*1 Accordingly, quashing the court’s order is reversed. subpoenas
Senate Star, by The San Juan we appeal
In the
uphold protective the district court’s orders they prevent parties
to the extent litigation and their counsel from disclos-
ing press public information through deposition proceedings.
obtained appeal by plaintiffs,
In the we reverse the
protective orders the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys sharing
bar from
plaintiffs depositions. the content of the
Lastly, we reverse the district court’s order
quashing subpoenas. the Senate
So ordered. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Thomas LINES, INC.,
UNITED AIR
Defendant-Appellant.
No. Docket 81-7093.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued May Sept.
Decided
121
differing
with
views among the district
Circuit,3
in
judges
the Second
but
only
appeal passing
courts of
on
question,
Sixth,5
Fifth,4
Seventh,6 Circuits,
and
held
have
there is
private
no such
judicial
remedy.
agree
We
with the ex-
tended
question
Judge
by
Alvin Rubin
the panel majority
for
Katz,
A.
City,
Michael
New York
for de-
Inc.,
Rogers
Frito-Lay,
Fifth
v.
Circuit
in
fendant-appellant.
1980),
(5th
dies in this
whether
that “such indi-
[federal]
primary jurisdic-
may
complaint
this case was within
vidual
file a
with the De-
partment
“promptly
of Labor.
of Labor” which shall
investigate”
...
and “take such action
alleged
in the complaint
The facts
”
the facts and circumstances warrant....
very briefly
stated. Thomas Davis
*3
explicit
Because section 503 creates no
Lines,
for United Air
had worked
Inc.
private judicial remedy against
con-
federal
serviceman,
(“United")
a ramp
since 1966 as
charged
employment
tractors
with
discrimi-
servicing
loading
aircraft and
and unload
against
handicapped, the federal
nation
ing cargo.
diagnosed
In 1969 he was
as
courts have had to determine whether a
having epilepsy and from
until
time
time
may
of action
be inferred.
1974,
mid-September
experienced
he
sei
The
our
must be
starting points for
that
not interfere
zures
did
with his satis
Ash,
out in
v.
four factors set
Cort
factory performance
ramp
of
as a
duties
part
“a
of
whether we view these factors as
experienced
serviceman. After he
a seizure
Club, 451
law,”
v.
our
California
Sierra
1974,
mid-September
placed
he was
on
1775, 1783, 68
287, 301, 101 S.Ct.
U.S.
duties,
ultimately
restricted
and he was
J.,
(Stevens,
concur-
(1981)
101
L.Ed.2d
working
bag
confined to
in the
room.
In
ring),
central
“merely guides
or as
1977,
June
placed
he was
on “extended ill
intent,”
ascertaining
id.
task of
ness status”
epilepsy;
because
his
he was
J.,
302,
(Rehnquist,
at
at
S.Ct.
officially discharged
15,
February
on
concurring
judgment).
See Texas
In
complaint
December 1978 Davis
filed
Materials, Inc.,
Industries v.
Radcliff
provided
with the
as
Labor
630, 639,
2061, 2066,
U.S.
S.Ct.
503(b),
supra,
section
note 1
charging
(1981).
Analysis
L.Ed.2d
of the Cort
against
United had discriminated
him
“preferred approach”
factors
is the
physical handicap.
on the basis of his
The
implied private
an
determining whether
Department of Labor has not acted on his
exists. See Transamerica
1979,
complaint.
pri-
October
he filed a
Lewis,
11,
Mortgage
v.
Advisors
444 U.S.
vate
against
suit
United in the Eastern
(1979)
100 S.Ct.
was discharged
handicap.
because of his
Although
generally
section 503 was
intend-
handicapped persons,
ed to benefit
The law may
briefly
be
stated
follows.
alone does not establish that
in-
Under
503(a),
any contract
excess
tended to “create a federal
in favor of
$2,500
by the federal
entered into
plaintiff.”
v.
at
Cort
government
provision
must “contain a
re-
at
2088. See
v.
quiring that
take
...
shall
contractor]
[the
Inc.,
There would
far
a private right
be
less reason to infer a
ate
of action. Given Con-
private remedy per-
silence,
favor
individual
gress’s
initial
we
seek some
sons if Congress,
drafting
instead
Title
guidance from the 1974 and 1978 amend-
Univ.,
Handicapped
United
F.Supp.
