*1 THOMAS, (Claimant) Appellant Eddie C.
REVIEW BOARD the INDIANA EM- OF DIVISION,
PLOYMENT SECURITY Skinner, Haley, Frank
William H. J. Miles,
Ralph as Members and as consti-
tuting Board of Indiana Em- the Review Division,
ployment Security Machinery, Foundry
Blaw-Knox &
Inc., Appellees.
No. 2-1276A491 — 779S192.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 1979. Sept. 1979.
Rehearing Denied
with the work. The Employment Security Review Board affirmed the referee’s deci- reference, sion adopted, by the referee’s Findings and Conclusions. The Court of Sullivan, Opinion by J., J., Shields, concurring, judgment reversed the Buchanan, J., Review Board. C. dissented opinion. with Thomas v. Review Board of Sec., (1978) Indiana Employment Ind.App.,381 N.E.2d 888 . question
The presented for our review is whether the statute made the claim- ineligible unemployment ant for benefits if voluntarily he left his employment without good work, cause in connection with the (Burns 1974), Ind.Code 22-4-15-1 as it applies Thomas, violates his First guarantee Amendment to the free exercise religion. of his claimant, The record reveals that the Ed- Thomas, die seeking any C. without infor- mation company, applied about the for em- Blaw-Knox, ployment at plant engaged a primarily production weapons. He in obtaining employment aided friend, member, his a fellow church worked in foundry. the roll foundry agreed foreman of the roll had hire so applied when he he was hired directly foundry. into the roll There Jannusch, Janet Gary, appellant L. for exception was no made for him because of (claimant). his employment application On his Sendak, gave he Gen., Theo. L. his as Jehovah’s Atty. Witnesses Darrell K. Diamond, Gen., Atty. reading Asst. listed as hobbies Bible Indianapolis, and Bi- appellees. study. ble He stated no restrictions or con- regarding applica-
ditions his work on his PIVARNIK, Justice. employment. tion for This petition cause comes us on Thomas had worked for Blaw-Knox for transfer from the Appeals. Appel- nearly year when the roll closed. . lant filed a claim for com- He was then transferred to the turret line. pensation stating that he voluntarily quit He stated that on the first he worked because of hooker, convictions. Af- there as a chainman he realized ter an initial deputy determination type doing, what of work he was and that claim, denying his a hearing was held checking be- after job open- board where appeals 27,1976. fore an January referee on ings posted, finally were he realized that His decision of March 1976 affirmed the “all of Blaw-Knox was armaments.” He deputy determination of the friend, and included approached the other Jehovah’s Findings denying Witness, and Conclusions Eddie C. about the work situation and his Thomas’ for unemployment compen- claim anything friend said that he didn’t find sation because voluntarily there, he left his em- wrong and that he ployment good without cause in “unscriptural.” connection didn’t view it as The claim- desirable stable enact- inquired ant then of other members of the congregation they agreed provide pay- and stated that ment of this measure to unemployed make the decision of whether or not persons ment of benefits to unscriptural own, would be for him to continue through fault of their to encour- no working there. The record does not reflect age employment, stabilization whether or not this decision was made is, provide employment for a state service *3 therefore, welfare; them. The claimant did not seek transfer public essential depart- because he said there were no other and proper the same is declared to be a ments for him to work in. He asked for a exercise of the police powers of the denied, lay-off, which was and on Novem- state.” 6, 1975, quit
ber
he
after
as a
The purpose
legislation
of this
is
month,
nearly
stating
chainman for
clear.
protect people
is to
from the men
continuing to work with armaments was
periods
unemployment
ace of
of
and to en
against
religious principles.
courage
stable
It is not in
The fact that Eddie Thomas decided that
changing employment
tended to facilitate
not,
conscience,
he
good
could
work at
provide
quit
or to
relief for those who
quit voluntarily,
Blaw-Knox and that he
voluntarily
personal
Voluntary
for
reasons.
require
does not
that this court declare that
unemployment
compensable
is not
under
disqualifying
receiving
statute
him from
Act,
purpose
the
provide
which is to
applies
benefits
unconstitutional
persons unemployed through
benefits for
no
him.
Bd.,
fault of their own. Abshier v. Review
Div.,
“To strike down without the most crit- Empl.
(1952)
425,
Ind.App.
Sec.
