Dаvid Thomas (“appellant”) was found guilty of attempted voyeurism for photo
I.
In April of 2013, appellant and the victim, J.P., met while they were both students at Howard University. The pair briefly dated and became sexually intimate on one occasion in JJVs bedroom. Unbe-knovmst to ■ J.P., appellant photogrаphed her exposed back and buttocks while she slept. This photograph, which was introduced into evidence, depicted J.P. lying on her left side with her back to the camera. Although J.P.’s face could not be seen, she recognized her body, comforter, pillows, and pillow cases in the photograph. She also recognized several identifying items that appellant had staged around and on her body.. These included a hand-made poster board mаde by the victim’s father, which visibly displayed the victim’s name in large letters, the Greek letters identifying her sorority, and a message from her family; a purple and gold tee-shirt with a logo and motto associated with appellant’s fraternity plеdge class; a purple bracelet worn by appellant; and a used condom and its wrapper displayed on her thigh. The victim never consented to the photograph. J.P. testified that she had never seen anyone in her house wearing the T-shirt in the photograph that appellant was wearing that night.
J.P. first became aware of the photograph’s existence roughly six months later when a mutual friend told her that the photograph had been posted in аn online private chat room. Some months later, J.P. received a text message from a sorority sister that included a screenshot of the photograph. Now that she possessed a copy of the photograph. J.P. promptly filed a police report.
In December of 2014, J.P. met with Detective Wilfred Yulfo who arranged for her to call appellant to discuss the photograph. The phone conversation was made from JlP.’s cell phone tо appellant’s cell phone from a police station in the District and in Detective Yulfo’s presence. J.P. consented to the conversation being recorded. Appellant, however, was on a. train traveling from New York to D.C. at the time of the phone conversation and indicated at the end of the conversation that he was in Maryland. During the conversation, J.P. asked appellant why he lopk the photograph and then distributed it to others online. Appellant responded that he was sorry he took the photograph and that he only sent it to one other person, who then shared it with others online. J.P. also asked why appellant staged items in the photograрh. He responded that it was an immature thing “you do after you cross” (i e., to be accepted into a fraternity or sorority).
On August 12, 2015, appellant was charged by information with one count of Voyeurism Privacy,
II.
The issue before this court concerns the legality and admissibility of the intercepted audio recording. More particularly, the issue is whether a recording made in the District of Columbia involving an interstate communiсation that only one party consented to is admissible in our courts. In this case, appellant argues that a Maryland and law, which limits the admissibility in Maryland courts of any recorded conversation where both parties to the cоnversation did not consent to its recording, governs the admissibility of this recording at his criminal trial in the District, even though District of Columbia law is less restrictive.1 In essence appellant argues that D.C. Code § 23-551 (b)(1), the District' of Columbia statute that authorizes the suppression of “unlawfully intercepted” communications, must be interpreted in light of Maryland law because he was in Maryland at the lime the communication was intercepted. Appellant concedes that the interсept would have been lawful under District of Columbia law if both parties had been in the District; however, he contends that the District’s suppression statute is not expressly limited to “the law of any particular-jurisdiction,” and therefore, the -trial court should have applied Maryland law under these circumstances.
“On appeal from a • denial of a motion to suppress, we review the legal conclusions of the trial court de novo and defer to its findings of fact.” Lyons v. United States,
Under D.C. Code § 23-542,
In addition, our hоlding is consistent with how the federal courts have addressed similar circumstances. Evidence that is obtained in violation of state law is nonetheless generally admissible in federal prosecutions so long as there has been cоmpliance with all applicable federal requirements and the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Edmond,
Because the interception of appellant’s phone conversation was lawfully obtained under D.C. Code 23-542, the trial court did not err in denying аppellant’s motion to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
Notes
. D.C. Code- § 22-3531 (c)(1)(B), (d) (2012 Repl).
. In Maryland it is unlawful, in the absence of two-party consent, for "an investigative or law enforcement officer acting in a criminal investigаtion or any other person acting at the prior direction and under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral; or electronic communication” unless the intercept is to provide evidence for specific enumerated offenses, of which voyeurism is not one, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § .10-402 (c)(2)(ii) (West 2015).
. "It shall not be unlawful under this section for ... a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person’is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties to the communication has given -prior consent to
. “Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceеding in or before any court, ... of the United States or the District of Columbia, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the cоmmunication was unlawfully intercepted.” D.C. Code§ 23-551 (b)(1).
. Appellant relies on Mustafa v. State,