Thompson v. Armstrong, 7 Ala. 256

Thompson v. Armstrong

7 Ala. 256 | Ala. | 1845

ORMOND, J.

— This note being payable in Bank is by the statute made a commercial instrument and to be governed by the rules of the law merchant. The general rule is that mercantile paper in the hands of the holder, imports a consideration passing between the original parties. When, however, this presumption is repelled, and it is shown that the instrument is made without consideration, or has been fraudulently or improperly put into circulation, the holder will be required to prove that he gave value for the note, or bill, and that he acquired it before it was due, or he cannot recover. [Chitty on Bills, 79; Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P. 650; Marston v. Forward, 5 Ala. Rep. 347; Wallace v. The Branch Bank, 1 Ala. Rep. 565.]

In this case, it appears, that the note was made without any consideration, for the purpose of being negotiated in Bank. This was indeed indicated by its form and peculiar structure, being payable to the cashier of the Bank, through whom no-title w^s attempted, to be derived. In addition, one of the makers of the note, swore, that he never signed it, and another, that he had no recollection of ever having seen it before. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff should have been required to prove that he gave value for the note, and that he acquired it before it was due. The case of Heath v. Sansom & Evans, 2 Barn. & Al. 291, was not so strong a case as the present, and yet the Court required the indorsee to prove that he gave value for the indorsement.

The parties went to trial upon the plea of non esi factum, and the general issue. The Court charged the jury, that if they found that the defendant signed the note, they must find for the plaintiff. As the plaintiff had not proved that he gave a consideration for the note, or that he acquired it before it *259was dishonored, by becoming due, he was not entitled to recover, even if the signature of the defendant was genuine. The charge of the Court, therefore, putting the ease entirely upon the genuineness of the signature, was calculated to mislead the jury.

When this cause was here before, it went off mainly upon the admissibility of one of the co-maJcers as a witness,- and the precise question here considered was not, though it might have been, passed on by the Court. It is manifest that the case has never been put before the jury on its true merits, the judgment must therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded.