Plaintiff, Gillie Thomas, seeks to quiet title in and to certain real estate belonging to her situated in Lee County, Iowa, and to cancel a lien against the same claimed by the defendants, State of Iowa and the State Board of Social Welfare, said lien being asserted by reason of old-age assistance furnished to Oliver Thomas, the husband of plaintiff. Plaintiff pleads that said lien is not a proper charge against her real estate; that its imposition violates the State and Federal Constitutions. The defendants assert that the old-age assistance furnished the husband of plaintiff under the statute is a valid lien against plaintiff’s real estate. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff holding that the asserted lien was not a valid charge against her real estate, and ordered it canceled and held for naught. The court did not pass upon the constitutional question raised. Defendants have appealed.
I. There is no dispute in the facts — all are stipulated. Plaintiff and Oliver Thomas were husband and wife in February 1947. They had been married for some years prior to 1942. *1074 Sometime during that year they had separated and continued to live apart, but the marital status existed in 1947 and for some time thereafter. Sometime prior to February 1947 Oliver Thomas made'application for old-age assistance, as provided by chapter 249, Code of Iowa, 1946. Plaintiff knew of the application. After investigation said application was allowed and payments were made regularly to applicant and were continued from that time until the plaintiff brought this action. After February 1947 plaintiff acquired an interest in real estate in Lee County, Iowa. At the time the payments of the old-age assistance were begun, pursuant to the order authorizing the same, a copy of such order was indexed and recorded in the office of the county recorder of Lee County, Iowa, in the manner required by section 249.20, Code of 1946.
The defendants’ claim is that the old-age assistance furnished Oliver Thomas was a lien against plaintiff’s real estate by reason of the provisions of section 249.20 of chapter 249, Code of 1946. Such section, so far as is material here, is as follows:
“In any event, the assistance furnished" under this chapter shall be and constitute a lien on any real estate owned either by the husband or wife for assistance and funeral benefit furnished to either of such persons. Whenever an order is made for such assistance to any person, a copy of such order shall be indexed and recorded in the manner provided for the indexing of real-estate mortgages in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the recipient lives and in which the real estate belonging to the recipient or the spouse of such recipient is situated, and such recording and indexing shall constitute notice of such lien.”
Such order was duly indexed and recorded.
II. That Oliver Thomas and Gillie Thomas were husband and wife during the time the old-age assistance was furnished the former stands conceded. There is no claim that he was not entitled to receive such assistance. Neither is there any claim that Oliver Thomas had deserted the plaintiff, and the record has nothing to indicate the reason for their separation or which party was to blame therefor. The fact that Thomas and plaintiff lived apart would not raise any presumption that he had deserted her. So far as the record is concerned there was nothing *1075 irregular in the proceedings whereby the old-age assistance was furnished. His wife knew of his application for old-age assistance and made no objection thereto.
The question then is: Were the payments made to Oliver Thomas a lien upon the real estate of his spouse, plaintiff, herein! The trial court ruled that no such lien existed and quieted title thereto in plaintiff and ordered such asserted lien canceled as regards such property. We are unable to agree with such ruling and decree.
III. In the findings of fact and conclusions of law the trial court stated that the facts had a “lot of equitable appeal.” The court was of the opinion that during the time plaintiff and Oliver Thomas were separated the family relationship ceased to exist between them; that for all practical purposes the marriage between them had ceased to exist and that all that remained was the “mere naked relationship” of husband and wife. The court further held that the old-age assistance furnished her husband was of no benefit to plaintiff and that as she was under no legal duty to support him there could be no valid lien placed upon her property for aid furnished to him.
The provisions of the Iowa statute relating to old-age assistance are set forth in chapter 249 of the Code of 1946. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section 249.1 (subject, “definitions”) of said chapter make reference to chapter 234 of said Code. Section 234.6 defines the powers and duties of the State Board of Social Welfare. That board was vested with authority “to administer old-age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, child welfare, and emergency relief, and any other form of public welfare assistance that may hereafter be placed under its administration.” It empowered the board to administer statutes involving the welfare of those who were unfortunate, improvident and unable to properly care for themselves.
