Thompson v. . Newlin

41 N.C. 380 | N.C. | 1849

Lead Opinion

Sarah Freeman, by marriage articles with her intended husband, Richard Freeman, became entitled to her property to her separate use, with the power of disposing of it by a will during her coverture. She had some real estate, about thirty slaves, and money or securities for money to the amount of some $7,000 or $8,000; and by her will, dated May, 1835, she devised a piece of land to her husband during his life; and the remainder therein, and all her other land, her negroes, money, debts, and every other part of her estate she gave to the defendant John Newlin, and appointed him her executor. She died in 1839, and the executor propounded the will, which was contested by her husband, and heirs, and next of kin; but the will was finally established early in 1843. In August following this bill was filed by her next of kin against Newlin and Freeman, and charges, that, although the devises and bequests to Newlin are absolute in their terms and without any trust expressed in the will, yet they were all upon the secret and unlawful trusts following: That the negroes should be held here, not for the benefit of Newlin, the apparent donee, but for the benefit of the negroes themselves, and in a state of quasi freedom, and that the devises and bequests of the other parts of the estate were in secret trust for the use and benefit of the negroes. The bill prays a discovery of those trusts, and that they may be declared unlawful and void, and also that it may be declared that a trust resulted to the plaintiffs, and for an account and distribution of the slaves and other personal estate.

The answer of Newlin admits that the bequest of the slaves to him was not to his own use, and states that the testatrix wished them to be emancipated, and gave them to him in trust that he should have them emancipated according to law. The defendant states that the testatrix and he frequently had consultations together upon the subject of empancipating them, and at one time she had determined to (382) manumit and send them out of the State, but afterwards abandoned that purpose, with the view that the defendant should have it done after her death. He states that both the testatrix and he were fully informed that the negroes could not remain in North Carolina as free persons; and that it was at no time intended by them that they should remain here, but that they should go out of the State; that the defendant told the testatrix she might express the trust in the will that the slaves should within a certain time be sent out of the state, according to law, to any other State or country in which they might enjoy freedom; that the testatrix preferred not to express the said trust in her will, but to confide in the defendant to execute her wishes and to take the necessary steps to carry them into effect; which he undertook and promised her to do; and that upon the faith thereof she executed her will in the terms in which it appears. The defendant states further that the testatrix seemed to prefer Liberia as their place of destination; but that she left to the defendant's discretion the place, and also the manner of transporting the negroes to some other country than North Carolina. He further states that, having accepted the said trusts with the purpose of executing them to the best of his ability, he would long ago have done so by sending the negroes out of the State, if he had not been prevented by the continued litigation at the suit of the plaintiffs touching the will and property; and that it is still his purpose to execute the trusts according to the laws of the State; and he submits to do so under the direction of the court. He denies that there was at any time an understanding between the testatrix and himself to violate or evade the law by holding the negroes in a state of qualified slavery.

The answer further states that the devises and bequests of the (383) parts of the estate were upon the trusts to apply as much thereof as should be required to defray the expenses of removing the slaves and making some provisions for them, and in part to compensate the defendant for his trouble for carrying into effect the wished of the testatrix.

The reporter, at the request of one of the judges, annexes a full copy of the will, as follows:

"I, Sarah Freeman, of the county of Orange and State of North Carolina, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make, publish, and ordain the following to be my last will and testament, that is to say: First, I give and bequeath to John Newlin all my negro slaves, to him, his executors, administrators and assigns forever.

"Secondly. I give and devise all my lands or other real estate of which I may be seized or possesed [possessed] unto John Newlin, his heirs and assigns forever.

"Thirdly. I give and devise unto Richard Freeman, my husband, during the term of his natural life, my lands on Rocky River in Chatham County, and after his death then to John Newlin, his heirs and assigns forever.

"Fourthly. I give and bequeath unto John Newlin, his executors, administrators, and assigns, all my moneys, notes, bonds, stocks, household furniture and all my personal property of whatsoever denomination it may be. And I do hereby revoke and make null and void all former wills by me at any time heretofore made.

