444 A.2d 246 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1982
This is a forceable detainer action brought pursuant to General Statutes §
The building in which this room was located contained other rooms which were hired out to other persons under written agreements containing substantially the same terms. Kitchen and sanitary facilities which were located in other areas of the building were shared by all occupants. The plaintiff's room was secured by lock and he was given the key upon payment of the first week's fee. When the plaintiff moved in he brought with him his entire wardrobe and all of his personal effects and possessions. Between November 2, 1980, and January 20, 1981, the plaintiff used his room, slept in it each night and shared the sanitary facilities and kitchen privileges with the other occupants of the building on a daily basis. Sometime before January 20, 1981, the defendant informally notified the plaintiff that he was delinquent in his payments and would have to vacate the room. On January 20, 1981, while the plaintiff was out looking for a job, the defendant entered the room without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent and, without having initiated eviction proceedings under General Statutes §
The plaintiff now brings this action for relief under General Statutes §
General Statutes §§
General Statutes §
Prior to the enactment of the landlord and tenant statutes, the Connecticut courts recognized a distinction between a tenant and a lodger. Carroll v.Cooney,
The issue to be determined in the present case is whether the lodger-tenant distinction still applies, or if the 1977 legislation intended to include lodging-like arrangements within the purview of summary process law. The legislature did not revise or revoke the boardinghouse lien statute, §
In applying this rule of construction the court concludes that the legislature in enacting the landlord and tenant statutes intended that a person who occupies a room as a residence is entitled to the protection of the summary process procedure while a person within the "transient occupancy" exception of §
"A resident of a place is one who is an actual stated dweller in that place, as distinguished from a transient dweller there, and he may have a technical domicil elsewhere."Don v. Don,
Although, in the present case, the plaintiff signed an agreement stating that the room would not be his residence, he indicated at trial that he did not have another residence and, in fact, did consider the room his home. The agreement is dated November 2, 1980, and the dispute arose on or about January 20, 1981. Thus, the plaintiff had occupied the room for approximately two and one-half months at the time the defendant attempted to revoke the plaintiff's use of the room. Furthermore, the agreement itself contained no provision concerning the duration of the occupancy. It is also noteworthy that the plaintiff had with him in the room all his personal belongings, a fact the court finds totally inconsistent with a transient occupancy.
The plaintiff did fail to change his voting address with the registrar of voters and did, in fact, vote in his former district shortly after signing the agreement. Such facts, although evidence of the locus of one's residence, are hardly conclusive of the issue at hand. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that it was a presidential election that took place on November 4, 1980, some two days after the plaintiff signed the agreement in question. District residency is of no consequence in such an election. Therefore, failure to change his address two days before such an election does not necessarily negate the plaintiff's intent to acquire a resident status. Moreover, the plaintiff testified that he saw no need to change his address later as he would have no occasion to vote in the immediate future. Considering all of these circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiff indeed had made this room his dwelling place for the time being.
Although a reading of General Statutes §
That such was the purpose of this agreement is clearly illustrated by the testimony of the defendant at trial that the overriding purpose of effecting such an agreement with the plaintiff and others in the building was to avoid the substantial expenses and time-consuming procedures associated with summary process proceedings. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the plaintiff is a resident and entitled to protection under the landlord and tenant statutes.
Consequently, at the very least, the agreement between the parties in this case must be considered a "Rental Agreement" pursuant to §
The court, therefore, finds that such conduct constituted a forcible entry into the plaintiff's dwelling unit and that the room, along with his personal effects, were detained with force. Accordingly, judgment shall enter against the defendant that the plaintiff be restored to possession of said room and, pursuant to §