Thermo Spas, Inc. v. Red Ball Spas & Baths, Inc.Thermo Spas, Inc. v. Red Ball Spas & Baths, Inc.
Appeals (1) from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Brown, J.), entered April 6, 1992 in Saratoga County which granted plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment against defendant Steven Naples, and (2) from that part of an order of said court, entered June 3, 1992 in Saratoga County which assessed damages against defendant Steven Naples.
In 1989, defendants Red Ball Spas & Baths, Inc., Ooo’s & Aah’s Spas, Inc. and Dollars Worth Spas & Baths, Inc. (hereinafter the corporate defendants) arranged with plaintiff, a supplier of spas and hot tubs, to market and sell its products. When the corporate defendants failed to make payment in accord with the agreement, plaintiff sued them and their personal guarantors, defendants Lawrence Dwyer and Steven Naples. Following joinder of issue, plaintiff served defendants with a discovery notice requesting various corporate records. Defendants failed to timely comply, prompting plaintiff to move for and obtain a 30-day conditional order of dismissal. When defendants still did not produce the documents within the 30-day period, plaintiff then moved pursuant to
The motion was returnable on January 24, 1992 and when
We affirm. In view of the foregoing sequence of events, we discern no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s failure to consider the woefully late papers submitted on Naples’ behalf. While a court can in its discretion accept late papers,
Finally, inasmuch as the papers submitted by plaintiff with regard to the dollar amount of the indebtedness of each of the corporate defendants, including the corporate defendant for whom Naples executed a guarantee, fully support the result found by Supreme Court we see no reason to disturb the judgment (see, Reynolds Sec. v Underwriters Bank & Trust Co.,
Mercure, J. P., Cardona, White and Casey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs.
Notes
While plaintiff takes issue with the propriety of this appeal relying on precedent which precludes direct appeal from a default judgment, it is well established that this mode of proceeding is proper in cases where the default is predicated upon