"Lastly. I do hereby appoint the above named John Newlin the devisee of all my estate, real and personal, to be the executor of this my last will and testament, and to which I have set my hand and seal this 20 May, 1835." If the trusts charged in the bill had been those on which the gifts were made, they would have been contrary to the policy of the law and void; and, of consequence, there would be a resulting trust for the plaintiffs. But the trusts disclosed in the answer for the emancipation and removal of the slaves are not unlawful. They are, indeed, in accordance with the policy, plainly appearing in the act of 1830, which, moreover, always prevailed here, provided only the emancipated slaves were carried, and kept, without our borders. If those trusts had been expressed in the will, they would undoubtedly be valid, and the executor and donee in trust would be compelled to execute them. Cox v.Williams, 39 N.C. 15. When this case was here before, it was held that the trusts would be no less obligatory on him in conscience and by the law of this Court, if the gifts were in fact made upon such express trusts, though not declared in the will, but resting in personal confidence between the parties. The defendant, when he acknowledges the trust, cannot be allowed to hold the property to his own use. The only questions in such a case are as to the effects of his breach of trust in not emancipating the slaves according to the laws of the State and deporting them, and as to the modes of enforcing the execution of the trust. We suppose that one who accepts the property upon such trusts is bound to execute them, and that, having once undertaken the trust, he may be compelled to perform it in those methods which the law prescribes for the benefit alike of the subjects of the trust and the public security; and it would seem that he could certainly be thus compelled, either at the instance of the Attorney-General, by regarding such dispositions in the light of charities, or at the suit of the negroes themselves, upon the capacity imparted to them by heir incipient right to freedom under the will of their former owner, as authorized by the statute. If that be so, the right of the next of kin would seem to be extinguished by the creation of such a trust, for it does not belong to them to enforce it, nor does the breach of it work any injury (385) to them, but only to the negroes or the State. However, it is not incumbent on the Court now, nor, perhaps, is it proper, to discuss the rights of the next of kin in the event the defendant should fail to emancipate the negroes and carry them away after he may do so without impediment, since this defendant submits to perform those trusts according to law, under the direction of the court, and it is to be presumed for the present that he will. "The act of 1830 authorizes the owner of a slave to direct the emancipation by will, and, of course, it is obligatory on the executor to do what is necessary to effect it. But the act further requires that, in order to obtain a grant of the emancipation from the court, the executor shall give bond to answer to the creditors of the testator for the value of the slave, and also a bond in the sum of $1,000 for each slave, that such slave shall be of good behavior while in this State, and will leave it within ninety days and never return. Where a person acting in the character of executor and trustee submits to proceed in the execution of the trust under the direction of the court, those acts must of course, be included in the directions, as they are for the security of creditors and in furtherance of the public policy; and a reasonable time allowed for procuring the emancipation and effecting the removal of the negroes — which, as the proceedings are to be in the Superior Court, one year would, in this instance, probably be. It must be declared, therefore, that the trust to emancipate the slaves in question, as disclosed in the answer, is lawful and proper to be executed by procuring or making the emancipation in the manner prescribed by the statute in such case made and provided; and the defendant is allowed one year from this time to effect the same. When he shall have refused or failed to do so, it will be time enough to consider whether the present plaintiffs can take benefit thereby; and, until that period, that point is reserved. It will be time enough then, because, if the defendant should in that manner perform the trust, the next of kin would certainly (386) have no rights in the matter, and it is not to be supposed the defendant will not perform a trust which he submits to perform and about the execution of which he professes a sincere and conscientious desire.

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Addendum

The slaves were not given to the defendant for his own use, but upon a trust. If the trust be unlawful, it is void, and they belong to the plaintiffs.

