*606 OPINION
Appellant William Troy Thomas was convicted, upon a jury *607 vеrdict, of burglary (NRS 205.060) and battery with intent to commit rape, causing substantial bodily harm (NRS 200.400).
Appellant assigns as error: (1) the judges’ failure to grant appellant’s requests for a change of counsel, (2) the judge’s failure immediately to admonish the jury upon his decision that appellant must be bound and gagged, (3) the judge’s failure to admonish the jury, suasponte, to ignore certain remarks of the prosecutor during oral argument, and (4) the conviction of appellant for burglary upon evidence showing that he entered the victim’s room with her consent.
1. Requests for Change of Counsel.
As an indigent defendant, appellant was assigned counsel from the Public Defender’s office. On April 29, 1977, Mr. McNabney of that office rеpresented appellant at his preliminary hearing. Appellant, against the advice of Mr. McNabney, chose to waive the hearing. On May 24, 1977, Mr. McNabney filed a motion to be relieved, citing “substantial conflict” between appellant and himself, and appellant’s failure to cooperate with counsеl in his defense. A hearing on the motion was conducted the following day by Judge James J. Guinan. Appellant was given a full opportunity to present his objections, citing thе advice of counsel regarding the preliminary hearing, and Mr. McNabney’s discussion of the option of pleading guilty to forcible rape. The judge denied the request that private counsel be appointed at public expense.
On the morning of the trial, June 13, 1977, appellant interrupted the questioning of jurors to inform thе court that he was going to retain private counsel. After consultation, and outside the presence of the jury, Mr. McNabney informed the court that appellant said he had the means, and wished to hire a private attorney. In response to questioning by the court, however, appellant claimed only to have money “coming”. The court denied the request as coming too late in the proceedings.
“The right to counsel of one’s own choosing is not absolute.” United States
ex rel.
Baskerville v. Deegan,
“A defendant is not entitled to reject his court-appointed counsel and request substitution of other counsel at public expense absent a showing of adequate cause for such a change.” Junior v. State,
The primary contention of counsel on appeal is that the trial court did not adequately inquire into the problem. He cites Brown v. Craven,
Nor is any abuse of discretion revealed in the denials of appellant’s requests. “A defendant cannot base a claim of inadequаte representation upon his refusal to cooperate with appointed counsel. Such a doctrine would lead to absurd results.” Shaw v. United States,
Appellant has demonstrаted no abuse of discretion in the denials of appellant’s requests for new counsel.
2. Admonition to the Jury.
Following several disruptive and disrespectful outbursts by appellant during thе jury selection process, two of which came after a clear warning by the trial judge of the consequences of such behavior, appellant wаs handcuffed and tape was placed over his mouth.
Appellant’s first interruption of the trial proceedings came during jury selection. After his initial outburst, and over appellant’s protest, the court directed appellant to proceed to the jury room for a conference with his counsel. Upon thеir return, and outside the presence of the jury panel, the court warned appellant that if he would not be quiet during the proceedings the court would havе him gagged and handcuffed. The appellant responded, “Well, gag and handcuff me.” The court *609 replied that that would not be done unless it became necessary. “Well, it is necessary. . . appellant replied. Return of the jury was followed by two further outbursts from appellant. Appellant was then handcuffed, and tapе was placed over his mouth. Selection of the jury panel continued, and potential jurors were each questioned generally or specificаlly about the effect of their reactions to what they had witnessed upon their ability to judge the case impartially. At various points in the trial, outside the presеnce of the jury, the judge informed appellant that the restraints would be removed if he were willing to abstain from further interruptions. Appellant gave no indication of his willingness to do so. At the conclusion of the trial, the jurors were instructed as follows:
The defendant has been bound and his mouth taped during the course of this trial. This was dоne upon the order of this court in order that the trial could proceed without interruption. This should not be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.
Counsel on appeal contends that the trial court erred in failing, on its own motion, to issue an immediate admonition to the jury to disregard the measures taken to prevent further disruptions by appеllant. Counsel has cited no authority for the imposition of such a requirement.
The Supreme Court of California has imposed upon a judge who determines that physical restraints are necessary the duty of giving the jury such an instruction
at some point
in the trial. People v. Duran,
There is no merit to this assignment of error. 1
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct.
*610
The prosecutor during his closing argument suggested to the jury that they not be sympathеtic to the appellant because the court had ordered him bound and gagged. He also commented on appellant’s failure to look the “victim in the eye” when she had testified. Appellant claims such conduct constituted prejudicial error, compelling reversal. We do not agree. There wаs no objection made to the statements when made and we shall not now consider them on appeal. Williams v. State,
4. Consent to Entry as Defense to Burglary.
As appellant conceded in oral argument, this assignment of error is disposed of by our recent holding in State v. Adams,
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Notes
We also note that the alternative of binding and gagging a disruptive defendant, while not constitutionally impermissible, Illinois v. Allen,
NRS 205.060
“1. Every person who, either by day or night, enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store...[etc.], with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary.”
(Emphasis added.)