It would seem that statutes having such beneficent purposes should be liberally construed and have the benefit of any reasonable presumption. Dickinson v. Porter,
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The existence and stability of the marital relation under our social system is of the highest importance. Consequently, the emphasis placed upon .the family and its maintenance is significant. Each spouse is held liable for the expenses of such family. Section 597.14. See Vest v. Kramer, Iowa,
The rule as set forth in the foregoing cases and many others we might cite is that the liability imposed upon the husband and wife is statutory and that it is to be so construed. Section 249.20, a part of which has been hereinbefore set forth, provides that where old-age assistance is furnished one spouse it shall constitute “a lien on any real estate owned either by the husband or wife for assistance and funeral benefit furnished to either of'such persons.”
To indicate how solicitous the legislature was of old-age assistance recipients, it provided that the lien created could not be enforced while either of such was living. This, too, was statutory.
It seems to us that if the legislature has power to charge the family expense upon the property of the husband or wife, it would likewise have the power to declare the property of either husband or wife liable for old-age assistance. To pay old-age assistance to one spouse would certainly be a benefit to the other.
Such statute (section 249.20) created a lien on the real estate of Gillie Thomas for such old-age assistance furnished during the time the marital relation existed between them. The language of the statute above-quoted is clear and free from ambiguity. Consequently we see no reason for construction. See Offe v. State Board of Social Welfare,
In her printed brief the plaintiff argues that as the wife *1077 is not liable for the support of her husband, section 249.20 cannot create a valid lien against her separate property.
In the face of the statutory declaration (section 249.20) making the separate property of the spouse liable for assistance furnished her spouse during the existence of the marital relation, we see no merit to such claim. Offe v. State Board,
IV. Plaintiff, in argument, sets out two propositions which she relies upon for affirmance. Both are denied by the defendants. They are as follows:
1. The wife is not- liable for the support of her husband, either under the common law or the statutes of Iowa. There is, therefore, no legal basis on which to rest the asserted lien of the State of Iowa against the separate property of the plaintiff-appellee.
2. Section 249.20, Code of Iowa, 1946, in so far as it attempts to create a lien against the wife’s separate property for the assistance furnished the husband, is unconstitutional and void under sections 6, 9 and 18 of Article I of the Constitution of Iowa and section 1 of Amendment 14, Constitution of the United States.
Section 6 refers to the necessity that laws must be of uniform operation; section 9 states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law; section 18 relates to taking property by eminent domain. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, so far as pertinent here, provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
We can see no merit to the claim of plaintiff as set out in the first proposition. It may be conceded that the statute does not in specific terms declare that the lien is for support to the spouse; it does declare any assistance furnished such spouse shall be a lien against the real estate of the other spouse. It seems clear to* us that the legislature contemplated that such aid was to go for the support' and maintenance of the one to whom granted, thus contributing to such support. In the rather recent case of Offe v. State Board of Social Welfare, supra, decided in 1947, we held that the legislative enactment was based upon the duty of one spouse to support the other'but that no such lien was
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created unless the marital relation existed at the time the assistance was furnished. In that case we held there was no need for construction of the statute in that the various provisions were free from ambiguity and that the meaning was clear. We find two other Iowa eases wherein this particular legislative enactment has been involved. In re Estate of Ragan,
V. We will next consider the claim of plaintiff that the provisions of the statute making the separate property liable for old-age assistance furnished during the marital relation were in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. This claim seems to be based upon the theory that the asserted lien is imposed without notice and results in a taking of the wife’s property in violation of the due-process-of-law requirements of said Constitutions. We are of the opinion that such claim is not tenable.
The chapter under which the old-age assistance is given has been in operation for many years. We do not find that its constitutionality has been challenged in this court. That the legislature intended to legislate on the subject must be presumed. Its provisions are clear and without ambiguity. It dealt with matters of vital concern to the public, and to construe the same along narrow and technical lines would impair its purposes.
