. I.C. 45-1110. foreclosure —fore- l>y pro- closure notice and sale—affidavit.—In 3. I.C. 45-1111. “Service of Affidavit. —The ceeding by sale, the to foreclose notice and personally upon must be the affidavit served mortgagee, agent attorney, his an or must make upon person having posses- mortgagor and the mortgage, stating affidavit the the date of the property, mortgaged sion the the same parties thereto, description names of the a full provided by manner is law the service as property mortgaged, of the and the amount due the a summons. At the time of the service of thereon. affidavit shall au- Such be sufficient affidavit, person making or officer thority possession to demand and receive upon persons, also serve the same service must property, peace- if the ably, the same can taken be by setting signed full a notice himself forth a taken, can be but if it not so then such description property, amount placed affidavit must be in the hands of by mortgagee, be due claimed to county sheriff of the or constable in place provided, if time of sale: precinct located, together where the is mortgagor the county can be found within signed mortgagee, with a his notice mortgage being fore- wherein the agent attorney, requiring or such officer closed, general in the notice of sale directed mortgaged posses- take the into his upon next is sufficient the mort- section service sion sell same. gagor of both said affidavit and notice.” “Provided, however, mortgagee, his agent, attorney, may place af- elect to said 4. I.C. 45-1115. “Contest § foreclosure.— of foreclose, right mortgagee fidavit and notice in the hands sher- well as instance, due, may iff constable first without claimed con- as amount to be be attempting peaceable by any person first to obtain in- the district court tested by personal demand; and, upon doing, purpose sion said elec- an in so for which terested injunction being may aforesaid, necessary.” tion set forth in the if affidavit issue Doney, trauma, humiliation. 82 Idaho degradation and tal gross outrageous Contrary appellant’s asser Dalton’s conduct was tions, overwhelming signifi disregard wilful conscious and depriving Thompson’s rights. cance attached to the word “malice” Mrs. shelter, findings Dal- its dis omission Mrs. safety. trict the award of threatened her When court does not invalidate ton’s actions punitive damages and Mrs. home the instant case. See Dalton removed the mobile possessions, he was jury the instruction to the Thompson’s engaged practice. approved this Court in Boise in a business Dodge, Inc. v. 906- and conclu- findings its of fact Based on Doug also (1969). See law, district awarded sions of Company, Refining las v. Oil Humble & damages for nominal $1.00 590, 310, (Or. 1968). 251 Or. 445 P.2d 592 $1,000 rights, of her invasion We consider that Dalton’s can conduct trauma and emotional for mental properly be gross characterized as and out- shock, damages. On $5,000 punitive rageous and a disre- conscious and wilful only the award appeal, contests Dalton gard Thompson’s rights. of Mrs. ei- He contends that punitive damages. proper case for is not a ther this Appellant contends the district that damages or alternative- punitive refusing court erred in to its find amend punitive damages award ly, that ings of fact to include certain circum $5,000 was excessive. stances on allegedly bearing which have a district court’s award variety employed a Court has This punitive damages. suggests He that the type characterizing of formulas negate factors the conclusion imposition of conduct which warrants gross, outrageous that his or conduct was frequent damages. most punitive The one oppressive. First, during their conversa early originated ly invoked suggest tion on had June 708, 728-729, Libert, 20 Idaho v. Unfried Thompson attempt ed that to Mrs. obtain this Court (1911) where 119 P. purchase If loan and the trailer herself. said: Thompson part relying Mrs. on this were of exem- rule “As understand the we conversation, possible oppor their as a they cannot damages, plary punitive or home, tunity to her Dalton’s ac save then shows unless the evidence be recovered removing tions it further warn without wrongdoer clearly that the action irresponsibility, ing suggest seem would outra- wanton, gross is malicious Thompson’s rather than concern for Mrs. as to are such the facts geous, or where appellant points well-being. Secondly, out * * *. imply malice and oppression only Thompson’s that he oral as had Mrs. jH ij< ‡ ^ % # regarding surances the existence of recognized general rule think the “We lease, in and that he had never seen her is, that exem- weight authority by the appel side the that trailer. consider We may al- be plary plenary damages Thompson’s ample lant had of Mrs. notice complained of injury lowed where occupation posséssion of the trailer. wrongdoer which acts of attended requirement that There is no malice, gross negli- fraud or wilful show year personal property be lease of (Emphasis added) gence.” against recorded and otherwise invalid parties suggest. appellant third as seems spoken terms cases have More recent she [plain informed Dalton disregard and wilful “conscious Deputy Rust told Puregro, 94 Idaho had lease. rights.” Jolley tiff’s] in the mobile living respondent was testimony Dalton’s regard for Furthermore home. without “[arbitrary action] any be- anybody had he not know and interests.” White [plaintiff’s] longings persuaded in the trailer is that Dalton’s actions completely incon- are not good testimony sistent with his in innocence or that on were undertaken June 1970, he had asked Mrs. re- faith. belongings her move from thé trailer. upon by appellant are The cases relied Appellant implicitly suggests be- easily distinguished from the instant interests, cause he protecting his own Libert, supra, and In Gun- both Unfried his conduct cannot be ma- characterized as P. 412 Largilliere, nell v. oppressive. points licious or He to testi- mortgages, (1928), which involved chattel mony lapsed that the insurance had legal process to mortgagee resorted to home, paid mobile delinquent that he mortgage. In obtain foreclosure of the taxes on the home that it mobile so would disap- Unfried, damages were lien, satisfy not be levied on to a tax proved showing because there was possession, that when he took the mobile gross negli- “willful malice or fraud or disrepair. was in home a state note part gence,” on the of the defendant. taxes, that at the paid time Dalton his attempted Gunnell the defendant had apparent interest in the trailer or upon foreclose before the debt financial transactions between the Bur- due, grounded foreclosure was became linghams the bank as guarantor again the record failed to show “willful promissory on the ti- note. He had neither fraud, gross negligence.” malice or tle, mortgage right lien nor Idaho at P. at 415. Graves sion of the trailer. 451, Cupic, (1954) 75 Idaho 1020 anwas action for breach contract where of Assuming that Dalton became oppression, there of “no evidence was. subrogated to the the bank of under malice”, fraud, any nor evidence the chattel mortgage, ti acquire he did not 459, at P. gross negligence. 75 Idaho 272 right possession. tle or the to immediate Zollinger Big 2d at 1025. Lost River Idaho, In a chattel mortgage creates a lien Dist., Irrigation 83 Idaho 364 176 P.2d and does not mortgagor divest the of title. trespass action land (1961) was an for Diego Forbush v. San Fruit & Produce “wilful where the evidence did not show Co., 46 Idaho P. (1928). 266 659 gross negligence.” 83 malice or fraud or The lawful means for chattel mort at Idaho 364 P.2d at 179. gagee to possession take mortgaged of the is by complying case, chattel the with statutes the of the instant Under facts how- Scheele, governing ever, punitive 63 damages foreclosure. Arens v. an award justified. Idaho also (1941). 119 P.2d 261 See Freeman,

