88 Iowa 374 | Iowa | 1893
The pleadings are somewhat lengthy, the facts numerous, and the evidence conflicting and contradictory. The following will be sufficient for an' understanding of the issues and questions presented on this appeal:
Against this claim of the appellant, the appellee 'contends that her judgment against her husband was a full and final adjudication x>f the question of indebtedness, and, being in her favor, is conclusive that she was not indebted to her husband. The appellant answers this plea by alleging that said judgment was obtained by collusion and fraud, for the purpose of furthering the intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of T. J. McDaneld. The appellant further contends that the question of indebtedness was not fully adjudicated in that action; that the adjudication was only as to the two notes and mortgages sued upon; and that the validity of the chattel mortgage, and the state of indebtedness .resting thereon, and upon the personal property and money received Iby the appellee, from her husband, was not involved nor adjudicated in that case; and that, upon an accounting thereof, it appears that the appellee is indebted as claimed.
Upon these issues the court instructed, in substance, as follows: “That, if the jury failed to find that the appellee’s judgment was collusively and fraudulently obtained by appellee, their duties were at an end, and they should return their verdict for the garnishee defendant.” By this instruction, the appellee’s judgment is made conclusive upon the question of her indebtedness, unless it was.found that it was collusively and fraudulently obtained. That it was so conclusive as to all matters of indebtedness that were or should have been pleaded therein there can be no question; but it will be observed that the matter of the chattel mortgage, the one thousand, six hundred dollar note, and the amount of personal property and
In Donahue v. McCosh, 81 Iowa, 296, this court held as follows: “One having two independent causes of action against the same party, by suing upon one, would not thereby be barred from afterwards bringing his action upon the other, though both might have been embraced in the first action.” The appellee certainly has a cause of action upon the one thousand, six hundred dollar note and chattel mortgage, independent of her causes of action upon the two notes and mortgages upon which she did sue. T. J. McDaneld and his creditors have a right in such an action to question the validity of said note and chattel mortgage, and whether or not anything is due thereon. This cause of action being independent of, and not joined with, the cause of action upon which said judgment was rendered, that judgment was not an adjudifeation thereon. In the absence of collusion or fraud in obtaining it, that judgment is conclusive that T. J. McDaneld was indebted to the appellee in the amount found on the two notes sued upon, but it is not conclusive as to the general state of indebtedness between them. We think the instruction Avas erroneous.
If the appellee’s judgment was not an adjudication .-as against the appellant because of collusion and fraud, he had the right to have the question of the validity of the notes and mortgages upon which said judgment was rendered submitted tp the jury. If they were void as -alleged, then the appellee was chargeable with the property she received under them. Under the instructions ■the inquiry was limited to the personal property and payments received by the appellee, while the amount ■ of the judgment was left to stand in her favor. If the appellee’s judgment was collusively and fraudulently ■obtained, it was, under the instructions, no adjudication as to the appellant, and the question of the validity of all these notes and mortgages should have been ..submitted to the jury, and they instructed to determine whether or not, upon all the transactions, the appellee was indebted to her husband at the time the notice of garnishment was served upon her. The appellant answered in that action that the notes, and mortgages sued upon had been fully paid, and were without consideration and fraudulent. If the judgment was not ■ obtained by collusion and fraud, as alleged, then it was an adj udication of these pleas, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the answer and cross petition, but, if the judg.ment was obtained as alleged, it adjudicated nothing.
Other questions discussed will not arise on a-, retrial, and are, therefore, not considered. Reversed.