122
scrutiny,
legislation
imposes
430,
ical
which
902,
105 N.E.2d
cited in Achenbach v.
only an indirect burden on the exercise of
Employment
Review Board of Indiana
Se
religion,
e., legislation
i.
which does not
Division,
655,
(1962)
curity
242 Ind.
179
make unlawful
practice it- N.E.2d 873.
self,
radically
operat-
restrict
justifies
cause
voluntary
Good
which
ing
legislature.”
latitude of the
objec
job-related
termination must be
Brown, (1961)
599,
Braunfeld v.
366 U.S.
tive in
v. Review
character.
In Geckler
Bd.
606,
1144, 1147,
Act, (Burns 1974) Ind.Code 22-4-15-1 an § by employee considered claim voluntarily individual “who has left his em- voluntarily employ who had terminated her ployment good without cause in connection employer ment of because criticism disqualified the work” is from receiv- “honestly” when she believed that it was ing benefits. impossible for her to continue in the em ployment. question presented The public policy of this in unem- State employee whether such an would be con ployment compensation is declared in Ind. employment sidered to have terminated her 1974). (Burns Code 22-4—1—1 § “good for cause.” The Court stated: insecurity unemploy- “Economic due to rule, “As a the cases hold that hereby ment is declared to be a serious cause”, “good justifies which the volun- health, menace to the morale and welfare tary employment termination of and en- of people of this state and to the compensation, titles the must claimant to public maintenance of order within this employment, be related to the and thus against great state. Protection this haz- objective be have ard of our economic life in character. cases provided can be “good required in some measure extended the construction of systematic purely personal cause” during accumulation of funds to include periods subjective unique are employment provide bene- reasons which fits to the unemployed during periods employee, required have but by encouragement similarly per- such “cause” would affect Act,
sons of reasonable and normal
sioned
required
sensitivi-
for one
ty.”
qualify
The claim
benefits.
transportation was not available without
Id.,
477-78, 193
244 Ind. at
N.E.2d at 359.
expense,
unreasonable
and that
this fact
unemployment compensa-
In the area of
good
constituted
cause in connection with
tion,
distinguishes
Indiana
between statuto-
employment,
rejected by
was also
ry “good
quitting
cause” for
work “without
Appeals,
though
even
it could be
good
work”,
cause
connection with the
good
refusing
cause for
available work un-
personal
and some valid
reason. Neutral
(Bums 1974).
der Ind.Code
22—4—15—2
objective standards must be
qualify
met to
compensation.
being applied
stricter standard
A
voluntarily quit
those who
work as com
Board,
In
(1972)
Lewis v. Review
pared to those who refuse available work
Ind.App.
282 N.E.2d
the Court of
keeping
seems to be in
with the intent of
Appeals determined that a claimant who
legislature
purpose
and the announced
*4
had
failing eyesight
left work because of
Unemployment Compensation
Act to
and a desire to be with his children before
unemployment by
avoid the menace of
en
blind,
quit
he
totally
became
had not
work
couraging people
present
jobs
to maintain
“good
with
cause” in connection with the
quit
rather than to
employ
them.
It allows
employment
meaning
within the
of the Em
place
ees to restrict
necessary
or
conditions
ployment
justifying
cause”
ter
Act. “Good
upon
work,
acceptance
their
of new
entitling
and
employment
mination of
an
encourage
maintaining
likewise
the
compensation must
employee
objectively
any
employment.
of
new
system ap
This
and not
employment
relate to the
to reasons
pears
place
responsibility for accommo
personal
employee.
to the
any special
dation of
considerations where
House, Inc.,
Gray
(1976)
In
v. Dobbs
belongs,
employee
on the
to make known
Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d
Ap
prospective employer any special
his
cir
peals discussed the distinction between
working.
cumstances which will restrict his
“good cause” in a failure to apply “without
system
This
specula
also avoids a detailed
good
work,
cause” for available suitable
or
tive inquiry by employers
applicant’s
of
per
offered,
to accept
“good
suitable work
beliefs,
sonal
unique
conditions or
situations
cause” involved when an employee quits
prior
hiring
requiring
and avoids
an em
good
work “without
cause in connection
ployer
pay money
from his fund for
obligations
the work.” Parental
compensation
employee
to an
who voluntar
transportation difficulties were held not to
ily
carelessly places
position
or
himself in a
“good
constitute
cause” within
meaning
where he will have to
quit
choose between
employee
of the claim of an
who had volun
ting
personal
or
his
beliefs. The find
tarily
employment
“good
left her
without
ing and conclusion that the claimant volun
employer.
cause” attributable to her
This
tarily
employment
good
left his
without
means that
claimant who
has terminated
cause in
with the
connection
work is cor
his employment
(a)
must demonstrate that
leaving
rect.