What is the trust? It is admitted to be a secret one. The defendant swears he did not disclose it to any one until ten years after the death of his testatrix, when he told it to his counsel who drew his answer, and the pleadings show he filed a demurrer and objected to making it known. It is admitted to be a secret trust by design. The answer states that the testatrix was distinctly told that her purpose of emancipating the slaves might be accomplished by expressing the trust in her will, and having them set free "according to law," or my making her wish known to some person in whom she had confidence, and reposing in him the trust of transporting the slaves to Liberia, or some other free country, where they could enjoy their freedom. She selected the latter mode.

(387) Secrecy is a badge of fraud, and this trust, being a secret one by design, must be received with suspicion.

The admissions of the answer leave no doubt in my mind that the trust was that the defendant would transport the slaves to a free country, so as to give them their freedom in that way without complying with the provisions of the statute. If it was the intention to emancipate according to the statute, what reason can be assigned for not expressing the trust in the will? The defendant can suggest none. The testatrix knew such a trust was lawful; and the preference she gave to the secret trust satisfies me either that it was her intention that the slaves should remain in this State as free negroes — which is denied by the answer — or that they should be carried to a free country and in that way set free, without giving the bonds required by law. The latter, the defendant says, was the trust, and that he would have executed "said trust by transporting the slaves to Liberia soon after the death of his testatrix, but for the litigation in which he has been involved."

Is such a trust lawful, laying aside the secrecy and supposing it inserted in the will? This depends upon the construction of the act of 1830. It provides "that any inhabitant of this State may emancipate his slaves by giving bond of $1,000 for each slave, with two sufficient securities, that the slave will leave the State and never return." This is the security taken by the public from the master. A security is also taken from the slave by the provision "that his emancipation shall be on condition that he will never return. If he does, he is to be sold as a slave and the proceeds of the sale shall belong to the informer and the wardens of the county." The act further provides that "no slave shall beset free but according to the provisions of this act." (388)

The intention of the lawmakers should be ascertained, and the courts should then see that this intention is carried into effect and in no wise evaded.

The Legislature intended that slaves should not be emancipated unless the public had both securities, that they would leave the State and never return, the obvious policy being, not so much to get clear of the slaves as to keep clear of the free negroes. Here, then, is a law providing that any person may emancipate his slave upon certain conditions. Does not this, as a matter of course, make unlawful a mode of emancipation without complying with those conditions, and without giving the two securities required? Did the Legislature do a vain and foolish thing? Is this the language of the law: You may emancipate your slave by giving a bond of $1,000 and upon condition that, if the freed man comes back, he shall be sold as a slave; but you may also emancipate him simply by sending him to a free country, without the bond or the condition? If so, the latter mode will always be adopted. The master will prefer not to incur liability, and if the slave returns he will belong to his former owner, for the title has not been divested; or if, by a forced construction of the statutes concerning free negroes, the slave is considered as a free negro migrating into the State, he will not be liable to be sold as a slave, but will be hired out for ten years, unless he leaves the State in twenty days; and in case of females the children would be free negroes. The act of 1830 seems to have been drawn with much care, and the fact requiring the security of a bond and the condition necessarily renders any other mode of emancipation, in which both or either of these securities are not given, repugnant and unlawful. If it had been the intention still to allow the mode of emancipation by simply transporting the slave, this repugnance could only have been avoided by providing that if the slave returned the master should be liable to a higher penalty, (389) say $2,000, and the slave to a stronger condition, say thirty-nine lashes in addition to his being sold as a slave. Without some such provision the act of 1830 would be nugatory and lie as a dead letter upon the statute-book; for why should it be resorted to, as the other mode is the plainest and is free from all liability? No such provision is contained in the statute, and from abundance of caution there is an express provision, that slaves shall be emancipated in no other way.

I ask, then, can it be possible that in spite of this repugnance and in the face of this provision, a trust, by which slaves are to be set free by sending them out of the State without giving the securities required, is lawful? It is said this mode has been frequently pursued since the act of 1830. That may be true. If so, it is time attention was called to it, and the courts should not countenance so palpable an evasion of an important law by recognizing, under any circumstances, those slaves as free persons who have been sent out of the State since its enactment without a compliance with its provisions.

