Thomas v. WaughThomas v. Waugh
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mae A. D'Agostino
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Errol Thomas, an inmate currently in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS“), commenced this action pro se pursuant to
On November 6, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. No. 47. In a July 24, 2015 Report-Recommendation and Order, Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted in part and denied in part. See Dkt. No. 53. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff‘s objections to Magistrate Judge Dancks’ Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 56.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Magistrate Judge Dancks’ Report and Recommendation
As there are no objections filed to the background and facts set forth in the Report-Recommendation and Order, the Court adopts and incorporates that recitation here. See Dkt. No. 53 at 1-5. Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion. See Dkt. No. 53. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended that the Court direct Defendants Waugh, Leifeld, Larkin, Morris, Antonelli, and Bly to answer Plaintiff‘s claims under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the RLUIPA because Plaintiff stated plausible facts suggesting that Defendants’ refusal to permit him to wear the larger head covering substantially burdened his sincerely held religious belief. See id. at 7-14. Magistrate Judge Dancks next recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff‘s procedural due process claims with prejudice based on the availability of adequate state court post-deprivation remedies. See id. at 14-15. Magistrate Judge then recommended that Plaintiff‘s substantive due process claim be dismissed with prejudice because, inter alia, it is covered by a specific constitutional provision and must be analyzed under that standard. See id. at 15-16. Magistrate
B. Plaintiff‘s Objections
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendations that his due process claims, retaliation claims, and claims against Defendant DiCairano and Defendant Bellamy be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 56 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his headcovering was confiscated arbitrarily and unjustifiably, thereby denying Plaintiff substantive and procedural due process because the prison authorities could have “resolved the problem in a more appropriate fashion without resorting to the harsher solution of penalizing plaintiff with a misbehavior report and pre-hearing confinement.” Dkt. 56 at 2-3. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Dancks applied the wrong standard for appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss to his retaliation claim. See Dkt. 56 at 3-5. He also appears to argue that his complaint sufficiently stated a retaliation claim against Defendant DiCairano and Defendant Bellamy. See id. at 3.
III. DISCUSSION
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge‘s report-recommendation, the district court makes a “de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2001). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complain is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]‘—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.‘” Id. (quoting
B. Free Exercise and Grievance Process Claims
Neither party has objected to Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendations that Plaintiff‘s free exercise claim go forward and claim related to functioning of the grievance system be dismissed. The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs and have not identified a legitimate or compelling penological interest justifying the impingement. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‘s free exercise claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The Court also finds that Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly concluded that Plaintiff does not have a due process right to have proper procedures be followed
C. Due Process Claims
1. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pled the elements of a substantive due process claim as set forth in Rother v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 970 F. Supp. 2d 78, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his complaint alleges “1) Plaintiff‘s religious headcovering was confiscated arbitrarily, denying him of his constitutionally-protected religious freedom; [and] 2) The issue of a misbehavior report is a punishment against his exercise of religion.” Dkt. No. 56 at 2.
Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that Plaintiff‘s substantive due process claim fails because Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants’ behavior was ‘shocking’ in a constitutional sense.” Dkt. No. 53 at 16. As Magistrate Judge Dancks noted, within the context of the prison setting, “[v]ery few conditions . . . have been found ‘shocking’ enough to violate a prisoner‘s right to substantive due process.” Id. (citing Sadin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479 n.4, 484 (1995); Tavares v. Amato, 954 F. Supp. 2d 79, 98 (N.D.N.Y. 2013)). The only facts alleged by Plaintiff in connection with his substantive due process claim are that his religious headcovering was confiscated and that he was issued a misbehavior report. See Dkt. No. 56 at 2. Neither of these allegations rises to the level of “shocking” that would support a substantive due process claim.
Moreover, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that Plaintiff‘s substantive due process claim must be dismissed on the additional ground that it is duplicative of Plaintiff‘s First Amendment free exercise claim. See Dkt. No. 53 at 16; see also Rother, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 100
2. Procedural Due Process Claim
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendation that his procedural due process claim be dismissed on the grounds that Defendants’ deprivation of Plaintiff‘s property was unjustified and not implemented in an “appropriate fashion.” Dkt. No. 56 at 3. However, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly found that under Second Circuit law, the confiscation of property even in a prison context does “not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation for loss of property because of the availability of state court post-deprivation remedies” in the New York Court of Claims. Dkt. No. 53 at 14 (quoting Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996)). Magistrate Judge Dancks also correctly concluded that better pleading cannot cure the substantive failures of Plaintiff‘s procedural due process claim. See id. at 15. Accordingly, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendation to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff‘s procedural due process claim.
D. Retaliation Claims
Here, Magistrate Judge Dancks applied the correct standards in determining that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between Defendant Leifeld‘s action and Plaintiff‘s protected speech. As Magistrate Judge Dancks explained, the only fact Plaintiff alleged that suggests a causal connection is the fact that Defendant Leifeld‘s actions were taken in close temporal proximity to Plaintiff‘s protected speech. See Dkt. No. 53 at 19. Magistrate Judge Dancks further correctly explained that temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish an inference of retaliation. See id. (citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Magistrate Judge Dancks also recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his retaliation complaint. In light of Plaintiff‘s misplaced reliance on the Conley notice pleading requirements, the Court agrees that granting leave to amend is proper. Plaintiff‘s retaliation claim against Defendant Leifeld is thus dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff also argues that his claims against Defendant DiCairano and Bellamy are “part of [his] retaliation claim,” as Defendants “continued to push the issue, particularly after plaintiff filed a grievance.” Dkt. No. 56 at 3. Magistrate Judge Dancks construed Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant DiCairano as alleging a violation of Plaintiff‘s free exercise rights. See Dkt. No. 53 at 20. That interpretation is consistent with Plaintiff‘s complaint, which alleged that “[D]efendant DiCairano intentionally harassed Thomas in derogation of his right to religious freedom so as to burden Thomas’ exercise of religious freedom.” Dkt. No. 26 at ¶ 40. Plaintiff‘s retaliation claims specifically name only Defendant Leifeld. See id. at ¶¶ 41-47.
First, Magistrate Judge Dancks is correct in concluding that Plaintiff‘s allegations of verbal harassment by Defendant DiCairano are insufficient to raise a constitutional violation. See Dkt. No. 53 at 20. Second, Plaintiff‘s allegations as to Defendant DiCairano involve solely conduct that occurred prior to Plaintiff‘s alleged protected activity of filing a grievance against Defendant DiCairano. See Dkt. No. 26 at ¶¶ 34-40. As Plaintiff has not alleged any adverse action taken by Defendant DiCairano in response to Plaintiff‘s protected activity, Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation claim against Defendant DiCairano. The Court therefore accepts Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendation and dismisses Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant DiCairano with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Dancks’ July 24, 2015 Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 53) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth therein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff‘s procedural and substantive due process claims, claims against Defendants DeCairano and Bellamy, and claims related to the proper functioning of the inmate grievance system are DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff‘s retaliation claim against Defendant Leifeld is DISMISSED with leave to amend;1 and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2015
Albany, New York
Mae A. D‘Agostino
U.S. District Judge