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“Every law is presumed to be constitutional in tbe first instance. An act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears clearly or unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it violates some constitutional provision. .The power of the court to declare a law unconstitutional is to be exercised only when absolutely necessary in the particular case and then with great caution.” Dimke v. Finke, Director of Social Welfare,
In the case of Cook v. Hannah,
“The power to declare legislation unconstitutional is one which couids exércise with great caution, and only when such conclusion is unavoidable. State ex rel. Welsh v. Darling,
In the early case of Boardman v. Beckwith,
In discussing the constitutionality of legislative enactments, this court, in Loftus v. Department of Agriculture,
“Unless the legislature has usurped powers prohibited by said Constitutions, the courts will not interfere. The unconstitutionality must ‘plainly, clearly, and palpably appear.’ Even if the constitutionality of a legislative act is doubtful, the courts will resolve the benefit of the doubt in favor of the legislature’s
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power. As is said in City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
The same ease holds that where a litigant challenges the constitutionality of a legislative act he has the burden to show such claim. See also Stewart v. Board of Supervisors,
It has long been the holding of this court that liberal construction shall be given legislative enactments with a view to promote its objects. Chiesa & Co. v. City of Des Moines,
It is the claim of plaintiff that section 249.20 violates section 6 of Article I of the Iowa Constitution in that it lacks uniformity in its application and operation. Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional and the burden rests upon one attacking such enactments on such ground to so show. Dickinson v. Porter, supra,
We hold that the classification in the instant case was reasonable and that it applied equally to all members of a, class, such class being those whose spouses had been rendered old-age assistance. In this class none was excluded, there were no exceptions — simply the requirement that the marital relation must exist. Such was the holding of this court in Offe v. State Board of Social Welfare, supra. Our latest pronouncement on the subject of constitutional powers of the legislature to enact along the lines pertaining to the public welfare was in the ease of Dickinson v. Porter, supra. Therein Justice Garfield, speaking for the majority, fully and carefully analyzed an enactment of the legislature which was claimed to have violated various constitutional provisions, and particularly section 6, Article I, of the Constitution of Iowa. Many deeisions of this court might be cited to sustain the rule above-announced but we think it unnecessary.-
VI. Plaintiff claims that the legislative enactment (section 249.20) violates section 9, Article I, of the Iowa Constitution in that it amounts to the taking of her property without due process of law. As the record stands in this case we hold that there- is no merit to such claim.
In considering the matters involved in the instant case, we are to keep in mind that Oliver Thomas, recipient of the old-age assistance, and his wife, plaintiff herein, are still living. The State is not seeking to enforce the claim which it asserts is a lien against plaintiff’s real estate. Section 249.19, Code of 1946, relates to the enforcement of such lien. Its remedies are two in number: (1) To file a claim against the estate of the spouse liable, or (2) by an equitable action of foreclosure after the recipient or the one liable is deceased. As matters now stand the State is simply claiming a lien against plaintiff’s real estate. It has taken no action to enforce it. Plaintiff is in- possession of her real estate and she cannot be disturbed in connection with the State’s claim as matters now stand.
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Section 249.20 provides that a copy of the order of assistance be filed in the office of the county recorder where the recipient lives and in which the real estate belonging to the recipient or spouse of such recipient is situated. This is a part of the same section which provides that such assistance furnished shall be a lien on the property of the spouse of the recipient. Such provisions necessarily must be construed together. There is nothing ambiguous in the language. One relates to attaching the lien, the other to the notice thereof. We held in Offe v. Slate Board of Social Welfare, supra, that the assistance must have been furnished during the time the marital relation existed. The lien thus declared was by virtue of legislative act. This court held in In re Estate of Ragan, supra,
It is plaintiff’s claim that the statute (section 249.20, Code of 1946) violated the State and Federal Constitutions in that it took her property without due process of law. We see no merit to this claim. She cites cases to support such claim but we think them inapplicable to the statute and the situation arising in this case.
Due process of law means ordinary judicial proceedings in court. Stewart v. Board of Supervisors,
In the case of Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt,
Speaking of the term “due process of law” the Oklahoma court, in Barnes Drilling Co. v. Phillips,
See Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., 489-592, inc.; 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 568.
We hold that the statute under which the State claims a lien against plaintiff’s property does not violate our State or Federal Constitution in the respects claimed. We further hold that the court erred in finding for the plaintiff and ordering cancellation of the lien claimed by the State. — Reversed.