Aрpellant Hazel B. Thomas owned a condominium unit located at 3000 7th Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C., from 1981 until the foreclosure sale in 2012. From around 2002 to 2012, Ms. Thomas did not live in the unit but instead resided at 4317 20th Street, Northeast, Washington-, D.C. For a significant period of time from at least 2004 to 2012, Ms. Thomas did not pay or make late condominium association dues. Therefore, the condominium association, appellee University Hall Condominium Association (“UHC”)
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UHC and the other named defendants on the LLC’s claim to quiet title and Ms. Thomas’s counter-suit for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that because “Ms. Thomas [njever formally designated a different address to the [UHC Executive] [B]oard, it was legally sufficient for UHC to provide notice by certified mail to the unit only.”
We conclude that UHC’s notice of the foreclosure sale of Ms. Thomаs’s condominium did not comply with the notice provision under D.C. Code § 42-1903.13 (c)(4).
I. Factual and Procedural History
Since 1981, Ms. Thomas has owned Unit 222 in the UHC building located at 3000 7th Street, Northeast, Washington, D.C.
Ms. Thomas has leased her condominium unit to a tenant since approximately 2002. Ms. Thomas testified at her deposition that she notified appellees that she was renting ber condominium unit, and “filled out a [TBM] form” that stated her current (actual) residence, 4317 20th Street Northeast. Although- the record does not contain a copy of the form that Ms. Thomas filled out, UHC does not contest that Ms. Thomas filled out a form when she notified UHC and TBM that she was leasing her unit. After Ms¡ Thomas filled out the form, the • record- evinces UHC and TBM sent her notices and letters to her 20th Street residence.
Pursuant to the condominium bylaws, Ms. Thomas was obligated to pay monthly UHC building assessment fees for the maintenance of the condominium’s common areas and amenities. Ms. Thomas consistently made late payments or made no payments at all. On two prior occasions, Ms. Thomas defaulted on her assessments and UHC threatened foreclosure. On at least one of these occasions, Ms. Thomas was notified of the potential fоreclosure and avoided foreclosure by agreeing to pay off her debt with a lump sum payment.
When .Ms. Thomas defaulted for the third time on her condominium assessments in December 2011, UHC filed a
Notice of the foreclosure sale was published in The Washington Post as required by statute. At the public auction, Ms. Thomas’s unit was sold to the LLC
The trial court consolidated the two suits, and denied Ms. Thomas’s motion for summary judgment, without prejudice. Ap-pellees UHC, TBM, and Mr. Buckley moved for summary judgment in Ms. Thomas’s wrongful foreclosure sale case, and appellee LLC moved for summary judgment in the quiet title case. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees and ordered that the unit be conveyed “free and clear of any right, title and interest... of [Ms. Thomas] ....” The trial court concluded that “[ajbsent evidence that Ms. Thomas ever formally designated a different address to the board, [for the purpose of notice,] it was legally sufficient for UHC to provide notice by certified mail to the unit only.” The trial court further concluded that Ms. Thomas failed to demonstrate that she gavе a “formal” designation to the UHC Board that she wanted to receive mail or notice at her 20th Street residence “exclusively.” This appeal followed.
Ms. Thomas raises numerous claims as to why summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.
Our review is de novo. Eaglin v. District of Columbia,
A foreclosure sale shall not be held until 30 days after notice is sent by certified mail to a unit owner at the mailing address of the unit and at any other address designated by the unit owner to the executive board for purpose of notice.
(emphases added). The trial court’s ruling and UHC, in its deposition of Ms. Thomas, suggested that Ms. Thomas was required to “formally” designate her actual address, and that the designated addrеss had to be “exclusive.”
In general, “the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he or she has used.” Eaglin, supra,
UHC first asserts that the statute requires a designation for the purpose of notice. ■ The literal definition of the term “designate” is “[t]o choose (someone or something) for a particular job or purpose[.]”
Further, the notice did not need to be “formal,” just because the statute states the notice has to be “for purpose of notice.” According to the plain meaning, there is no requirement that the notice be formal. Neither the Act nor the UHC bylaws define the phrase, “for purpose of notice,” however, similar legislation does give an indication that the notice does not need to be formal. For example, in the context of judicial proceedings, “[njotice may ... be given in any ... manner calculated to give notice and not prohibited by statute or court rule.” D.C. Code § 16-4808 (d) (2012 Repl.). Further, in the same context, a similar statute provides in part:
(a) ... a person gives notice to another person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person ... (b) [a] person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has received notice, (c) [a] person receives notice when it comes to the person’s attention or the notice is delivered at the person’s place of residence or place of business ....
