Thomas Tyler Wright v. CommonwealthThomas Tyler Wright v. Commonwealth
told Barkley that he was not under arrest, and on more than one occasion informed him of his rights. They did not handcuff Barkley, threaten physical or legal force against him at any point, or interfere with his freedom of movement. Finally, the officers’ statement that they could obtain a search warrant for the premises did not coerce Barkley. Instead, it merely informed him of his options. See Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 532, 544, 383 S.E.2d 476, 483 (1989). Given Barkley‘s cooperative attitude and the noncoercive nature of the officers’ conduct, the trial court correctly held that the search of Barkley‘s home was entirely consensual.
IV.
Settled Fourth Amendment principles govern this appeal and validate the officers’ search of Barkley‘s apartment. The officers’ conduct, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, lacks the elements of coercion necessary to turn the initial conversation into a seizure. The Commonwealth also satisfied its burden of proving that Barkley consented to the search of his apartment. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Barkley‘s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: BUMGARDNER, HUMPHREYS and CLEMENTS, JJ.
ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS, Judge.
Thomas Tyler Wright appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, for maiming, in violation of
I. Background
Virginia State Police Trooper Mike Bradley was dispatched to the scene of a car accident at approximately 2:10 a.m. on June 3, 2001. When he arrived, emergency personnel were already present and treating two individuals on the ground. Bradley observed Wright standing nearby, in the company of two deputies. Trooper Bradley approached Wright and asked him what he knew about the accident. Wright stated, “I‘m f—ing drunk, okay? I was driving. Run off the f—ing road. I‘m f—ing drunk.” Bradley asked Wright how much he had had to drink, and Wright responded “I don‘t f—ing know. A lot.” He then asked Wright how fast he had been driving. Wright stated, “Don‘t know. Too f—ing fast.”
As emergency personnel attempted to treat Wright‘s injuries, Trooper Bradley observed that Wright cursed and spat at them. Wright‘s demeanor fluctuated from “one extreme to the other,” as he was calm one moment and then “yelling, cursing and screaming,” the next. Wright was eventually restrained by medical personnel and transported to the hospital. Trooper Bradley then obtained a search warrant for a sample of Wright‘s blood. The analysis showed that Wright had a blood alcohol content of 0.09%. Wright was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated, in violation of
At trial, Trooper Bradley testified that, when he arrived at the scene, he observed emergency personnel performing CPR on Matthew Switzer, a passenger in Wright‘s car. He further stated that, according to Wright, the accident occurred when he was travelling south on Route 640 and approached a sharp right curve in the road. Instead of making the turn, Wright continued straight and drove off the left side of the road, over an embankment, crashing into a tree. The “total distance off the left side of the road to the impact was one hundred forty-seven feet.” The skid marks measured sixty-four feet. Trooper Bradley testified that there was no posted speed limit on that road, so the speed limit was “fifty-five” miles per hour.
Switzer testified that he was a passenger in Wright‘s car when the accident occurred. Switzer stated that Wright picked him up that evening at about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. and that they went riding around with another passenger named “Shaney.” Switzer stated that at some point, they stopped and obtained over a dozen Xanax pills. He stated that everyone in the car took the pills. He personally took three-and-a-half pills. They later obtained some beer and drank while they continued to drive around. Switzer did not recall the accident.
The doctor who treated Switzer testified that Switzer presented to the emergency room with “a lot of superficial lacerations,” and a severely fractured jaw.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Wright contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction. Specifically, Wright contends
We first note that the standard for appellate review of criminal convictions is well established. “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to review the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.‘” Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 177, 179, 409 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1991) (quoting Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). “The conviction will not be reversed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id.; see also
[a]ny person who, as a result of driving while intoxicated ... in a manner so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life, unintentionally causes the serious bodily injury of another person resulting in permanent and significant physical impairment shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
While no Virginia appellate court has issued a decision interpreting this particular statute, the common law definition of criminal negligence, as stated in the statute, is well settled. Indeed, in Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 611, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938), the Supreme Court of Virginia defined criminal negligence in terms of “gross negligence,” stating that conduct “is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or wil[l]ful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of his acts.” 170 Va. at 611-12, 195 S.E. at 681.
Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 548, 557, 513 S.E.2d 453, 457-58 (1999). Thus,
[w]hile willful misconduct requires an intentional or purposeful act or failure to act, gross or criminal negligence involves [an act or] a failure to act under circumstances that indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward the welfare of others. Moreover, the defendant must be proved indifferent in the face of knowledge that injury or illegality will be the probable result or, in the alternative, that circumstances exist under which the defendant may be chargeable with such knowledge.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court of Virginia has further held that in determining the degree of a defendant‘s negligence, intoxication is relevant as an aggravating factor, increasing with the level of intoxication. Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 283, 322 S.E.2d 216, 221-22 (1984); see also Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 315, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1993). Nevertheless, although the Court
Bishop v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 206, 210, 455 S.E.2d 765, 766-67 (1995).
Here, Wright conceded to Trooper Bradley that he was driving “too fast.” Wright‘s conduct of driving his car in a manner that was too fast for him to control it properly, was necessarily rendered more culpable because Wright was driving while his intellectual and motor functions were substantially impaired by his voluntary consumption of alcohol and drugs. Indeed, immediately after the accident, Wright admitted he was drunk and despite only slight injury, was behaving in a considerably irrational manner. Accordingly, there was ample evidence on this record to justify the trial court‘s determination that Wright was guilty of such a callous indifference or disregard for “the rules of law and safety, and of the rights of others, as was incompatible with a proper regard for human life, and amounted to gross, wanton and culpable misconduct.” Bell, 170 Va. at 613, 195 S.E. at 682.
Furthermore, we reject Wright‘s argument that Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 104, 255 S.E.2d 504 (1979), and Tubman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 267, 348 S.E.2d 871 (1986), compel a different result. The facts presented in those cases are distinguishable from those presented here. In Jenkins, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate recklessness when it demonstrated merely that Jenkins struck a pedestrian while driving “down the center of a narrow, unlighted, unmarked, rural, secondary road in the early morning hours at a time when he was unlikely to encounter other traffic or pedestrians.” Jenkins, 220 Va. at 107, 255 S.E.2d at 506. Indeed, the Court noted that the evidence proved “Jenkins was driving at a speed well within the posted speed limit,” and had not been drinking, or reckless in the operation of his truck. Id. In Tubman, there was also no evidence that the defendant had been drinking, and we found that the evidence merely proved simple negligence where Tubman failed to come to a “complete stop before entering Route 3,” causing him to fail to see a motorcycle, “which was admittedly partially obstructed by [a] hedge.” Tubman, 3 Va.App. at 275, 348 S.E.2d at 875.
Accordingly, because we find that the trial court‘s determination that Wright‘s conduct amounted to criminal negligence, as provided for in
Affirmed.