Federation v.
Doe v.
York
New
Andre,
Coll.,
(8th
1977);
(S.D.N.Y.1978);
558 F.2d
v.
Barnes
Converse
Cir.
Kampmeier Nyquist,
(2d
v.
(D.S.C.1977);
F.Supp.
553 F.2d
Gurmankin
Auth.,
Lloyd
1977);
Regional Transp.
Costanzo,
(E.D.Pa.1976),
Cir.
aff’d,
1977);
(3d
548 F.2d
Davis v.
Cir.
ments to
even indicate that section
amendments,
these
we would choose a mid
unlike
was not intended to be
dle road
panel majority
between the
in Rog
enforced;
privately
Department
of La-
Frito-Lay,
ers v.
simply
be relied
faithful
“cannot
Advisors,
prior congressional
intent.”
indicator of
at
gage
Co., 629 F.2d at
Simpson Reynolds
Metals
Act
though
247. And
the Rehabilitation
directly
provide
judicial
review
failed
procedure,
such an administrative
ambiguous legisla-
the somewhat
Given
thought
however,
Department
evidently
of Labor
proceed
history,
tive
we must
question
might
possible,
the third
under Cort v. Ash:
that such review
be
as indi-
underlying
60-741.28(b).
it
with the
whether
is consistent
cated
regulation section
purposes
of the
scheme to infer a
implementing regulations
incorpo-
do
action for the
sophisticated hearing
rate the
elaborate
person
against by
employ-
his
discriminated
practice
procedure
used to enforce
note,
Rogers majori-
er. Here we
as did the
equal opportunity under Executive Order
ty,
Congress provided
that
11,246, reprinted
part
No.
in 41
60-
C.F.R.
complete
a rather
administrative scheme to
60-741.29(b) (1980);
see 41 C.F.R. §
remedy
503 violations
that
hearing provisions
these
culmi-
elaborate
implementing regulations, 41
60-
C.F.R. §§
nate,
culminate,
in a final adminis-
(1980), emphasize
741.4 to 60-741.54
resolv-
order,
60-30.37,
is in
trative
id.
which
our
§
ing
complaints
Department
of Labor
view reviewable like other administrative
means,
“by
conciliation,
including
informal
orders under the Administrative Procedure
and persuasion,
possible,”
whenever
id.
particularly
Act
701-706.
U.S.C. §§
60-741.28(a).
regulations provide
sure,
regulations’
To be
failure
withholding
progress payments,
remedies
problem
specify
presented
time limits has
contracts,
existing
termination of
or debar-
that
particularly
evident in the case at
receiving
contracts,
ment from
future
id.
has,
bar. The
of Labor
con-
60-741.28(c)
(e),
rather than
remedies
trary
Congress,
to the will of
been unable to
running to
discriminated-against
em-
comply speedily
with the
ployee.
regard,
In this
the administrative
Rehabilitation Act. This has resulted in the
procedures
established
the Act and im-
Department’s
taking
position
plementing regulations
remarkably
are
con-
here,
past, although
position
it takes no
sistent
Comprehensive
with those under the
permit-
cause of action should
Employment
(CETA)
and Training Act
dis-
remedy
ted
order to
section 503 violations
cussed in CETA
Organizing
Workers’
Com-
effectively
acknowledg-
more
and indeed an
(2d
mittee v. New
edgment of inadequacy
clearly
because of limited
defined class
intended
benefit
departmental
equiva-
general public.
resources is not the
protect
rather
than to
*8
established,
lent
a long-held, firmly
University
Chicago,
of
well-
441
of
U.S.
Cannon
677,
position
690-92,
reasoned
agency
that the
has made
S.Ct.
1954-55
99
at
to Congress
Looking
language
known
and to the courts over
the
the statute
of
Here,
years,
Cannon,
such as in
441
at
of
Id.
provide evidence
this intent.
U.S.
8,
503(a)
(b)
688 n.
or
language
specifically
at
in North
S.Ct.
