403 F.3d 1223 | 11th Cir. | 2005
Before CARNES, HULL, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order to require the defendants to transport Theresa Marie
Schindler Schiavo to a hospital to reestablish nutrition and hydration and for any
medical treatment necessary to sustain her life, and to require the state court judge
defendant to rescind his February 25, 2005 order directing removal of nutrition
and hydration from Schiavo and to restrain him from issuing any further orders
1 that would discontinue nutrition and hydration. After notice and a hearing, the
district court entered a careful order which is attached as an Appendix to this
opinion. Plaintiffs have also petitioned this Court to grant the same injunctive
relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
Although we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction over appeals from orders
granting or denying temporary restraining orders, in circumstances such as these,
“when a grant or denial of a TRO might have a serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence, and can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal, we may
exercise appellate jurisdiction.” Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations, marks, and ellipsis omitted); see also United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961). In these circumstances we treat temporary
restraining orders as equivalent to preliminary injunctions or final judgments,
either of which are appealable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1292(a)(1).
The district court correctly stated the four factors to be considered in
determining whether temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief is to be
granted, which are whether the movant has established: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if
the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief
would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the
public interest. See Ingram, 50 F.3d at 900; Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163,
1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Requests for emergency injunctive relief are not
uncommon in federal court and sometimes involve decisions affecting life and
death. Controlling precedent is clear that injunctive relief may not be granted
unless the plaintiff establishes the substantial likelihood of success criterion. See
Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176; see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 339, 119 S. Ct. 1961, 1978 (1999) (“Plaintiffs with questionable claims would not meet the likelihood of success criterion.”).
Applying those factors, the district court determined that the last three
weighed in favor of granting the temporary restraining order. The court reasoned
that because those three factors were met, plaintiffs only had to show a substantial
case on the merits. After analyzing each of plaintiffs’ claims, the district court
concluded they had failed to show a substantial case on the merits as to any of the
claims. 2
While the district court conducted de novo review of plaintiffs’ claims, we review the district court’s denial of temporary injunctive relief only for an abuse of discretion. This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the district court
applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper procedures, or relies on
clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion that is clearly
unreasonable or incorrect. Klay v. United Healthcare, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096
(11th Cir. 2004); Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). Short of that, an abuse of discretion standard recognizes
there is a range of choice within which we will not reverse the district court even
if we might have reached a different decision. See
McMahon v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001); Rasbury v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168-69 (11th Cir. 1994). 3
For the reasons explained in the district court’s opinion, we agree that the
plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a substantial case on the merits of any of their
claims. We also conclude that the district court’s carefully thought-out decision to
deny temporary relief in these circumstances is not an abuse of discretion. 4
The principal theme of plaintiffs’ argument against the district court’s denial
of a temporary restraining order is that Pub. L. No. 109-3, which Congress enacted
to enable them to bring this lawsuit, mandates that injunctive relief be granted to
enable them to have a full trial on the merits of their claims. Pub. L. No. 109-3 is
an extraordinary piece of legislation, and it does many things. Defendants contend
that the legislation is so extraordinary that it is unconstitutional in several respects.
We need not decide that question. For purposes of determining whether temporary
or preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate, we indulge the usual presumption
that congressional enactments are constitutional. United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 607, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004). It is enough for present purposes that in enacting Pub. L.
No. 109-3 Congress did not alter for purposes of this case the long-standing
general law governing whether temporary restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions should be issued by federal courts.
There is no provision in Pub. L. No. 109-3 addressing whether or under
what conditions the district court should grant temporary or preliminary relief in
this case. There is no more reason in the text of the Act to read in any special rule
about temporary or preliminary relief than there would be to read in a special rule
about deciding the case before trial on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or summary
judgment grounds. Not only that, but Congress considered and specifically
rejected provisions that would have mandated, or permitted with favorable
implications, the grant of the pretrial stay. There is this enlightening exchange in
the legislative history concerning the Senate bill that was enacted:
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to seek clarification from the
majority leader about one aspect of this bill, the issue of whether
Congress has mandated that a Federal court issue a stay pending
determination of the case.
Mr. FRIST. I would be pleased to help clarify this issue.