Again, it is said this is not an open question, but is settled byCameron v. Comrs., 36 N.C. 436; the opinion delivered in this case when it was before the Court upon demurrer, 38 N.C. 338, and Cox v. Williams,39 N.C. 17.

If the point had been directly decided in those cases, as the decision would make the act of 1830 a dead letter, I should hesitate long before adopting the conclusion that this Court was bound to consider the question settled. But the point was not directly decided in either case, and the attention of the Court not called to it. In Cameron v. Comrs., supra, there was an expressed trust, and the slaves had been sent to Liberia and settled there before the bill was filed; and the question was, to whom a certain fund belonged. The Court, assuming that the slaves had been duly emancipated, say: "The policy of our law never did forbid (390) the removal of slaves to a free country, in order to their residence there as free people, and the act of 1830 provides for their emancipation, so that they be removed, and kept without the State." The question was not made whether the mode of sending off slaves without giving the bond and subjecting them to the condition was not unlawful, as evading the provisions of the act of 1830, and, in fact, directly in violation of it. It is not intimated how the slaves are to be "kept removed without the State." So in this case, upon the demurrer, the bill charged that the slaves were given to the defendant, "in trust for their own benefit, and for the purpose of their enjoying a qualified freedom in this State." The decision is that if the trust be as charged and admitted by the demurrer, it is unlawful and void. It is true, in discussing the question, the Chief Justice says, among other things: "Since the act of 1830, it is not unlawful to bequeath or convey slaves for the purpose of being removed out of the State, and kept away from this State. If, in truth, the trust was to send them out of the State, and the defendant intends to do so, and will enter into the obligations which the law requires that they shall not return, let him so answer." The question was not before the Court, and if any inference is to be drawn from the opinion of the Chief Justice, it is that he considered the mode of emancipating, by simply sending slaves to a free country, unlawful, as evading and violating the act of 1830; for he says, "Bonds must be given as the law requires," and evidently had in his mind "a trust" to emancipate according to the statute, and not a trust to transport slaves to a free country and thereby set them free — which is the trust set up in the answer.

In Cox v. Williams, supra, the bequest is of slaves to the Colonization Society, upon condition that the slaves are to be sent to Liberia. The decision is that such a trust is lawful. In what manner the trust was to be executed was not before the Court. So there has been (391) no decision that the mode of emancipation by simply sending slaves to Liberia is lawful since the act of 1830; and for the reasons given I think it is clearly unlawful.

It is urged for the defendant that, admitting the trust, as originally declared, to be unlawful, he may claim the aid of this Court "to remodel it," and make it a trust to emancipate under the provisions of the act of 1830, and he submits to act under the directions of this Court and to given bond, etc.

The defendant asks aid with an ill grace after having concocted an unlawful trust, and after his testatrix has made her election to declare an unlawful instead of a lawful-trust. I find no ground upon which to remodel the trust and make it the very trust which she refused to insert in her will. If this Court had the power to do so, to exercise it would be to give encouragement to secret unlawful trusts by allowing them to be made lawful in case of detection. But this Court has not the power. It would violate the wish of the testatrix and be making a trust for her in place of the one she chose to make for herself, and it would violate the rights of the plaintiffs. They have a vested right to the slaves, if the trust be unlawful and void. Is it in the power of any court to deprive them if it? In the cases of Cameron and of Cox there was an open express trust to cause the slaves to be sent to Africa. The general words imply that it was to be executed as the law requires. The fact that it has not been legally executed does not render the trust void, although the slaves cannot be treated as free persons until the law is complied with. In this case the trust is secret, and the implication that it was to be executed as the law requires is repelled by the positive refusal of the testatrix to insert it in her will.

PER CURIAM. Decree for emancipation of the slaves upon the defendant complying with the requisitions of the law.

Cited: S. c., 43 N.C. 32; Hurdle v. Outlaw, 55 N.C. 78; Hogg v.Capehart, 58 N.C. 72; Robinson v. McDiarmid, 87 N.C. 462.

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