59 Mo. 310 | Mo. | 1875
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a suit to recover the amount of a check drawn on and paid by the plaintiff, but altered before payment.
The facts, as they appear from the record, are substantially these: Thomas Bliodus & Co., a business firm keeping their accounts with the plaintiff, drew a check on it for $20, pay
The case was tried before the court without the intervention of a jury, and at the instance of the plaintiff three declarations of law were given : First, The defendants were bound to the use of ordinary diligence in the discovery of the forgery, and if it appeared from the evidence that the defendants were guilty of negligence in failing to discover the forgery, and that plaintiff paid the amount of the draft to the defendants in ignorance of the fact that it was a forgery, then plaintiff was entitled to recover ;, Second : If-plaintiff paid the draft to defendants without knowing it to be forged and without any reasonable cause to believe it to be a forgery, but sup
It seems to be well settled that money erroneously paid, or allowed, under mutual ignorance or mistake of facts, may be recovered back. The cases founded on mistake seem to rest on this principle; that if parties, believing that a certain state of things exists, come to an agreement with such belief for its basis, on discovering their mutual error, they are remitted to their original rights. (Mowat vs. Wright; 1 Wend., 335, 62, per Savage, Ch. J.) As money paid under a mistake of fact may always be recovered back, one who pays money on forged paper, by discounting or cashing it, can always recover it back, provided he has not materially contributed to the mistake himself, and has given a sufficiently early notice of the mistake to the other party after he has discovered it. _ As to what is a sufficiently early notice, or in other words, reasonable time, there has been considerable difference of opinion. In the earlier English cases it was strictly held that the payor could not recover back the money unless he gave notice on the very day of the payment, and before any change of circumstances. (2 Pars. N. & B., 598, and note.)
But in this country this doctrine has not generally prevailed. The American courts have mostly repudiated it, and the accepted rule is that the payor must be allowed a reasonable time to detect the forgery and demand restitution. What will amount to a reasonable time will greatly depend on the circumstances of each particular case. It is conceded, at all
In the case of Espy vs. Bank of Cincinnati (18 Wall., 604), Stall and Meyer, customers and depositors with the First National Bank of Cincinnati, made their check on that bank for the sum of $26 50, payable to the order of Mrs. E. Hart, and delivered it to a stranger to all the parties to the transaction, out of which the controversy arose. The man erased the name of the payee, and the amount for which it was given, and inserted the name of “Espy, Heidelbach & Co., bankers and brokers,” and also the sum of $3,920, and passed it to Espy, Heidelbach & Co., in payment of bonds and gold which he purchased of them. The check was paid by the bank through the clearing-house, and the next day the fraud was discovered, and the bank made a demand on Espy, Heidelbach & Co. for the amount as paid through a mistake. Judge Miller writing the opinion of all the judges, after making the above statement of facts, said : “If this were all the case there could be no doubt of their right to recover. The principle that money so paid under a mistake of the facts of the ease can be recovered back is well settled, and in the case of raised or altered checks so paid by banks on which they were drawn there are numerous well considered cases where the right to recover has been established, when neither the party receiving nor the party paying has been in any fault or blame in the matter.”
In the case of the Canal Bank vs. Bank of Albany (1 Hill, 287), the payment was made on a forged indorsement, on the 28th of March, 1839, and on the 7th day of June thereafter the plaintiff called on the defendants and asked to have the money refunded, notifying them, at the same time, of the forgery; and it was decided that they were entitled to recover. Mr. Justice Co wen examined the English eases and strongly disapproved of them, and in the course of in's opinion said :
“But I am not willing to concede that delay in the abstract, as seems to- be supposed, can deprive the .party of his remedy to recover back money paid under the circumstances before us.- It is said that the défendants had indorsers behind them; and by delay they were prevented from charging them by giving reasonable notice. Admit this to be so. The plaintiffs did not stand in the relation of a holder. They were the drawees, and advanced the money by way of payment. They would never, therefore, think of notice to the defendants till they accidentally discovered the forgery. If there had been any unreasonable delay after such discovery, another question would be presented.” (S. P. Bank of Commerce vs. Union Bank, 3 Comst., 230; Kingston Bank vs. Ettinge, 40 N. Y., 391.)
In Koontz vs. Central National Bank, (51 Mo., 275) the draft was paid by mistake in July and no notice was given to the defendant of the error till the following December, and we held that the plaintiff might still recover. The cases of the U. S. Bank vs. Bank of Georgia, (10 Wheat., 333) and the Gloucester Bank vs. The Salem Bank, (17 Mass., 33) are strongly relied on by the counsel for the defendants in this court. They were both cases where the banks had received
Neither of these cases are in opposition to the principles of law announced previously in this opinion, but they are rather confirmatory of them. The court has found here that the plaintiff paid the forged draft under a mistake of fact, and its right to recover is undoubted.
The discovery of the forgery was made on the next day after payment, and whether the defendant was notified on that day or the next succeeding, in either event we think it was within a reasonable time. A point has been raised here that there was no offer to return the draft, but that does not appear to have been raised in the pleadings or passed upon in the court below.
We think the judgment should be affirmed ;