Case Information
*3
McKAY, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from the district court’s denial of the parties’ respective motions for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, residents of Tacoma, Washington, brought a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to, inter alia , 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleg- ing multiple causes of action against the Tacoma Police Department (“TPD”), the City of Tacoma, three City officials, and twenty-two individually named police officers. Based on several incidents in which Plaintiffs were allegedly abused and harassed by police officers from the TPD, Plaintiffs brought numerous causes of action which ranged from viola- tion of federal civil rights statutes to abuse of process.
During the course of litigation, several dispositive motions were filed by Defendants, many of which were granted. [1] As a result, by the time of trial, three of the original four Plain- [1] In ruling on these motions, the district court’s job was facilitated in part because Plaintiffs did not oppose some of the motions and stipulated to the dismissal of actions against various officers.
tiffs maintained claims against the City and eight police offi- cers stemming from ten incidents. The district court trifurcated the trial, grouping related causes of action into sep- arate proceedings: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers, (2) Plaintiffs’ claims against the City for its hiring and retention of Officer Baker, and (3) Defendants’ counter- claim against Plaintiffs for malicious prosecution.
The trial lasted five weeks and jury deliberations continued for three days. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Plaintiff Thomas on his claim against Officer Tennyson for violation of his constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizures. Defendants prevailed on all remaining claims, including the counterclaim. In its award to Plaintiff Thomas, the jury allocated $15,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. [2] Plaintiff Thomas [3] and Defen- dants, in their respective status as prevailing parties and pur- suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, agreed to have the district court decide the issue of attorney’s fees. After submission of the briefs and oral argument, the district court denied both par- ties’ requests for fees.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
We have jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of
attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Awards of attor-
ney’s fees are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Watson v. County of Riverside
,
[3] Although Plaintiff’s briefing often refers to the collective “Plaintiffs” in arguing the district court’s decision to deny fees was wrong, it is clear that Plaintiff Thomas was the sole prevailing party and therefore is the only Plaintiff appealing the district court’s decision.
2002). However, we only arrive at discretionary review if we
are satisfied that the correct legal standard was applied and
that none of the district court’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous.
Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp
., 244 F.3d 1145,
1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001). If the parties contend the district
court made a legal error in determining the fee award, then
de
novo
review is required.
Hall v. Bolger
,
II. Analysis A prevailing party may be awarded reasonable fees in
relation to the prosecution of a federal civil rights claim. [4] “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea- sonable attorney’s fee . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). The statute does not differentiate between a prevailing plaintiff and defendant, but case law has filled that gap. “[A] prevail- ing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976)). Prevailing defen- dants, on the other hand, may only be awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) when the plaintiff’s civil rights claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
[4] We note that this fee dispute is based solely on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and is not related to Plaintiff’s other claims or Defendants’ counter- claim.
A. Plaintiff’s Request for Attorney’s Fees
In denying Plaintiff’s request for fees, the district court
concluded that granting an award of attorney’s fees to Plain-
tiff would be unjust because doing so would “result in a wind-
fall.”
Thomas v. City of Tacoma
, No. 01-5138 RBL, at *6-7
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2003). In support of this finding, the
district court reasoned that “any outside observer would easily
conclude that [Plaintiff] did not obtain what [he] sought in
this case” as he only prevailed on one of his many claims.
Id.
at *6. As legal support, the district court relied on
Farrar v.
Hobby
,
Plaintiff contends that reliance on
Farrar
was error. We
agree. The district court used
Farrar
as a vehicle to arrive at
the ultimate denial of Plaintiff’s request for fees. After catego-
rizing
Farrar
as a “primary case” for analyzing a request for
a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, the district court stated
that
Farrar
“cautions that any fee award must be evaluated by
comparing the extent of the plaintiffs’ success with the
amount of the award . . . [and] recognizes that even where a
plaintiff formally or technically prevails, sometimes the only
reasonable fee is no fee at all.”
Thomas
, No. 01-5138 RBL,
at *6 (internal citation and internal quotation omitted). In so
characterizing
Farrar
, the district court missed its central
holding and improperly applied it to this case. The district
court characterized
Farrar
as a case authorizing an award of
no attorney’s fees, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff pre-
vailed, because the plaintiff did not prevail enough.
Farrar
’s
holding is much more limited. In
Farrar
, the United States
Supreme Court decided the propriety of a fee award when the
plaintiff was awarded only
nominal
damages. It held that,
although a plaintiff is technically “prevailing” when awarded
nominal damages, a formal or technical victory may, in some
circumstances, only support an award of no fees.
The proper analysis requires that a prevailing plaintiff only be denied an award of attorney’s fees when special circum- stances exist sufficient to render an award unjust. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 429. In applying the “special circumstances” exception, we focus on two factors: “(1) whether allowing attorney fees would further the purposes of § 1988 and (2) whether the balance of the equities favors or disfavors the denial of fees.” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster , 177 F.3d 839, 878 (9th Cir. 1999).
The two justifications articulated by the district court for denying the request for fees were: (1) it would result in a windfall to Plaintiff, and (2) Plaintiff did not obtain the relief requested. Granting a windfall to plaintiffs was a concern ech- oed by Congress in enacting § 1988, but Congress balanced that concern against the need to attract competent counsel to prosecute civil rights cases. City of Riverside v. Rivera , 477 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1986) (plurality opinion). Thus, § 1988 is a product of balancing those concerns by only permitting rea- sonable fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). To require Defendants to pay reasonable attorney’s fees relevant to the prosecution of the successful claim does not create a windfall, but fulfills the Congressional purpose of § 1988(b). The fact that Plaintiff failed to recover on all theories
of liability is not a bar to recovery of attorney’s fees. This concern was addressed by the Supreme Court in Hensley . In Hensley , the Supreme Court recognized that “the most critical factor [in determining the amount of attorney’s fees to award] is the degree of success obtained.” 461 U.S. at 436. The Supreme Court explained:
Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the district court did not adopt each conten- tion raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.
