Petitioner is presently serving a sentence of 15 years imposed by the district court for the District of Massachusetts upon a plea of guilty to a charge of bank robbery. He appeals from the order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence. The action of the court below took place after the taking of testimony at a. hearing at which petitioner was not present or represented.
A preliminary question points up a matter that has concerned this court, for some time. Petitioner filed a brief, but was not present or otherwise represented at the hearing of his appeal. This, was in accordance with our customary practice when there are no special circumstances. See Price v. Johnston, 1948,
The following facts appear on the record. On January 25, 1957, petitioner was indicted, charged with robbery of a federally-insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On March 4 he was. arraigned and pleaded guilty, and on-March 13, 1957, he appeared and was. sentenced. On both these occasions he-was represented by counsel of his own choosing. In his petition he alleges that on January 24, 1957, at about 8 A.M., he was lured out of his home by a ruse and surrounded by several armed FBI agents “and at least one Lieutenant” of the Massachusetts State Police; that he
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was then placed under arrest and taken immediately to FBI headquarters in Boston; that during the morning he was shown a “confession” by his fiancee implicating him, and implicating herself as an accessory, and that he was taken to a room where his fiancee identified him and admitted signing the statement; that he was questioned “almost continuously” until 4:30 P.M., at which time he made an oral confession, which was then reduced to writing; and that thereafter he was taken before a United States Commissioner. He asserts that this delay between his arrest and his production before the Commissioner was a violation of his statutory and constitutional rights, citing McNabb v. United States, 1943,
The petitioner requested a hearing at which he could testify. In due course a hearing was held, but petitioner was not invited. Although there is nothing in the record showing the reason why, the government states it was because the court possessed petitioner’s “sworn affidavit contained in his motion.” Government brief, p. 3. The government goes on to say that although no hearing was required, “in an effort to give the appellant the benefit of any facts helpful to him which might be brought out at a hearing, the Court requested the United States Attorney to have witnesses present to be interrogated * * Id., p. 4. The ensuing rendition of Hamlet without the prince was anything but helpful to the petitioner, as the court found all material allegations of his sworn petition contradicted and untrue. Specifically, it found that petitioner voluntarily accompanied the agents to FBI headquarters, remained there throughout the day, confessed of his own free will, and was not arrested until after he had done so.
Assuming for the moment that a hearing was required, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (third paragraph); cf. Waley v. Johnston, 1942,
The government contends that the denial of the motion was nonetheless correct because the petition on its face conclusively shows petitioner has no grounds for relief. Insofar as the allegations of illegal detention are concerned, we readily agree. Excessive detention before arraignment is not, per se, a violation of constitutional rights, nor is the use at trial of a confession so obtained. Brown v. Allen, 1953,
A more serious question is presented by the contention that the confession was involuntary because obtained by fear and duress. This raises constitutional issues which under some circumstances may render the sentence subject to collateral attack. Compare Waley v. Johnston, supra, with Smith v. United States, 1950,
There are many reasons why a defendant may choose to plead guilty. They do not, simply by being denominated “fears,” necessitate the conclusion that the plea was not voluntary. The fact that a defendant is told that his brother and others will be called to testify against him if he stands trial can not be illegal coercion, at least in the absence of an allegation that their testimony would have been false. A contrary conclusion would mean that the more obviously guilty a defendant was, and the more witnesses there were to testify against him, the better would be his position to have his plea set aside at some later date on the ground that he had been “coerced.” Similarly, petitioner recites that his fiancee “confessed” in writing, and orally acknowledged her confession to him, and that he was told she would be charged as an accessory. We are not prepared to say that it can be coercion to inform a defendant that someone close to him who is guilty of a crime will be brought to book if he does not plead. If a defendant elects to sacrifice himself for such motives, that is his choice, and he cannot reverse it after he is dissatisfied with his sentence, or with other subsequent developments. Cf. Brown v. United States, 5 Cir., 1953,
Finally, petitioner alleges that he was told that if he did not admit the federal crime, he would be turned over to the state authorities. No doubt the crime, if committed, was also a state offense. This allegation merits no discussion.
Judgment will enter affirming the order of the District Court.