§
Education,
class, “handicapped
Haven Board of
individu-
629 F.2d at
identifies
Indeed,
als,”
equal employment oppor-
783-84.
no
provides
record here contains
Indeed,
similar statement
Cf.
all
fall
it.
agency.
tunities for
who
within
to the first
vides little assistance.
fo
relying
approach
primarily
on this
Cort
Debate
factor,
virtually
federally-
all of
district courts
cused on the establishment of
503, including
handicapped,
analyzing
programs
those that ulti-
funded
§
action,
antidis
private right
relatively
on the
non-controversial
mately found no
provisions
crimination
503 and 504.
have
that the statute was enact-
§§
concluded
history
Nor is an examination of the
sur
“especial benefit”
ed for the
handi-
rounding
1974 Amendments to the Act
capped.
Paralyzed
California
particularly enlightening, because discus
FCC,
F.Supp.
Assn. v.
Veterans
“handicapped
redefining
sion centered on
(C.D.Cal.1980);
County
128-29
Hart v.
individual,”
full
explicating
not on
Alameda,
(N.D.Cal.1979);
503 and 504. The confer
meaning
§§
Ry.
Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna
however,
It
report,
guidance.
ence
lends
(E.D.Ohio
“judicial remedy
permits
states that
§
however,
majority,
contends
action,”
through private
S.Conf.Rep.No. 93-
“right-
duty-
when 503 is examined for
§
(1974), and
Cong.,
93rd
2d
Sess.
creating language,”
University
Cannon v.
notes,
majority recognizes,
as the
that both
n.13,
Chicago, supra,
U.S.
sections will be
to effect a
administered
no indication of an intention
approach
uniform
to discrimination
establish a federal
in favor of the
27.
lan
persons.
Id. at
Such'
plaintiff
can be found. See Cort v.
believe,
guage,
fairly
I
should
be read to
supra, 422 U.S. at
at 2088.
that,
suggest
Congress recognized a
since
While the absence of such a “talismanic
private right of action under
such a
§
incantation,” Rogers
Inc.,
v. Frito-Lay,
remedy
would not be inconsistent
Con
dissenting),
Cir.)
(Goldberg, J.
gress’s purpose
See
§
denied,
t.
cer
Frito-Lay,
supra,
Here, the
Org.
City
notion that the view of
subse-
Comm.
CETA Workers’
New
quent
forms a weak foundation
misplaced readily because CETA is (citing Thompson, distin Steffel v. guishable. statutory presumption in 464,
favor of administrative
enforcement
potent under
Comprehen
much more
said,
light
what I
I
have
would hold
Employment
sive
and Training Act
private
that a
right of action under
503 is
§
(“CETA”) than it is under the Rehabilita
clearly
Handicapped persons
authorized.
provides,
tion Act.
great
Section
“especial
are the
meant
Congress
class”
detail,
sophisticated
scheme for enforce
benefit from the
enactment
and
§
ment of
In particular,
CETA.
the Secre
attorney’s
the 1978
fees amendments dem-
tary of Labor is required to reach a final
Congress
onstrate that
assumed that
complaint
determination
within 120
Congress
pri-
intended to create this
days.
106(b),
816(b).
CETA
29 U.S.C.
§
§
Moreover,
implication
vate
of action.
This complex enforcement
sug
mechanism
private
of a
right of action is not inconsist-
gests
“primacy”
and “exclusivity” of
goal
ent with the
of administrative enforce-
grievance procedures.
the administrative
ment of
the statute’s antidiscrimination
Org.
CETA Workers’
Comm. New
provisions. We should be mindful that the
supra,
My brothers [I]t do not contend that the re- charge duty say: courts We see quirements of the pre- fourth Cort factor — at, you what are have not emption driving you but typically matters the concern of it, go state said and therefore we shall on as courts —have not been met. As States, acknowledge, before.” 163 F. Johnson v. United invidious discrimination has always (1st general been scheme legisla- addressed federal tion. indeed, Cannon v. University Chicago, legislation, su- indicates pra, Congress, affording rights privi- S.Ct. at 1963-64 new *11 leges to handicapped, wished to redress inequities borne them. To hold oth- take from an entire group
erwise
individuals who suffer odious discrimination important right by Congress, given them America,
UNITED STATES of
Appellant, MARGIOTTA,
Joseph Appellee. M. 267 and
Nos. Dockets
81-1258 and 81-3073. Appeals,
United States Court of
Second Circuit.
Argued Sept. 17, 1981.
Decided Oct.
