2 Johns. 471 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1807
That a personal action once suspended, by the voluntary act of the party entitled to it, is for ever gone and discharged, is a rule as well settled as any in the law.
It is equally well settled, that if a creditor appoint his debtor his executor, such appointment, if the debtor takes upon himself the burden of the execution ofthe will, shall operate as a release,
The defendant, by her plea, admits that she has in her hands assets, unadministered, to the amount of 1,160 dollars and 83 cents, which sum, it. is clear, she would have a right to apply toward the discharge of the judgment in question, if her appointment, as executrix of Alexander Thompson, did not operate as a complete release or extinguishment of it. I notice, particularly, the fact that the defendant has assets, as administratrix of Alexander Thompson, jun. to nearly the amount ofthe judgment,, as that will be found important, when I consider a case cited on the argument by the defendant’s counsel, to show, that the present case is not within the rule which I have first laid down.
The appointment of the defendant, as executrix, by Alexander Thompson, after he had obtained the judgment against her as administratrix of his debtor, Alexander Thompson, junior, was his own act. Upon his death, and
In order to determine when a suspension of the remedy works an extinguishment of the debt, Holt, Chief Justice, in 4he case of Wangford v. Wangford,
But I am inclined to think that the present case is, also, within the second rule. The effect of this judgment was to render the defendant, in case of failure of asssts, liable in her individual, as well as representative capacity; that is to say, if the fund in her hands, as administratrix, proved inadequate to the payment of this judg
I will now briefly notice the.cases relied upon by the defendant’s counsel, on the argument. The first is from Bacon's Abridgement.
The case of Fryer v. Gildridge,
After a full consideration of this subject, and a recurrence to the authorities, I am clearly of opinion that the judgment in question, under the circumstances of this case, is extinguished. And I am also inclined to think, that inasmuch as the defendant was personally liable for this judgment, at the time she was appointed executrix
Judgment for the plaintiff'.
Sir John Needham’s case, 8 Rep. 136. Co. Litt. 264. b. note 1. Hob. 10. 1 Salk. 299. Cro Car. 372. 1 Bos. & Pull. 630. Toller's Law of Exec. 347, 348.
Cro. Car. 372.
1 Salk. 306.
1 Saund. 219. a. note. 336 note 10. 337 note 1. 3 Term, 685. 1 Atk. 292.
3 Bac. Ab. 119. Exec. & Adm. A. 10.
Cro. Car. 372.
1 Salk. 306.
Hob. 10.
The appointment of a debtor as executor of the creditor, and his acceptance of the trust, do not extinguish the debt by the law of Massachusetts. Winship v. Bass, 11 Mass. 199. It is a general rule that if a creditor appoint his debtor executor, and ho do not renounce, such appointment operates as a release or extinguishment of the debt. 2 Cowen, 781. But the rule does not hold good where there is a deficiency of assets to pay debts; and whenever from the whole will, it appears that it was the intention of the testator to discharge the debt by making his debtor executor, then the executor shall be trustee to the amount of the debtfor the legatees or s ;