143 S.E. 144 | N.C. | 1928
Action to recover of defendant reasonable compensation for services rendered by plaintiff, as a real estate broker, in procuring a lease for certain real estate owned by defendant.
The issue submitted to the jury was answered as follows: "What amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover of the Piedmont Realty and Development Company (now the Cutter Realty Company)? Answer: $11,850.00."
From the judgment on the verdict that plaintiff recover of defendant the sum of eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty dollars ($11,850), with interest from 5 June, 1925, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. On or about 5 June, 1925, and for some years prior thereto, defendant was the owner of certain real estate situate on North Tryon Street, in the city of Charlotte, N.C. at Sixth Street. This real estate, together with a building to be erected thereon, and to be used by the lessee as a theatre, was leased by defendant for a term of years, at annual rentals, aggregating for the term the sum of $790,000.00. The lease was the result of negotiations between the parties which had extended through several months. The lessee, a corporation, is a nonresident of this State; it had been interested in the lease by the plaintiff, who is engaged in business in the city of Charlotte, as a real estate broker. The negotiations which resulted in the lease were conducted partly by the plaintiff, as a broker, and partly by the parties themselves.
Two questions of fact are involved in the issue submitted by the court to the jury. First: Is defendant liable to plaintiff for services rendered *593 by him in procuring the lease, as alleged in the complaint? Second: If so, what sum is a reasonable compensation for such services? Both these questions, as appears by the verdict, were answered by the jury in accordance with the contentions of plaintiff. The verdict is supported by the evidence offered at the trial, and admitted by the court. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed, unless there was error, as contended by defendant, upon its appeal to this Court, in the admission of evidence, or with respect to instructions by the court to the jury, or in the judgment upon the verdict as signed by the judge presiding.
There was evidence in support of the contention of plaintiff that he opened and conducted, at least in part, the negotiations which resulted in the lease. Plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, so testified. J. H. Cutter, president of defendant company, as a witness in its behalf, testified that when he learned that the negotiations, which plaintiff had been conducting for a lease of the Burwell-Harris property, as a site for a theatre, had been unsuccessful, he sent for plaintiff, and requested him to ascertain if the proposed lessee would be interested in defendant's property, situate on the opposite side of the street from the Burwell-Harris property, as a site for the proposed theatre. In consequence of this request plaintiff wrote to the proposed lessee, and thus opened the negotiations which resulted in the lease. Plaintiff kept in touch with the negotiations, from time to time, by correspondence and otherwise, and was instrumental in procuring the lease.
During the progress of the negotiations and before the lease was executed, the question arose as to which of the parties, the lesser or the lessee, should pay plaintiff for his services. The proposed lessee declined to assume any liability to plaintiff for his services as broker, insisting that defendant as lessor should pay for such services. Plaintiff testified that at one time, Mr. Cutter, acting for the defendant, stated that he would not pay for such services, but that subsequently he called plaintiff to his office, and said that if he closed the deal, the defendant would pay plaintiff's commission. In a letter addressed to plaintiff, dated 5 May, 1925, relative to his claim for compensation for his services in the matter, defendant said: "While we might be willing to allow a moderate sum for the limited service rendered, yet this is all that we would do." An arbitration is suggested in this letter. The negotiations were thereafter closed by the execution of the lease.
It is well settled that a landowner, who has requested a real estate broker to undertake the sale or lease of his property, and who thereafter accepts the result of services rendered by the broker, in response to the request, is liable, in the absence of a special contract, for the reasonable value of the services. Dorsey v. Corbett,
Defendant excepted to evidence offered by plaintiff, and admitted by the court, over defendant's objections, tending to show that considering the character and extent of the services rendered by plaintiff, and the amount to be received by defendant, by the terms of the lease, a commission of one and one-half (1 1/2) per cent on the aggregate amount of the annual rentals, for the term of the lease, was a reasonable compensation for his services. Assignments of error based upon these exceptions cannot be sustained. Plaintiff did not allege or contend that he was entitled to recover a definite sum as commissions, because of a custom in the city of Charlotte, with respect to sales or leases on real estate, procured by brokers. The decision in Penland v. Ingle,
Defendant's assignments of error based upon exceptions to the refusal of the court to give certain instructions as requested, and also to certain instructions as given in the charge, present the same question as that presented by its exceptions to the admission of evidence. These assignments of error cannot be sustained. The refusal of the court to give the instructions requested, and the instructions as given in the charge are supported by Trust Co. v. Goode,
In the instant case, the services were completed when the lease was procured. Defendant's prayers for instructions based upon its contention that the commissions should be based upon the rental to be received for the first year of the term only, or upon the present cash value of the aggregate sum to be received by the defendant, under the lease, were properly refused. The decision in Thomas v. Gwyn,
Defendant assigns as error the inclusion of interest from 5 June, 1925, in the judgment, for that the jury found that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty dollars ($11,850), without including interest on said sum. This sum is due, by contract, and under C. S., 2309, bears interest from the date on which it was due. All the evidence shows that the services of plaintiff were completed prior to 5 June, 1925, and that demand for payment was made prior to said date. There was no error in the judgment with respect to interest.Bryant v. Lumber Co.,
No error.
