68 Fla. 305 | Fla. | 1914
The appellants seek to charge in equity and have sold certain lands, the separate real property of a married woman, to pay for material alleged to have been in part selected by her and all used “with the full knowledge of the married woman in the erection and construction of a residence on her separate property.”
By answer the married woman denied the indebtedness; denies that she personally selected or purchased any material from the complainants “for use in her dwelling and denies that any merchandise or material was ever furnished or was ever used in the construction of her dwelling house with her knowledge or consent.” The answer avers that the married woman “while living in the City of Jacksonville, County of Duval, and State of Florida, in the year 1911, and owning the lot in Gainesville, Alachua County, Florida, described in complainant’s bill, and desirous of building a bungalow on said lot, she contracted with one B. Daugherty, a contractor and builder in the City of Jacksonville, for an agreed price, to erect and build said building, he furnishing all material, etc. That she had no knowledge of where he was to buy the material, — whether in Jacksonville, Gainesville, or elsewhere. That during the erection of the bungalow she was in Gainesville several times on visits to her sister, while the work was being carried on; that she had no knowledge
The Constitution provides that “a married woman’s separate real or personal property may be charged in equity and sold, * * * for labor and material used with her knowledge or assent in the construction of buildings, or repairs, or improvements upon her property.”
The evidence shows that the dwelling was built by a contractor, and that the materials in question were charged to him. There was evidence upon which the chancellor could have found that the married woman did not select or order any of the materials, and that if they were purchased as alleged and used in the building, it was done without any knowledge on her part that they were purchased from the complainants and that she did not assent to such purchase and use, but dealt only with the contractor who purchased in his own name in constructing the house under contract. We do not hold that the notice required in cases of statutory liens does not apply in a case like this.
On the. entire evidence it is not clear that the chancellor erred in-dismissing the bill of complaint. Where the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a finding that ma
The decree is affirmed.