Adair v. supra. question We turn now to the» mortgage Burling the from whether the district award court’s $5,000 part punitive permissible hams forms of the record damages bank appeal. mortga on this We note that the under Idaho law. In 1960 case of insurance, gor taxes, pay Doney, was to all 82 secure White v. P.2d Idaho 351 property properly, (1960), substantially maintain the and refrain 380 under different facts, encumbering disposing pu from of it. In this an Court reduced award of default, provided wrongful reposses for for mortgage damages nitive house, provided “by foreclosure method sion of a trailer under an install contract, $1,400 light the laws of the State of Idaho.” In ment sales from to $900. However, explicit mortgage, of the Dal terms of the case does neces not White ownership of ton’s a trailer sales business of the sarily mandate a reduction award of punitive (which suggest damages would seem to some famili instant Dep arity transactions), Stolworthy, secured the recent case Cox v. uty an regarding consulting Rust’s cautions Idaho this Court order, attorney comprehensive obtaining we undertook a review damages, disputes established serious law nevertheless between determining parties. dispute guidelines to assist two centers certain Often the We on an proper- amounts of such awards. interest in real or proper “at three” op- least or an recognized ty that there were interference with business have cases which patterns factual eration. Here the action an Idaho concerned punitive dam- imposition trespass plaintiffs’ act of to the real warranted pat- first two ages. endangered but no lives were characterized follows, the defend- was no indication terns as practice acting made in this at 690: ant fashion. involving “The cases first concerns those past “In such situations Court operated deceptive for business schemes large favorably puni- has not looked profit victimizing and often numerous apparent damage tive awards for the aside public members dispute the nature reason that plaintiff. Clearly in such cases penalty to the warrant a severe exemplary damages aim should award wrongdoer proportion award out of —an repetitive making the cost of activity complained both to the Thus, conduct uneconomical. antisocial incurred.” damages Inc., Dodge, example, Boise “ordinarily,” in a P.2d 551 We recommended [92 type, punitive vic- case of the third cross-complainant was (1969)], against should be generous tim of a A measured 1) plain- fraudulent scheme. tiff’s exemplary damages necessary served reasonable and attorney fees, 2) expenses whole profit from the other not ordinar- remove factor related See, Comment, ily recoverable, expert ‘Automobile such as scheme. witness fees, Damages,’ 3) Dealership reasonable Punitive reimbursement Fraud: inconvenience, B. time Barth and effort required L.R. Cf. Co., Cal.App.2d bring Having F. the action. Goodrich Tire determined 228, Cal.Rptr. dispute that in the case Cox fell into the third category, we there reduced an category “The is illustrated second punitive $5,000 award of from damages to decision, Village of Peck v. Denison $2,000. (1969)]. 450 P.2d 310 [92 Appellant en- repeated urges actions There defendants’ the facts of the in- stant case dangered physical it in well-being category the'third de- Appellant citizens of lineated health the several hundred Cox. of stresses physical harm actions endanger actual his did not town. Where health safety actually large inflicted on people, is threatened or numbers of nor did they to person rises persons victimizing the situation involve a business scheme public. numerous a serious level of affairs. members There- fore, physical plaintiff’s punitive if case where submits that damages endangered, upheld, is aré is substantial well-being fees, justifica- punitive attorney award finds entitled to related ex- penses the malicious con- and a modest sum her tion in the nature of to reimburse quality bringing of the time and inconvenience of duct itself as well as added) ap- (Emphasis persuaded by the action. are injury sustained.” pellant’s contention. say, then went on to This Court 691, 496 P.2d at 690: Cox, As implicitly recognized we complexities human occa- “The at bar fits neither of these interaction case However, sionally give to category rise factual situations categories. third applicable. readily These which subsumed does seem cannot be under cases categories. one of the three Cox typically cases nonviolent Further- involve

