78 So. 147 | Miss. | 1918
delivered the opinion of the court.
George Thomas was convicted, on a charge of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life, from which judgment he appeals. During the stage of the trial when the jury was being impaneled to try Thomas, he voluntarily left the courtroom and went to the toilet with a deputy, remaining • there about ten minutes in response to a call of nature. "While he was absent two jurors were examined, one of whom was excused by the state, and the other was accepted by both the state and defendant. Thomas absented himself from the trial without the knowledge or consent of the court or his-counsel. His counsel was informed of the fact about thirty minutes thereafter and before the jury was finally accepted to try the ease, but neither counsel nor the accused made any objection to or protest against the progress of the trial. The court and district attorney knew nothing of Thomas ’ leaving the courtroom until the fact appeared in the motion for a new trial, and the fact of his absence was not disputed by the state. The motiort for a new trial was overruled by the court, and this action of the court is assigned here as fatal and reversible error, and is the only serious question presented by the appeal.
Counsel for the appellant ably urges that the proceedings in the absence of the accused for ten minutes, during that part of the trial when the jury to try him was being impaneled, was a denial of his right to be heard, to be present, at his trial; a right given by the common law, and guaranteed by our Constitution, section 26, which provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both, to*541 ■demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to he confronted hy the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in all prosecutions hy indictment of information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed; and he shall not he compelled to give evidence against himself,” etc.
Counsel for appellant cites and relies upon several cases decided by this court to sustain his contention, which cases are apparently decisive of the question in his favor. The leading cases cited which seem to fortify him in his position are the Sherrod Case, 93 Miss. 774, 47 So. 554, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509, Warfield Case, 96 Miss. 170, 50 So. 561, and Watkins Case, 110 Miss. 438, 70 So. 457. Prom a careful reading of all the eases cited hy counsel we observe that in no case, did this court especially consider and expressly pass upon the question of whether the accused may waive his presence during his trial, as provided in section 1495, Code 1906 (section 1253, Hemingway’s Code), which’ is as follows:
“In criminal cases the presence of the prisoner may be waived, and the trial progress, at the discretion of the court, in his absence, if he he in custody and consenting thereto. If the defendant, in cases less than felony, he on recognizance or bail, or have been arrested and escaped, or have been notified hy the proper officer of the pendency of the indictment against him, and resisted or fled, or refused to he taken, or he in any way in default for non-appearance, the trial may progress, at the discretion of the court, and judgment final and sentence he awarded as though such defendant were personally present in court.” .
This important statute seems to have escaped the notice and consideration of this court for more than a quarter of. a century. Why so, we are unable to say, but the fact that it has been overlooked or else ignored during this period is certain. What does this statute mean
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, The courts of many different states have held, that ;£hp accused may waive Ms presence at the trial, and that
In Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241, the court. said: “The constitutional right of a prisoner to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to meet the witnesses face to face, was conferred for the protection and the benefit of one accused of a crime, but, like many other rights, no reason is perceived why it may not be waived by the prisoner. ’ ’
The following cases hold that the defendant’s voluntary absence from a courtroom during the examination •of a juror who was challenged by'defendant’s counsel .and did not sit in the case is no ground for reversal: Van Houten v. People, 22 Colo. 53, 43 Pac. 137; Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 7 So. 824. Mere absence of ‘defendant from the courtroom for an inappreciable length of time during the trial will not warrant a reversal, is the rule announced in People v. Bush, 68 Cal. 623, 10 Pac, 169; State v. Ricks, 32 La. Ann. 1098. It was held in State v. Gonce, 87 Mo. 627, that the voluntary absence of accused in a criminal case from the courtroom, without the knowledge or permission of the court, and without the knowledge -of his own counsel, is not sufficient ground for a new trial.
But it is urged by counsel for appellant that if an accused may waive his presence in a felony case, yet certainly in no event can he waive his presence in a capital case. This court so holds in the Sherrod Case, supra. But this holding is directly in the face of section 1495, Code ,1906 (section 1253, Hemingway’s Code), which .statute seems to have been entirely overlooked, or else ignored, in passing upon that question in the Sherrod • case. The statute here makes no exception or distinction between felonies and capital cases. In fact, all capital • cases are classed as felonies. It is said by the court in,
Neither the appellant himself nor his counsel made any objection or protest at any time, nor did they do as much as notify the court, of the temporary absence of the accused. But they withheld this knowledge from the court and proceeded to a trial upon the merits, and raised the point for the first time after conviction, on motion for a new trial. We think in such cases the accused and his counsel are under legal duty to inform the court of the absence of the accused, so that the'judge-might correct the situation at the time. By their silence and acquiescence in the progress of the trial, with secret knowledge of the fact of the absence of the accused, and the absence being voluntary, constitutes waiver by the accused of his right to be present.
Moreover, it does not appear from this record that the interests of the accused were harmed or prejudiced by his absence from the courtroom, as he could have examined the jurors when he returned, and could have-excused them if he so desired. He did not do this, but accepted one of the jurors who had been examined in his absence, and this juror, with the others composing -the jury, appears to.have constituted a fair and impartial jury, as provided in section 26 of the Constitution ; and if it had -been error on the part of the trial
Our search and examination of the books and authorities bearing upon the progress in criminal procedure for the past six hundred years leads us to the conclusion that we are at this age approaching a more reasonable and sensible basis of procedure . in criminal cases. There was a time less than one thousand .years ago when all felonies were punished by death, and the accused was denied the right of a trial by jnry, to be confronted by his witnesses, or to be heard by counsel or himself. In fact, the right of trial in that barbarous age was a farce, and the accused was denied any chance to be heard or to receive a fair and impartial trial in a • so-called court of justice. But from time to time the many different rights that an accused now enjoys have been granted to him, from the date of Magna Charta until the nineteenth century. . But the pendulum swung from the one extreme, when the accused had no rights at all, to the other extreme of the present age, when his rights are so numerous and extensive and the courts have guarded them so zealously that now, in the trial Of a criminal case, the courts generally have by law and precedent become so fettered with technical rules and shackeled with these rights and safeguards of the accused that it is indeed difficult for a conviction to be had without some error, technical or substantial, appearing therein and justifying a reversal
This situation in criminal procedure, in this enlightened and progressive age, should not exist, but those errors only in the trial of a case which deprive the accused of some substantial right should be held reversible error. The pendulum should not be swung to the extreme in either direction, but there ought to be a happy
We are not prepared .to say that this opinion is in such conflict with the Watkins, Warfield, and Sherrod Cases, supra, as to necessitate overruling those cases. However, the rule announced here' is the law.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