D.C. Code §§ 16-4402 (a)-(c) (2012 Repl). In the context of business organizations, not unlike a condominium association, the relevant statute states in pertinent part:
[a] person has notice of a fact if the person: (1) [kjnows of it ... [or] [h]as received a notification of it ... [or] [h]as reason to know it exists from all of the facts known to the. person at the time in question ... (e) [a] person notifies or gives a notification to another person by taking steps reasonably required to in•form the other person in ordinary 'course, whether or not the other person lеarns of it ..., (f) [a] person receives a notification when the notification: (1) [c]omes to the person’s attention; or (2) [i]s delivered at the person’s place of business..,,
D.C. Code §§ 29-701.03(b), (e)-(f) (2012 Repl.). Further, in the context of nonprofit
Therefore, the plain language of “for purpose of notice’’ does not entail a formal method, but rather, just that the person who is notifying another person must communicate thе information in such a way that would be “reasonably required to inform the other person.” D.C. Code § 29-701.03(e). Further, there is no formal procedure necessary to notify another of a fact, just to take reasonable steps sufficient to bring the information “to the [other] person’s attention ....” D.C. Code § 16-4402(c). Therefore, under the statute, so long as 'a unit owner takes measures reasonable to apprise the executive board of another address, the board has a duty to send notice.
Ms. Thomas complied with the ■ plain meaning of the term “for purpose of notice” by giving actual notice to TBM of her 20th Street address. UHC and TBM then complied with the notice that Ms. Thomas provided, and began sending Ms. Thomas notice to the address she designated. By filling out TBM’s form, Ms. Thomas acted “reasonably necessary to inform” TBM of her 20th Street address. D.C. Code § 16-4402(a). UHC and TBM had, “reason to know [Ms. Thomas’s 20th Street address] exist[ed] from all of the facts known” to both entities, because she notified them of the address. D.C. Code § 29-701.03(b). Therefore, the manner through which Ms. Thomas notified appellees of her 20th Street address satisfied the “for purpose of notice” provision and therefore, UHC should have sent the foreclosurе sale notice to her 20th Street address.
In addition, we disagree with UHC’s argument that. Ms. Thomas was obliged to • designate or choose her 20th Street ■ address to receive- notice, exclusively. In fact, this argument is - in direct contradiction with the term “and” in the notice provision, which states that a condominium association must send notice- to the unit address “and ■ at any ■ other address designated by the unit owner to the executive hoard for purpose of notice,” The term “and” is an indication that the legislators intended for a condominium association to send notice- to more than one placе if there is evidence that the unit owner has designated another place.
UHC was. therefore required to send notice to Ms. Thomas’s condominium unit and to her 20th Street address because Ms. Thomas had previously “designated” that address “for purpose of notice” by filling out a form that stated she was leasing
Even though the plain meaning of our statute is clear and unambiguous, we may also turn to the legislative history of the notice provision for additional guidance. Aboye, supra,
■The Act’s legislative history lends support to our reading of the plain language of the statutory notice provisions.
III. Conclusion
The statutory notice provisions of §' 42-1903.13(c)(4) required UHC to send notice of the foreclosure sale to both Ms. Thomas’s condominium unit “and [to] any other address [that she] designated[.]” UHC failed to comply with those notice provisions when it sent notice only to Ms. Thomas’s condominium unit. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellees. See Logan v. LaSalle, supra,
Since we hold in favor of Ms. Thomas on the notice issue, we do not address the rеmaining issues she raises, which all stein from the wrongful foreclosure of her unit. Cf. Transport. Leasing Co. v. Dep’t of Emp’t Services,
So ordered.
Notes
. This decision applies primarily to UHC, the condominium association where Ms. Thomas’s unit is located, because UHC owed Ms, Thomas the statutory duty to provide her notice of the foreclosure sale under D.C. Code § 42-1903.13 (2001). The remaining appel-lees include: Tilton Bernstein Management, Inc. ("TBM”), the property manager of UHC; James Buckley, President of the UHC Board of Directors; Linowes and Blocher LLP, UHC’s counsel, which assisted in collecting Ms; Thomas’s overdue assessment fees and with the foreclosure proceedings against her; and 3000 7th Street 222 SB, LLC ("LLC”), the entity that purchased Ms, Thomas’s condominium unit.