79 J Nevertheless, more, $5,000 punitive in the recent dam- explicitly we stated as the Co., Puregro supra, ages be on other Jolley award can sustained finding that grounds, Idaho at 496 P.2d at 948: the district court’s wrongful conduct of the defendant was “By specific attention to our Cox] [in pursuit of a “committed while he inwas Dodge Village in Boise facts practice,” harmless error. business is cases, possi- preclude do not Peck we bility may respondent be sit- judgment other similar in favor of entirety. dire aggravating in which is affirmed in its uations departure respondent. circumstances necessitate the Costs to general exemplary rule dam- McFADDEN, JJ., con- McQUADE However, Stolworthy. ages in Cox v. cur. exemplary awarding of additional provided in damages, in excess of those BAKES, specially) (concurring : Justice rule, to general should be limited I don’t believe that the trial court inwas ** the most circumstances extreme error when it concluded that wrongful case, however, re- The instant does not conduct of the defendant “committed departure quire a from the Cox classifica- pursuit while he prac- was in of a business tions. we the case of In Cox chose Vil- phrase tice” as that Jolley was used in Denison, lage supra, Peck illustrate Puregro, 94 Idaho type in which substantial situation question case, (1972). The is in this moot punitive damages properly be award- could however, because in either event the same the defend- ed. In that case the actions of result is reached. supply ants threatened the a town water DONALDSON, (concurring and not, Justice people. how-

