*211 Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
Pаrk Thomas, while working under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in the employ of appellee, was injured May 10, 1940. He filed аpplication for compensation on October 6, 1942, and an award was entered by the Board allowing him the maximum compensation for permanent and total disability. Regular payments were made under the award until the' employee’s death November 9, 1942, which of course was more than two years after the injuries were sustained. At that time the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not provide that the unрaid benefits of an award survived the injured employee; on the contrary, the established law in this jurisdiction was to the effect that they did nоt. Partusch v. Kaufman-Straus Company et al.,
The amendment went intо effect June 1, 1942, over two years after the date of the injury, approximately four months before the award was made, and approximately five months before Thomas’s death. Although it has no effect upon the decision of the case, it is not remiss to say that thе injured workman was regularly paid the maximum compensation at all times after the injury until his death. On November 21, 1942, the appellants, who werе dependents of the deceased, filed their application before the Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation Board for аn adjustment of the claim, wherein they asserted that they were entitled to be • allowed, and, to receive, the unpaid amount of thе award allowed to their decedent, subject to certain limitations' provided by the amended Statute. The Referee found that thе amendment to the Statute was not applicable to the case, conceiving the rights of the parties to . have, been fixеd under the law as it existed on the date of the injury. *212 The decision of the Referee was approved by the Boar^, and affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court.
On the date of the injury, Section 4882. of Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes, 1936 Edition, was in effect, and provided as follows: “Whereas, at the time of the-injury both employer and employee have elected to furnish or accept compensation under the provisions of this act for a personal injury, received by an employee by accident and arising out of and in the сourse of his employment, or for death resulting from such injury, within two years thereafter, the employer shall be liable to provide and рay compensation under the provisions of this act and shall be released from all other liability whatsoever; # *
The rights of the parties in respect to compensation for injuries became fixed and vested on the date of the injury. Those rights were controlled by the law in existence at that time, and the acceptance by the employer and employee of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was merely a contract between the employer and employee, whereby the formеr agreed to pay the latter compensation for injuries in accordance with the provisions of the Act in effect at thе time the injury occurred. The Workmen’s Compensation law contemplates the procurement of insurance by the employеr, to indemnify him in respect to his liability under the Act, although provision is made that an employer may carry his own insurance by meeting certаin requirements in respect to financial stability. If the employer carries insurance, as is contemplated by the Act, the rates hе must pay as premiums upon his employees are fixed in accordance with the liability imposed upon the employer by the provisions of the Act. If the amount for which the employer becomes liable under the Act is increased, premiums for insurance may bе reasonably increased; and, since the Act is not compulsory (and would be unconstitutional if it were, Kentucky State Journal v. Workmen’s Cоmpensation Board,
It is argued by appellants that the amendment affects only the remedy, and not the substantial liability of the employer. But this argument is refuted by the very contеntion in support of which it is made, that contention being: that appellants are entitled to compensation by reason of thе amendment, although it is admitted that, had the amendment not been enacted, they would not have* been entitled thereto. The amendment, therefore, substantially extends the scope' of the liability of the employer, and is not merely remedial in its nature. The mere fact that the decision (award of the Board) concerning the respective rights of the employer and employee was madе after the effective date of the amendment, does not extend the benefits of the decision to those who were not entitled to its benefits at the time the rights of the parties became vested, viz., May 10, 1940.
Wherefore,* the judgment is affirmed.