. The notice provision of the District of Columbia Condominium Act ("the Act"), D.C. Code § 42-1901.01 ef seq., has been updated twice during the pendency ,of this case, in 2014 and in 2017. The notice provision was not changed in tire 2014 revision of the statute but it was revised in the 2017 version, D.C. Code § 42-1903.13 (c)(4)(A) now states':
A foreclosure sale shall not be held until at least 31 days after a Notice of Foreclosure Sale of Condominium Unit for- Assessments Due is -recorded in the land records and sent by a delivery service providing delivery tracking confirmation and by first-class mail to a unit owner át the mailing address of the unit, any last known mailing address, and at any other address designated by the unit owner to the executive board for purposes of notice.
(2017) (emphasis added). The revised 2017 version of the statute, which was enacted subsequent to Ms. Thomas's foreclosure, ■ now makes clear that notice must be sent to "any last known mailing address" of the owner.
. Ms. Thomas and her then-husband owned and lived in the unit, periodically, until 2002 when they moved overseas. When Mr. and Ms. Thomas returned to the United States, Ms. Thomas did not live in the unit. It is unclear from the record when Ms. Thomas acquired sole ownership to the condominium unit. Aрpellee LLC contends that it was on November 20, 2006. On one occasion Ms. ■ Thomas stated that it was “on or around [December 18, 2006] by divorce settlement,” and in her deposition she stated that it was on May 16, 2009 as "part of the divorce settlement.”
, The record contains at least four notices and letters from UHC or TBM sent to Ms. Thomas at her 20th Street address dated August 24, 2009, March 21, 2011, April 21, 2011 and August 8, 2011. The language in the April 21, 2011 .letter addressed to Ms. Thomas's 20th Street residence states in part: ”[t]he Community hereby notifies you that it intends to pursue all legal actions allowed by law .” (emphasis added). Further, the trial court stated that ”[t]he -reсord demonstrates that written notices of unpaid assessments were sent by UHC to Ms. Thomas on March 21, 2011; April 21, 2011; and August 8, 2011, at the following address: 4317 20th Street NE, Washington, D.C, 20018,” (emphasis added). ’
. More specifically, Ms. Thomas owed $11,983.50 in unpaid assessments, $1,361.20 in interest, $190.00 in assessment late charges, and $2,546.25 in attorney’s fees.
. James Buckley, the President of the UHC Board of Directors, which initiated foreclosure proceedings on Ms. Thomas's unit, was also a member of the LLC at the time of the foreclosure sale.
. Ms. Thomas sought relief for the following claims: (1) breach of contract by the UHC Association; (2) slander of title; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) abuse of process; (6) "cloud on the title” of the condominium unit; and (7) invalidity of the foreclosure sale because all conditions precedent were not satisfied and the "default was fabricated by the Defendants.” The individual and corporate defendants included: (1) James Buckley, (2) Chengetayi Sithole, (3) Santiago Properties, (4) UHC, (5) Linowes and Blocher LLP, (6) TBM, and (7) LLC. James Buckley served as president of the UHC Association Board and was a member of Santiago Properties. Santiago Properties was a member of the LLC. Chengetayi Sithole was the managing member of the LLC. Additionally, Ms. Thomas allegеd that Linowes and Blocher LLP served as the "substitute trustee” to the foreclosure sale of her condominium unit.
.On appeal, Ms. Thomas argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the appellees’ motion for summary judgment: (1) in the wrongful foreclosure case without first adjudicating the quiet title case or adjudicating both cases simultaneously; (2) in the wrongful foreclosure case because the LLC was an indispensable party to the case and was not, at that time, a party to the case; (3) in the wrongful foreclosure case because the deed transferring title was invalid on its face; (4) in the сonsolidated case because the LLC was not a bona fide purchaser; (5) in the quiet title case because the deed transferring title was invalid and therefore, the LLC was not a bona fide purchaser; and (6) in the wrongful foreclosure case for a second time when the motion was no longer pending.