Id. at 440. To deny an award of attorney’s fees notwithstand- ing Plaintiff’s clear victory on one of his claims for relief is an abuse of discretion; a reasonable fee in this case is not no fee at all. On remand, the district court must determine the rea-
sonable fee for Plaintiff in this case. Because Plaintiff
“achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation
as a whole
times a rea-
sonable hourly rate
may be
an excessive amount.”
Id.
at 436
(emphasis added). Therefore, the district court’s inquiry is
more searching, though it “should not result in a second major
litigation.”
Id.
at 437. In such cases, we have employed a two-
part test: (1) whether Plaintiff prevailed on unrelated claims
(“[h]ours expended on unrelated, unsuccessful claims should
not be included in an award of fees”), and (2) whether “the
plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee
award.”
Webb v. Sloan
,
To determine whether the claims are related, the district court should focus on whether the claims on which Plaintiff did not prevail “involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories.” Id. (emphasis in original). [5] To the extent the claims are related, Plaintiff should recover reason- able fees for prosecuting those claims. However, a determina- tion that certain claims are not related does not automatically bar an award of attorney’s fees associated with those unre- lated claims; work performed in pursuit of the unrelated claims may be inseparable from that performed in furtherance of the related or successful claims. We recognize the diffi- culty in parsing through Plaintiff’s claims to determine relat- edness and in no way imply which of the myriad claims brought by Plaintiff are related to his successful claim. That is for the district court to decide.
The bulk of discretion retained by the district court lies in the second, significance of relief, inquiry. Id. at 1169 (“If it is impossible to isolate the truly unrelated claims from those related claims, the district court should instead reflect that limited success in [the] second step.”) (citation omitted). At the heart of this inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s “accomplish- ments in this case justify the fee amount requested.” Thorne v. City of El Segundo , 802 F.2d 1131, 1142 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.” Id. at 436. Plaintiff succeeded on only one of his many claims against Defendants, which was sufficient to persuade the jury to award punitive damages. It is now within the district court’s discretion to determine whether that award supports Plaintiff’s fee request.
B. Defendants’ Request for Attorney’s Fees In denying Defendants’ fee application, the district court stated:
The Court is convinced that while some of the plain-
[5]
By way of comparison, unrelated claims are those that are “entirely
distinct and separate from the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed.”
Webb
,
tiffs’ claims were stronger than others, the claims do not rise to the “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” level required to entitle the defendants to their fees. The defendants do not cite a truly anal- ogous Civil Rights case in support of their motion, and the Court has not found one. The cases relied upon involve more egregiously meritless claims, and, more importantly, less compelling fundamental Civil Rights issues.
Thomas , No. 01-5138 RBL, at *5. Defendants contest this result on two fronts. First, Defendants claim that the district court erred by applying the wrong legal standard by premising its denial of Defendants’ request on Plaintiffs’ subjective good faith. Second, and in the apparent alternative, Defen- dants contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying the request because many of Plaintiffs’ claims had no factual basis or were not legally cognizable.
In support of their first argument, Defendants cite to a case
from the Second Circuit. In
Davidson v. Keenan
, the Second
Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the defen-
dants’ motion for attorney’s fees because it employed an
improper legal standard. 740 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1984).
The district court’s sole basis for the denial of fees in
David-
son
was because plaintiffs relied in good faith on their coun-
sel’s advice in deciding to proceed with their suit.
Id.
Defendant’s reliance on
Davidson
is misplaced. The district
court did not base its denial of Defendants’ fee application on
Plaintiff’s good faith. The district court’s operative finding on
this issue, as stated in open court, was that after sitting
through “six weeks of trial,
[the court did not] believe that the
claims that Plaintiff brought were frivolous
.” ER 377 (empha-
sis added). The district court reiterated this finding in its writ-
ten order.
Thomas
, No. 01-5138 RBL, at *5. Therefore, the
holding of
Davidson
is not applicable to this case.
Defendants’ second argument, that the district court
abused its discretion in not granting fees because many of
Plaintiff’s claims were without merit, is not well taken.
Defendants assert that dozens of the claims asserted by Plain-
tiffs had no reasonable basis in fact or law. Thus, Defendants
argue that the claims were frivolous, entitling them to an
award of attorney’s fees. Aple’s Br. at 21 (citing
Tarkowski
v. Lake County
,
[5]
We are persuaded by the First Circuit’s reasoning artic-
ulated in
Tang v. Rhode Island, Dep’t of Elderly Affairs
, 163
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1998), on which the district court relied. In
Tang
, the court recognized that, although a finding of frivolity
was a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees,
“[n]otwithstanding such a finding, the district court still
retains discretion to deny or reduce fee requests after consid-
ering all the nuances of a particular case.”
Tang
,
articulated in Tang :
[T]he Court does not find in the exercise of its dis- cretion that, even if some of their claims could be [characterized as frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation], the plaintiffs should be forced to pay the defendants’ attorneys’s fees. The lofty goals of the Civil Rights Act and the fee shifting mechanism contained in it would be undermined, not advanced, by an award of fees against the plaintiffs in this case. Thomas , No. 01-5138 RBL, at *6. In so doing, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse in part and affirm in part the district court’s opinion. Specifically, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff Thomas, AFFIRM the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees to Defendants, and REMAND the case for proceedings con- sistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.