142 Mo. App. 598 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1909
On February 23, 1905, plaintiff, a corporation, sold to defendant an instrument or machine known as the Regina Concerto. The purchase price was seven hundred and fifty dollars of which defendant paid two hundred and fifty dollars in cash and gave his note for five hundred dollars, payable in installments thereafter, which note he secured by a chattel mortgage on the instrument. He afterwards defaulted in paying the installments of his note and the present action in replevin was instituted to recover possession of the instrument under the. terms of the chattel mortgage. The cause was submitted to the court on stipulated facts, and we will cull from the stipulation such facts as we deem material to the decision. The defense to the action rests on the notion that the chattel mortgage executed by defendant to plaintiff was void and gave no security, because the instrument was purchased by defendant to be used in violation of section 3018 of the Statutes (R. S. 1899) of which unlawful purpose plaintiff had knowledge when the sale was made and the mortgage executed. Instead of quoting the section as printed in the statutes, we will copy the original Act, including the title:
“An act to prevent any dramshop keeper from keeping or permitting to be kept in or about his dram-shop certain musical instruments, any billiard, pool or other gaming table, bowling or ten-pin alley, cards, dice, or other device for gaming or amusement.
Section 1. Dramshops not to keep gaming tables, etc. — penalty.
Be It Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:
“Approved June 17, 1889.”
Plaintiff admits knowing the appliance was purchased to be used in a saloon defendant kept in the city of St. Louis, but contends the statute, when properly construed in connection with the title of the original act, refers only to pianos, organs or other instruments like them; that these words in the act “or other musical instrument whatever,” must be construed according to the doctrine ejusclem generis and held to include only musical instruments similar to pianos and organs, and the Regina Concerto is not a musical instrument within the statutory meaning of those words. It is agreed an organ produces music when air is pumped into an air chest; that it causes certain valves to open
Tbe statute inAToked in defense is one forbidding a dramshop keeper to keep, exhibit or use, or suffer to be kept, exhibited or used “in his dramshop a piano1, organ or other musical instrument whatever, for the purpose of performing upon or having the same performed upon in such dramshop.” We ask whether the appliance in controversy is a musical instrument within the meaning of the statute, which, of course, being penal, is to be construed strictly. The question may ■ be otherwise framed in these words: Did defendant violate the statute by keeping the appliance in his saloon? We consider it a musical instrument; one that could be performed on, and that -winding it and dropping a coin in the slot would constitute performing on it. These things are true as they are understood in common speech; for its only purpose was to give forth musical sounds, and Ave reject the contention that it was not a musical instrument. We reject also the argument that performing on a musical instrument consists only in playing on it in a common way; as by fingering the keyboard of a piano or the strings of a guitar; draAving the bow of a violin across the strings, or breathing into a horn. Nevertheless we do not think the appliance was such a musical instrument as the Legislature meant to designate in the statute. It will be observed the offense of a dramshop keeper consists not only in keeping, exhibiting or using a musical instrument, or suffering it to be kept, exhibited or used, but in doing so “for the purpose of performing upon or having the same performed upon” in his dramshop. If these words are to have any force, they must be held to mean the instrument must be kept, exhibited
We have said nothing about whether, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the words “or other musical instrument whatever” following the words “a piano, organ,” and read in connection with the title of the Act, which speaks of “certain musical instruments,” can be held to include an instrument like the Regina Concerto. Said doctrine is applicable to cases of this character. [State v. Gilmore, 98 Mo. 205.] We think it is unnecessary to go into that phase of the case, for it is clear to our minds that on a proper construction of the language of the statute, without reference to said rule of construction, the instrument in controversy was not covered. Therefore the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.