. Designate, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
. Appellees1 do not adequately raise the issue of whether Ms. Thomas properly notified "the executive board” as stated in the statute. D.C. Code § 42-1903.13 (c)(4). Therefore, any claim with regard to the portion of the statute requiring a unit owner to provide notice “to the executive bоard” is thus forfeited on appeal. Cf. Oparaugo v. Watts,
. Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
. We must also note that publishing the notice of foreclosure sale in The Washington Post, alone, was not enough to satisfy the notice requirements of D.C. Code § 42-1903.13 (2001). Section (c) of § 42-1903.13 details the requirements that a condominium association must follow before initiating a foreclosure sale (to enforce a lien of past due assessments). Subsection (5) states in part: "[t]he executive board shall give public notice of the foreclosure sale by advertisemеnt in at least 1 newspaper of general circulation .... [t]he newspaper advertisement shall appear on at least 3 separate days during a 15-day period to the date of the sale.” § 42-1903.13(c)(5) (emphases added). In compliance' with this requirement, UHC published notice of the foreclosure sale in The Washington Post on May 7, 9, and 11, 2012 and the unit was sold on May 15, 2012. However, the statute is written so that both subsections (4) and (5) must be complied with. For notice to be proper, the condominium association must first send notice to the unit owner as required by subsection (4) and then must publish notice of the public auction as required by subsection (5). Although appellees do not specifically raise the claim that only adhering to the requirements of subsection (5) is enough to satisfy the notice requirements of § 42-1903.13, we still find it important to clarify.
. The "formal” and "exclusive” language, which is not included in the Act, is also not included in the UHC bylaws. Article IX Section 9.1 of the bylaws, "Manner of Notice," states in pertinent part:
whenever any notice is required ... such notice may be given in writing, [or] by mail... to such ... Unit Owner at such address as appears on the books of the Condominium .... ”
Appellees’ argument is inconsistent with the language of the bylaws, which required the UHC to send notice to “such address as appears on the books of the Condominium .... ” According to D.C. Code § 42-1903.14(b) (2001), the books of the condominium include "books and records kept by or on behalf of the unit owners’ association, including the unit owners’ association membership list, [and] mailing addresses of the unit owners[.]” We discern no error in the trial court’s reasonable inference, that Ms. Thomas’s address appeared on the books of the condominium because the address was known to appellees since at least 2003 and the condominium association previously used the 20th Street аddress to send her correspondence. Thus, even by their own bylaws, appellees should have sent notice to the 20th Street address.
. The version of the Act applicable in this case is the 1992 version, which was recodified in 2001. It states that notice shall be sent to the unit owner at the unit address and to any other address designated. The 2017 version incorporates the 1992 requirements and adds an additional requirement that notice shall be sent to the unit owner at any last known mailing address.
. This is clear by the Council’s addition to the notice provision in the 2017 version that condominium associations must send notice to thе unit to "any last known mailing address[,]” D.C, Code § 42-1903.13(c)(4)(A) (2017), which is a clearer way of saying "any other address designated.” The D.C. Council added the notice provision of "any last known address” in other foreclosure sale provisions in other previously-enacted statutes, indicating an early intent to clarify this provision in foreclosure sales for past due assessments cases. See, e.g., Abdel-Kafi v. Citicorp Mortg., Inc.,
. See, e.g., Steward v. Moskowitz,
. In Harris, a unit owner, Harris, moved from his condominium unit in Washington, D.C. to Laurel, Maryland.
Harris only verbally infоrmed the association of his address and attempted to evade the notice by moving multiple times and not providing a forwarding address. We found that the association's efforts to find a forwarding address for Harris satisfied the statutory notice requirements. In Ms. Thomas’s case, not only did she notify UHC via a form, but UHC and TBM knew of her address and sent her mail previously, and she never moved or attempted to evade notice of the foreclosure. Therefore, UHC's efforts to notify Ms. Thomas were inadequate to satisfy the notice requirements because sending notice to a unit they knew she did not live in could not "reasonably” notify her of the impending sale of her unit.
. Finally, in the trial court, UHC argued that mailing the foreclosure sale notice to the condominium unit, under the assumption that Ms. Thomas's tenant would deliver it to her, constituted a reasonable and valid notice. We will not address the merits of this claim, however, because the notice was not actually delivered to Ms. Thomas’s tenant, but was returned to UHC and marked "Return to Sender, Unclaimed, Unable to Forward.”
. Ms. Thomas also argues that appellees violated her due process rights when they did not afford her proper notice. However, "foreclosure procedures implicate the [due process clause of the] Fourteenth Amendment only where there is at least some direct state involvement in the execution of the foreclosure.” Harris v. Northbrook Condo. II, supra,
. We cannot sua sponte grant summary judgment in Ms. Thomas’s favor because she did not move the trial court to do so in the consolidated case, nor did she ask this court to do so on appeal.