Thomas’ reasons
his em
his
abandoning
employment
reasons for
his
ployment
unique, personal
subjec
were
were
impel
reasonable,
such as would
They
objectively
tive.
were not
related to
prudent man to terminate under the same
employment.
circumstances;
(b)
similar
these rea
“If the purpose or effect of a law is to
sons or
objectively
causes are
related to the
impede
the observance
one or all reli-
gions
invidiously
or is to discriminate
be-
In Gray, supra,
it was
religions,
noted that al-
tween
law is constitution-
though parental obligations
ally
though
no doubt consti-
may
invalid even
the burden
good
tute
personal reason for termination
being only
be characterized as
indirect.
of employment, they
regulates
nevertheless lack the
But
if the
State
conduct
objective
employment
nexus with
enacting
general
envi-
law within
power,
its
Now,
Q.
right.
you
All
at
the time
of which is to
purpose
and effect
goals,
working
roll
advance the
secular
were
at
State’s
that,
indirect burden
despite
right?
statute is valid
its
you didn’t realize
.
.
.
observance
A. That
.
added)
(Emphasis
Q.
armaments
part
That it was
Braunfeld,
supra, 366
at
procedure?
1148,
neutral your a little bit . convictions him, apply to we believe it is they utes as to set out his statement of his necessary Certainly. A. objections to his ideas and beliefs and Q. you What if were for Unit- “A determination continuing work. ed States Steel or Inland Steel *5 ‘religious’ practice or enti what is a belief produced steel, product the raw nec- protection may tled to constitutional essary production for the any question.” per A present a most delicate kind of a tank . philosophical choice rather than a reli sonal A. Mm-hum. choice, gious does not rise to the level of a religious expres Q. was you first amendment claim And found that that steel Yoder, (1971) . being shipped sion. Wisconsin to whoever 205, 215-16, 1526, 1533, L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. Yes, A. for 15, 25. Q. strictly . for armaments After the claimant was transferred purpose. from the roll to the turret line he Yeah, understand, strictly I for ar- A. ask for another transfer. The hear did not continue to maments. Then I could ing questioned referee him as follows: . to work for U.S. Steel “Q. Okay, point you because at that re- prod- raw whatever steel maker or plant was an arma- alized the entire pro- . whatever ucts or the . . production. ments might ducer it be. I could still A. The entire . . . that’s correct. know, scripturally, you cause see
Q. Engaged production. in armament the work for the . . . right. . . . because it company
All . would ... it would A. That’s correct. I would not be a it would ... Q. against your Which is be- they party direct to whoever liefs, right? to, see, would not be shipped you it A. That’s true. chargeable . would not be Q. pro- To contribute to the armament according my con- in . duction of the world. me, know. But you science to A. That’s correct.
Q.
Is that correct?
Q.
atmosphere
social
Okay, is it
peo-
tank or is it the
A. That’s correct.
that makes a
Verner,
pie?
(1963)
I don’t know.
of Sherbert v.
