Appellants appeal based on seven enumerations of error. The jury awarded appellant Cindy L. Thomas damages in thе amount of $5,700 and appellant Ricky W. Thomas damages in the amount of $4,300. Subsequently, the trial judge reduced the jury’s verdict *607 against appellant Ricky W. Thomas to $0.
Appellant Cindy L. Thоmas was driving an automobile down a major thoroughfare. Appellee Frances T. Clark was driving an automobile on a street running рerpendicular to the thoroughfare. Appellee Clark attempted to cross the thoroughfare, and a collision оccurred in which appellant Cindy L. Thomas’ vehicle collided with the right rear portion of appellee’s vehicle. Neithеr driver saw the other driver before the collision; however, a witness did see appellee enter the thoroughfare, crоss in front of appellant Cindy L. Thomas’ oncoming vehicle, and observed the resulting collision. Appellee testified that she did stop at the stop sign and look in both directions before proceeding across the thoroughfare. The witness did not observe the аppellee stop, but could not testify as to whether the appellee was stopped before she was observed. Held:
1. Appellant’s first enumerated error is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of medical benefits paid by collaterаl sources. The collision occurred on December 9, 1986, the complaint was filed on March 25, 1987, and trial commenced Januаry 28, 1988. The collateral source rule was a viable part of Georgia law for many years. See, e.g.,
Western & A. R. v. Meigs,
However, our inquiry does not end at this juncture, as the error must be prejudicial to warrant reversal. See
Kelley v. Harris,
*608 Appellee asserts that in any event only appellant Richard W. Thomas made the claim for medical expenses and therefore the judgment for him is the only judgment, if any, which should be reversed. The trial record, however, does not support this argument. First, the complaint reflects that Richard W. Thomas did affirmatively claim for the hospitalization, medical care and treatment expenses of his wife. Hоwever, the complaint also avers that Cindy L. Thomas “incurred medical bills for treatment and care, and will continue to do so in thе future,” and reflects that both parties jointly prayed for certain damages including “special damages as proven at trial.” Secondly, neither appellant abandoned their claims at trial. Thirdly, the form of the verdict does not expressly reveal whаt proportion of the amount awarded to each appellant was for medical expenses, if any. We decline to speculate regarding the jury’s intent in announcing its particular verdict. Suffice it to say we cannot, based on this record, draw the conclusion which the appellee seeks concerning this issue.
The facts of this case are distinguishable from
Petty v. Barrett,
2. Apрellant asserts that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the issue of comparative negligence. We disagree. See
Fargason v. Pervis,
3. Aрpellant enumerates as error the trial court’s charge to the jury that it could return a verdict for appellant Cindy L. Thomas оn her claim of personal injuries without returning a verdict for appellant Richard W. Thomas on his consortium claim. We find this case fаctually distinguishable from
Groover v. Dickey,
4. Appellant еnumerates as error the trial court’s ruling allowing appellee’s counsel to cross-examine appellant Cindy L. Thomas on the allegations contained in the unsworn complaint. Although a defendant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of а witness, OCGA § 24-9-64, the scope of such examination is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
White v. State,
5. In view of the disposition of this сase, appellant’s remaining enumerations of error need not be addressed either because they are without merit or because repetition of the conduct complained of is not likely to recur.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.