of two hundred Cox dissenting). ever, proposition stand for the that the se- portion opinion of the defendant’s conduct concur in that riousness I solely people judged affirming judgment respon- be the number of favor safety However, endangered. health and dent. that the whose because I believe unduly inter- category, would be an constricted case falls as es- Such within third earlier, pretation holding. Stolworthy, of our As noted tablished in 94 Idaho Cox v. spoke threatened rather than the we in Cox of actual or P.2d 682 second, well-being per- respectfully physical harm the of “a I dissent from that portion persons.” opinion affirming son the award $5,000.- An damages. 939. punitive damages appears me be This the Cox action was tried after both the facts this excessive under Jolley opinions were handed down and $2,000.00. it should be reduced court on the classifica- the district relied system arriving Stolworthy, tion in In this supra, the Cox case Cox v. Court $5,000punitive damages. categories provide created three its award The of cases to specifically by guidance determining de- district found that what amount of punitive damages proper given are in a priving her home and shelter, ap- categories, Into the first leaving her without a two proper, pellant safety. fall threatened her Un- substantial awards are deceptive case, involving those cases either this are not dis- busi- der facts of we operated profit, practices in- often posed disagree. agree ness conduct, expense public, or malicious at the unconscionable business stance of case, physical endangering conduct well- present in as that the instant both, pre- being the need to as a of others. properly be characterized cannot in the of the conduct fu- Puregro, vent recurrence practice.” Jolley “business See v. category, and The third supra. ture is obvious. Dodge, supra, Boise v. Inc. appears Village the one into which this case to me 453 P.2d 551 (1969); of Peck fall, Denison, involves those described v. cases P.2d 310 supra, Where, here, Stolworthy, as follows: dispute Cox as cen- ters in- around of two non-vio- typically “These cases involve dividuals, lim- should be disputes lent nevertheless serious be- expenses ited to which are not com- those dispute parties. tween two Often pensated by compensa- jury’s centers an interest in real or Stolworthy, tory damages. supra. Cox v. with a property or an interference busi- Therefore, I would reduce the amount of the action con- operation. ness Here punitive damages this awarded in case to plain- trespass act of- to the cerned an $2,000.00. tiffs’ real but no lives were en- dangered and there was no indication practice acting

defendant made fashion.” 94 Idaho

at 690. The case before the involves a Court dispute parties between over two FRANDEN, Appellant, E. Jack property. ap- sion of actions of pellant endanger respon- did not the life of Marjorie JONASSON, as and Tax Treasurer Nothing dent. in the record indicates that Idaho, County, Collector of Ada State of appellant acting profit a crass Virgil King, T. of Ada as Assessor appear any motive does it that there is nor Idaho, Respondents. County, State repeat danger appellant will his con- No. 11148. Thus, justi- there is duct the future. Supreme Court of Idaho. awarding damages fication excess respon- required compensate the amount Dec. 1973. hardship

dent for the inconvenience and expense

caused Thus,

bringing the action. Stolworthy, supra,

language from Cox v.

applicable: nothing

“There is in the record to re- any

flect intent the defendant future activities, as in Vil-

to continue the

lage Denison, of Peck nor crass

profit making present in scheme as Boise necessity

Dodge, Inc. v. Clark. Thus the punishment heavy

for the deterrent here.”

aspect those two cases is absent P.2d at 687.

94 Idaho at punitive damages are not fa-

Because be awarded the law should

vored Club, caution, Pistol Lewiston Imthurn,

Inc. puni- awarding of substantial excep- be limited to

tive should the need those where

tional cases such as protect public from fraudulent present. acts is endangering life

schemes or Dodge, Inc. v. Boise

See

Case Details

Case Name: Thompson v. Dalton

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Mar 22, 1974

Citation: 520 P.2d 240

Docket Number: 11333

Court Abbreviation: Idaho