What’s the dif-
374 U.S.
whether you
ference
work for the
. these are tanks and provided employee that no jeop- . these was a couple other ardize seniority nor be discriminated occurrences really imprinted on against any manner for refusal to work my exactly mind where I was work- Sunday. ing, durin’ those three or four Court, Sherbert, was careful weeks that I was in . they state that did not declare the existence *6 within armaments. There was of a right constitutional they what call it a bomb scare on benefits on part persons the of all whose two different occasions where we religious convictions are the cause of their had to evacuate the work area. So unemployment, specifically limited their holding as follows: Q. Go ahead. “Our holding today only that South not, know, A. I really you could consci- may Carolina not constitutionally apply entiously continue to to work with eligibility provisions the so as to constrain armaments. It against would be all religious worker to abandon his convic- of the . . . the . . .re- respecting tions the of rest. ligious principles Id., 374 at that I have ap- come to learn and L.Ed.2d at 974. The Court determined that preciate except up to that . placed a burden was on the free exercise of up point.” to this religion Sherbert’s when her ineligibility for The hearing referee concluded the benefits derived “solely practice from the claimant, Thomas, Eddie had left work for religion” her “pressure and that upon religious reasons. The Review Board ac- forego her to practice was unmistak- cepted this conclusion when adopted it able” by forcing her to choose between fol- Findings referee’s and Conclusions which lowing precepts religion, of her remain- are set out in the Court of opinion. ing unemployed forfeiting benefits or Appeals, under authority abandoning precepts one of the of her reli- precise was uncertain as to his beliefs and accept work. This clear-cut gion order being or scare in the working choice of on one’s Sabbath he was concerned about a bomb presented plant. expression at all was and the This of his does unable to work dilemma court found it to be an unconstitutional a violation of kind of cardinal equal right Sherbert, to the free upon burden Sherbert’s tenet at stake in involv- exercise of pressure and the ing work on one’s Sabbath religious precepts or not to work to violate True, (W.D.Ky.1975) In Lincoln v. at all. Thomas, F.Supp. upon also relied
claimant her em- voluntarily terminated Here, the claimant’s reasons for although ployment years compa- of 21 with a tobacco religious, as quitting work are described ny because the elders of the Jehovah’s Wit- was, his belief and what the is unclear what anyone using nesses informed her that his belief was. This situa- religious basis of products with tobacco was violat- distinguishable from our clearly tion is ing resigned the Will of God and unless she case, Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. recent expelled fellowship she from the would be Inc., (1978) Prayer, Pentecostal House of of Jehovah’s Witnesses. District Court Ind., 1225, in 380 N.E.2d Indiana controlling cited and held that Sherbert 9-1—4- Supreme Court found Ind. Code § the claim- the denial of benefits violated 37(b) (Burns Supp.1977) to be an unconsti- right ant’s First Amendment to the free infringement tutional of the Free Exercise exercise of her benefits ordered clause of the First Amendment of the Unit- paid. to be ed and of Art. 1 2 of States Constitution Appeals opinions the Indiana Constitution. That case in-
The Court requirement Ind.App., photograph 381 N.E.2d note the distinc- volved a previously clearly tion in Indiana in this issuance of driver’s licenses. It was discussed opinion, in a vol- shown that the beliefs of the mem- standards involved reading of untary quit compared case as to an availa- bers were derived from a literal photographic for work and that re- bility case and the facts that dis- Bible tinguish quirement from We feel forced them to choose between Sherbert Lincoln. Lincoln, violating important religious principle or supra, improperly interpreted Sher- surrendering driving privileges. their apply bert to Lincoln’s situation and person violate require was held that to rely therefore do not on it here. religion effectively tenet of his cardinal sought Thomas out work with Blaw-Knox penalized the free exercise of constitutional hired. It appears from the record liberties. that all of Blaw-Knox was involved in the claims, production of some armamants. Thomas worked In the area of free exercise transferred, apparent. in the roll and when of difference are broad areas volun- who refuse to persons worked the turret line before he The claims of those *7 tarily quit employment. perform his He also ex- established positive action pressed willingness to return to work in state are different from the claims of those possible. the roll foundry if It is not clear from whom benefits have been withheld. voicing objection objection whether Thomas was of his Claimant’s to the enforcement conviction, continuing to work as personal question applies the statute in as it to him or if expecting unemployment he were his fellow church is that he will be denied members to make this voluntarily quit decision for him. benefits because he apparent is not religious that such a decision was for reasons. Thomas is not re- ever made. There is no evidence that there violate cardinal tenet quired by statute to Thomas, any pressure placed was the record religion. on or on of his Our review of Witness, his fellow Jehovah’s claimant’s who continued here reveals that the basis of Blaw-Knox, to is not quit precise work at work. In is unclear. The belief belief Thomas’ own show how the struggling words he was articulated. He does not hampered. is position religious determine his in this matter. He exercise of his beliefs 1134 GIVAN, J., PRENTICE, J., prevented being
He is not from C. seeking, con- for, accepting new available or work. He is cur. deprived of benefits extended to others. opinion. HUNTER, J., with dissents require Sherbert does not that benefits be
extended to
To
require
this claimant.
so
DeBRULER,
opinion.
dissents
would
improper expansion
be an
of that
holding.
