{orally.) It is insisted by counsel for defendant —First, that this court has no jurisdiction in the case under the act of congress, approved March 3, 1875, entitled “An act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from the state courts, and for other purposes, ” which act, it is insisted, repeals all prior acts upon the subject of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, including the provision
Again, it is a rule long settled that a later statute which is general and affirmative in its provisions does not abrogate a former which iparticular or special. Courts will not allow such an exposition of the statute as will 'revoke or alter, by construction of general words, a previous special statute, where the words may have their proper operation without it. These general propositions are so familiar and so well settled that it is unnecessary to quote authority to support themApplying them to the act of 1875 we are constrained to hold that it does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, repeal the tenth clause of section 629 of the Revised Statutes, under which this suit is brought. To give to the act of 1875 the construction contended for, and to hold that there is no other statute under which the circuit courts of the United States can in any ease have jurisdiction, would lead to consequences disastrous in their effects, and which congress could not. have had in contemplation. An examination of prior statutes will show numerous provisions under which suits may be brought in particular cases in the circuit courts of the United States, and some, at least, of which could not be maintained, under the act of 1875.
The remaining question is whether jurisdiction can be maintained under subdivision 10 of section 629, of the Revised Statutes, which, as we have seen, has not been repealed, and which gives the circuit courts of the United States jurisdiction “of all suits by or against any
Counsel for defendant insists that under this statute it is not enough that the suit is brought by a national bank. It must, in his view, also appear that it involves the construction of some provision of the constitution, or of a treaty, or of some law of the United States. Ever since the decision of the supreme court in the case of Osborne v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, it has been taken as settled that it is competent for congress to eonfer upon a national bank created by it the right to sue in the federal courts by reason of their character as such. An examination of the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in that case will show that he placed the right to sue upon the simple ground that the bank was chartered by congress, lie insisted that the right of the bank to sue at all in any court depended upon a law of the United States; that this question of the right to sue, however clear it might be, and however well settled, was still a question that might be renewed in every case, and therefore one which forms an original ingredient in every cause. He said: “Whether it bo in fact relied on in the defence, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on. The right of this plaintiff to sue cannot be dependent on the defence which the defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must depend on the state of things where the action is brought. The questions which the case involves, then, mast determine its character, whether those questions bo made in the cause or not.” This ruling, as I have had occasion heretofore to decide, applies with full force to the construction of the present national banking law. See Foss v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 1 McCrary, 474.* In numerous cases in this court it has been taken for granted that the ruling of the supreme court in Osborne v. U. S. Bank is conclusive upon this question. See Bank v. County of Douglas, 3 Dill. 298, and note.
In the case of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 395, Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the opinion of the supreme court, said:
“Jurisdiction in such suits (by or against national banks) is unquestionably vested in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which sueh association may be established.”
The decisions of circuit judges in other circuits have been to the same effect, and are numerous, but it is not necessary here to cite cases.
The motion to dismiss is overruled.