123 Ky. 740 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1906
Opinion by
Reversing.
The General Assembly passed the following act, which was approved March 24, 1904:
“An act relating to revenue and taxation, providing for license taxes on compounded, rectified adulterated or blended spirits, known and designated as single stamped spirits, and providing penalties for violation of its provisions.
“Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky:
“Section 1. That every corporation, association, company, co-partnership or individual engaged in this State in the busines or occupation of compounding rectifying, adulterating or blending distilled spirits', known and' designated as single stamped.spirits, shall pay to the commonwealth of Kentucky a license tax therefor.
“Sec. 2. The license tax imposed by the first section of this act shall be based upon the amount of distilled spirits compounded, rectified, adulterated or blended, viz: Fifty cents for each barrel so rectified, compounded, adulterated or blended distilled spirits, to be of standard measure. Twenty-five cents for each package containing less than one barrel of such compounded rectified, adulterated or blended distilled spirits.
“Sec. 3. It shall be the duty of each corporation, association, company, co-partnership or individual engaged in this State in the business or oeupation of compounding, rectifying, adulterating or blending*746 distilled spirits, known and designated as single stamped spirits, to make and deliver to the Auditor of Public Accounts, on the 31st day of December, 1904 (or within ten days), and at the end of each six months thereafter, a report, sworn to, showing ■ the number of barrels, standard measure, and the number of packages containing less than one barrel, of compounded, rectified, adulterated or blended distilled spirits, known and designated as single stamped spirits, sold during the six months then ended, and at the same time pay into the state treasury, through the Auditor, ■ the amount of taxes due the State, as imposed' by this act.
“.Sec. 4. Any compounder, rectifier or blender, liable for the taxes imposed by this act, or embraced by its provisions, who shall willfully fail or refuse to make and deliver to the Auditor sworn reports required by section 3 of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be fined five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense, to be recovered by indictment in the Franklin circuit court.
‘‘Sec. 5. The provisions of this act shall apply only to such corporations, companies, associations, co-partnerships or individuals actually engaged in compounding, rectifying, adulterating or blending distilled spirits.
“Sec. 6. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”
See acts 1904, p. .255, c. 104.
Appellants failed to file the reports with the Auditor as required by the act, and, being indicted therefor in the Franklin circuit court, demurred to the indictment, and, their demurrer being overruled, excepted. They pleaded not guilty, and, the case being heard and judgment having been entered against them, they" appeal.
The chief ground for reversal is that 'the act is
An analysis of the bill itself should determine the jmrpose for which it was enacted. Section 51 of the Constitution provides: “No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended, extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and published at length.” The legislators, in conformity with the requirements of this section of the Constitution, styled
Appellee insists that, while it is true that the bill raises revenue, this is an incident merely, and that the primary purpose of the bill is to regulate the business of the rectifier, and, being such, was not passed in violation of section 47 of the Constitution, and is, as a police regulation, in full force and effect. We are aware that the police power of the government has been, for the good of the public, so extended that it now covers a much broader field than formerly; that it can be so extended in its scope as to reach and affect, not only large interests, in which many are engaged, but small concerns as well. In extending its power and broadening its field of operations, one main object is sought to be attained — one purpose is kept in legislative view: The betterment of society; the advancement of the public good; to secure to the individual citizen all his constitutional rights. No police regulation, we take it, will ever be exercised over any business which does not in some way affect the general public or the private citizen in the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, But that regulation comes only in those cases where the business itself, or the product which it manufactures, is calculated to take from the public the
Appellee has cited numerous authorities of this and other States illustrative of the extent to which the police power of the State has been carried by legislative enactment. But he has not cited any authority in point in which the law in question did not require the granting of a license as a condition precedent to engaging in the business; such as the sale of liquor by retail- or by barrel-house men, the peddling of goods, the operation of foreign insurance companies through local agents, and the licensing of lawyers, The courts have held, and we think properly so, that all such acts are police regulations, and the revenue derived from their enforcement is a mere incident — ■ the main purpose and -object of the acts in question being the protection of the people in their health and morals, and against impostors and fakes; and in each and every instance there was required, as a condition precedent to engaging in the business, the payment of a license fee and the granting of a license, as an evidence to the public that the holder had complied with the requirements of the law. It is this feature which requires of the applicant compliance with certain rules and regulations as a condition precedent to engaging in any particular line of business that is characteristic of all the measures which may properly be designated as police regulations. Mr. Justice Story, in United States v. Mayo, 26 Fed. Cas. 1231, thus lays down the rule for determining a revenue bill: “The true meaning of revenue laws in these clauses is such
Tested by these rules, which are sound in principle, the bill before us cannot be regarded in any other light than as a bill for revenue. It does not seek to regulate in any way, shape, or form the manufacture or sale of liquor. It seeks nothing of the manufacturer but the payment of the tax. The identical question raised in this case was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Perry County v. Railroad, 58 Ala. 546. In that case the bill was entitled: “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to establish revenue laws for the state of Alabama.’ ” The Constitution of that state was practically the same as the Constitution of this State, in that it required that all bills for raising revenue should originate in the House of Representatives, but that the Senate might amend or reject them, as other bills. It was contended in that case that a bill to amend a revenue act or system of laws in existence was permitted by that part of the Constitution which confers upon the Senate the power to amend or reject a revenue bill. But this contention was denied by the court, and, after reviewing the history of like constitutional provisions, the
It is insisted by appellee that it is a delicate duty for the court to declare an act unconstitutional; that, in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the act in a case of this sort; that, if the House had deemed the act an infringement of its prerogative, it might have refused to consider it when] it came to it from the Senate; that, if the Governor-, had deemed it unconstitutional, he might have vetoed it after it had passed both houses; and that after the act has been concurred in by both houses, and lias been approved by the Governor, if there is any construction of it, which may reasonably be adopted, rendering it constitutional, that construction should be followed. This is true. A legislative act should never be held unconstitutional, if its validity can be, by .any reasonable construction, upheld. But, in the case before us, the only construction that can be given the act in question is that it is an act for revenue, pure and simple; and, eriginating, as it did, in the Senate, it was passed in violation of the plain provision of the Constitution.
As the case must be reversed for this cause, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other questions raised upon this appeal.
For the reasons given, the judgment is reversed,