Justice,
HUNTER,
dissenting.
addition,
considering
In
in
basis
In
the issue in the case
order to resolve
awarding
denying unemployment
or
com-
bar,
necessary
it is not
to delve into Indiana
pensation
presented
we are also
with the
law, including prior decisions of this Court
dilemma noted
in
Appeals, regarding
and the Court of
what
opinions of the conflict between the Free
“good
constitute
in
does or does not
cause
Exercise Clause
under
First Amend-
work,”
connection with
Ind. Code
ment and the Establishment Clause of the
(Burns Supp.1978),
vol-
22-4-15-1
for one
First Amendment.
untarily terminating
his
Re-
As
stated
United
States
spondent
complaining
on transfer
is not
States,
Court in
(1971)
Gillette v. United
petitioner
that
acted improperly
has
under
437, 449,
828,
401
836,
U.S.
91 S.Ct.
Rather,
the statute.
issue here
L.Ed.2d
180-81:
respondent,
whether
Eddie C.
“As a
matter it is surely true
properly disqualified
that
the Establishment
prohibits
Clause
light
benefits in
his claim
dis-
of
this
government
abandoning
from
secular
qualification violates his First Amendment
purposes
put
in order to
an imprimatur
guarantee
exercise of his
free
on
religion
such,
one
as
or
Verner, (1963)
case of
Sherbert
to favor the
of any
adherents
sect or
L.Ed.2d
religious organization.[T]he
appear
controlling
be
In
here.
Establishment
stands at
Clause
least for
Seventh-Day
that case a
Adventist was
proposition
government
that when
ac-
employer
fired
thereafter
refus-
religious sphere, they
tivities touch on the
ed other
because of
employment
her refusal
purpose,
must
in
be secular
evenhanded
Saturday,
work on
the Sabbath
operation
primary
and neutral
im-
her faith. The
Carolina Employment
South
pact.”
added)
(emphasis
Security Commission refused
un-
Sherbert
Thomas does
not ask
benefits be ex-
employment compensation because of her
they
others,
tended to him as
are to
but
Saturdays.
refusal to work
that they be extended to him when they are
case, Thomas,
In the instant
a Jehovah’s
denied to
hold that
employee
others. To
Witness,
job
quit his
with Blaw-Knox
who voluntarily quits
personal
work for
Machinery,
Foundry &
Inc. shortly after
reasons
personal
beliefs which can
being
from
transferred
the roll
beliefs,
somehow
be
described
line,
plant directly
turret
an area of the
must be allowed benefits while other em-
involved in armaments manufacture. The
ployees
voluntarily quit
work for valid
referee,
adopted by
whose decision was
personal
beliefs
reasons or
which are not
Security
Indiana Employment
Review
“religious”
benefits,
are denied
would vio-
Board,
quit
found
Thomas “did
due
late the Establishment Clause of the First
convictions.” Thomas v. Re-
Amendment.
Div.,
Emp.
(1978)
view
Board
Ind.
Sec.
*8
granted,
Transfer
is
and the Court of
888,
Ind.App., 381 N.E.2d
890.
Appeals opinion is vacated. The Board’s
decision that
the
voluntarily
opinion
claimant
majority
“signifi-
left
The
observes
good
without
cause in connection with
cant differences” between Thomas’s situa-
the work and is not entitled to
tion
benefits is
and Adell
situation. The
Sherbert’s
affirmed.
majority correctly notes that
the United
holding
emphasized
gen-
today
only
the
“Our
Supreme Court
States
South
disqualifi-
effect of the
discriminatory
eral
may
constitutionally
Carolina
not
apply
Verner, supra,
v.
because
in
cation
Sherbert
eligibility provisions
so as to constrain
expressly
Sunday
saved “the
Carolina
South
a worker
religious
to abandon his
convic-
having to make the kind
worshipper from
respecting
tions
of rest.” 374
infringes
we here hold
of choice which
410,
1797,
at
U.S.
