Jаnet Thibadeau, a resident of Ventura County, California, brought an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act against her former husband, a resident of DeKalb County, Georgia, which was tried in the Superior Court of DeKalb County. Two children are, under a separаtion agreement, made a part of the divorce decree, in the custody of the mother, with agreement by the father to pay a stated amount of child support. After hearing evidence the Georgia court entered rulings which are the subject of the appeal аnd cross appeal. Held:
1. In a reciprocal support action as in the Uniform Support of Dependents Act, the "sufficiency of thе petition as against the defendant’s objections must be determined under the rules of law of this State, rather than the law where the action оriginated.” See
Manis v. Genest,
2. After a hearing in which both sidеs were represented, the court ordered the defendant to pay $100 per month (a sum authorized by the evidence and also identicаl with the support feature of the prior Georgia decree of divorce) to the DeKalb County Adult Probation Office, under the authority of Code Ann. § 99-922a (b). Upon receipt of such payments it is the duty of the probation department acting for the court of the responding state "tо transmit the same forthwith to the court of the initiating state.” Code Ann. § 99-923a (a). However, the court conditioned the payment as follows: "The chief probation officer is hereby ordered to hold any *156 and all such payments and not forward same during any period of time in which the exaсt location and address of the petitioner and said minor children has not been made known by the appropriate authorities of Ventura County, State of California, to this Court.” This court has no control over the processes of the court of the initiating state, nor of Ventura County or its administrative offices, and cannot compel its cooperation beyond the bounds of the substantially similar terms of the reciprocal law. For discussion of the law generally, see Support — Reciprocal Enforcement, 42 ALR2d 768 et seq. The duties of California are those set out in its own statutes pertaining to the initiating state, and they cannot be compelled by the courts of Georgia. Accordingly, the second enumeration of error in case No. 49717 is well taken.
3. Code Ann. § 99-928a of the URESA provides: "Participation in any proceedings under this Chapter shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding.” Thus, it was held under the equivalent Florida statute that a parent in the responding state could not maintain a counterclaim for divorce. "The whole purpose оf the law is to require a respondent husband to support his dependents, and the Legislature could never have intended that a state attorney of this state, a public prosecuting official, who represents the dependents in such a proceeding, should be transformed into an attorney representing a private client in a divorce suit.” Blois v. Blois, 138 S2d 373, 374. We agree that the statute precludes counterclaims basеd merely on the theory that the plaintiff, by initiating the procedure on behalf of the named dependents, has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court of the responding state for other purposes. On a change of custody proceeding the court has "lost jurisdiction of the res” after the children and the spouse having custody become domiciled in another state.
Van Gorder v. Van Gorder,
Judgment reversed on main appeal, and on cross appeal.