I cognizant regarding religious am of the limited nature of kus’s admonition intol- Verner, supra. decision Sherbert erance in colonial Massachusetts in his com- *9 judgment, enjoying making to the for Reli- and use
prehensive Appeal Public of 1773, gious responsible freedom, written in a time of Liberty, by not driven coer- religious duty.” our liber- but debate which fashioned cion motivated a sense of [Emphasis ties. added.]3 “Yes, some minorities are tolerated in An individual in be this nation should Massachusetts; not, some are and the but religious free to seek truth duty in a procedure deciding which are and of manner which with accords his or her na- privilege worthy which are not of this ture cannot be of denied benefits gives group magistrates to a of civil public legislation —a welfare thereby. which, speak since body each man must The Court of Appeals decision in this case God, cannot in the himself before way in no fosters the establishment of the things represent nature in anyone of mat- religion Jehovah’s Witnesses in this state. power passing ters of of —the merely governmental reflects “the obli- neigh- judgment springs ‘the of their gation of neutrality in the face of condemned, bors’ actions.’ You are he Verner, differences.” Sherbert v. supra, magistrates, told the Massachusetts out at 10 L.Ed.2d mouths, say your you own at 974. The dissent in supra, and in England right beyond cannot tax her majority opinion here raise the same good right own “have we not as domain: argument that was raised Justice Harlan say thing, to so that you do same Sherbert, in supra, in his dissent which was you judge you wherein others condemn rejected specifically by Justice Brennan’s ” yourselves?’ [Emphasis original.]1 in majority opinion. Theologians have made similar state- reasons, the foregoing For I believe the indicating living pursuant ments to opinion of the should religious convictions is a matter of individu- would, therefore, stand and deny transfer. al response objec- conscience and not a to ON PETITION TO TRANSFER tive, theory doctrinaire on which stran- DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting. gers elders, they church administrative —be referees judges may pass judgment. Every — working person who is covered “[Religious] freedom means all men the Indiana Employment Security Act has are to be immune from coercion on the it in his expect mind that he can either part of individuals or of social groups and paycheck or check a benefit to live on. power, of any human in such wise that in accept Adell Sherbert’s decision to refuse to no matters one is to be forced to job have required new which would act contrary in a manner own con- Saturdays, day work on she and the science; is he impeded nor to be from regarded she belonged church as a acting according conscience, to his own worship, be set aside for rest and removed privately
whether or publicly, whether having expect- her from the class this dual alone others, or in association with within Eddie ancy. Thomas’ decision to refuse [Emphasis due limits.” added.]2 at a job employer new for his “A dignity sense of person required human him participate directly in fabri- has impressing been itself cating tanks, more and more army he and the because deeply on the contempo- consciousness of belonged regarded church to which such he man, rary demand increasingly making party work as a direct one made tanks, that men should act on their ultimately own use the those Paraphrased Bailyn, Ideological 3.Dignitatis Humanae, DeAlbornoz, 1. B. No. su- Ori- gins Revolution, Belknap p. the American pra, 15. Press, Cambridge, 1972, p. Mass. 266-267. Dignitatis Humanae, 2. No. found A.F.C. DeAlbornoz, Religious Liberty, Ward, Sheed & 1967, p. New York 12. *10 the same removed him from
effectively FULLER, Henry Appellant Thomas disqualified for benefits Both were class. (Petitioner Below), dictated their reli- because of conduct Supreme The United gious beliefs. States v. Verner, (1963) Court Sherbert Indiana, Appellee STATE 10 L.Ed.2d held that (Plaintiff Below). disqualification beneficiary as a Sherbert’s No. 1178S275. represented abridgement right of her Supreme Court Indiana. the free exercise of her secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First July 1979. through Amendment Fourteenth I find no Amendment. reason conclude Thomas should not be accorded the protection
same constitutional for the free
exercise of his belief. Salient here limitation which
is the
placed upon holding its in Sherbert in the
following passage: we, by today,
“Nor do our decision de-
clare the existence of a constitutional
right benefits on the
part persons all whose convic-
tions are the unemploy- cause of their This
ment. is not a case in which an
employee’s religious convictions serve to him a nonproductive
make member of 409-10,
society.” 374 U.S. at
1797. following
Both and Thomas Sherbert religious beliefs,
conduct dictated their ready, willing
remained and available jobs.
work at a multitude of Sherbert jobs
available to work at did
require Saturday attendance. Thomas was jobs
available to work at which did not production
involve the of armaments. Both only temporarily unemploy-
were in need of compensation clearly and therefore
ment protective under
come Constitution’s
umbrella.