Mr. LEVIN. Section 5 of the original version of the Martinez bill
conferred jurisdiction on a Federal court to hear a case like this, and
then stated that the Federal court "shall" issue a stay of State court
proceedings pending determination of the Federal case. I was
opposed to that provision because I believe Congress should not
mandate that a Federal judge issue a stay. Under longstanding law
and practice, the decision to issue a stay is a matter of discretion for
the Federal judge based on the facts of the case. The majority leader
and the other bill sponsors accepted my suggestion that the word
"shall" in section 5 be changed to "may."
The version of the bill we are now considering strikes section 5
altogether. Although nothing in the text of the new bill mandates a
stay, the omission of this section, which in the earlier Senate-passed
bill made a stay permissive, might be read to mean that Congress
intends to mandate a stay. I believe that reading is incorrect. The
absence of any state [sic] provision in the new bill simply means that
Congress relies on current law. Under current law, a judge may
decide whether or not a stay is appropriate.
Does the majority leader share my understanding of the bill?
Mr. FRIST. I share the understanding of the Senator from Michigan,
as does the junior Senator from Florida who is the chief sponsor of
this bill. Nothing in the current bill or its legislative history mandates
a stay. I would assume, however, the Federal court would grant a stay
based on the facts of this case because Mrs. Schiavo would need to be
alive in order for the court to make its determination. Nevertheless,
this bill does not change current law under which a stay is
discretionary.
Mr. LEVIN. In light of that assurance, I do not object to the
unanimous consent agreement under which the bill will be considered
by the Senate. I do not make the same assumption as the majority
leader makes about what a Federal court will do. Because the
discretion of the Federal court is left unrestricted in this bill, I will not
exercise my right to block its consideration.
151 Cong. Rec. S3099-100 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (colloquy between Sens.
Levin & Frist).
This enlightening exchange does not contradict the plain meaning of Pub. L.
No. 109-3, but instead reinforces it. Plainly, Congress knew how to change the
law to favor these plaintiffs to the extent that it collectively wished to do so. That
is what the changes it did make, including those to standing law, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, and abstention, demonstrate. When Congress explicitly modifies some pre-existing rules of law applicable to a subject but says nothing
about other rules of law, the only reasonable reading is that Congress meant no
change in the rules it did not mention. The dissent characterizes the language of
the Act as clear. It is on this point: the language of the Act clearly does not
purport to change the law concerning issuance of temporary or preliminary relief. 5
To interpret Pub. L. No. 109-3 as requiring that temporary or preliminary
relief be entered regardless of whether it is warranted under pre-existing law
would go beyond reading into the Act a provision that is not there. It would
require us to read into the Act a provision that Congress deliberately removed in
order to clarify that pre-existing law did govern this issue.
Nor do we find convincing plaintiffs’ argument that in reaching its decision
to deny the motion for a temporary restraining order the district court violated Pub.
L. No. 109-3 by considering the procedural history of extensive state court
litigation. The plaintiffs’ complaint and other filings in the district court asserted
that they had not been afforded procedural due process by the state courts. Their
pleadings and brief in the district court and this Court are replete with citations to
and discussion about the state court proceedings and decisions. In deciding
whether the plaintiffs had shown a substantial case on the merits of their federal
procedural due process claims, the district court had to consider the prior
proceedings in state court. There is no way to consider a claim that the state court
proceedings violated the Due Process Clause without examining what those
proceedings were. In obedience to Pub. L. No. 109-3 the district court considered
the federal constitutional claims de novo and made its own independent evaluation
of them.
Plaintiffs have also moved this Court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal, asking us to order the
same temporary or preliminary relief that we have concluded the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying. They are supported in that motion by a
Statement of Interest filed by the United States’ Department of Justice.
The All Writs Act provides: “The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id.
The purpose of the power codified in that statute is to allow courts “to protect the
jurisdiction they already have, derived from some other source.” Klay, 376 F.3d at
1099. It gives a “residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise
covered by statute” and is an “extraordinary remedy that . . . is essentially
equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other,
adequate remedies at law.” Id. at 1100 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Our decisions make clear that where the relief sought is in essence a
preliminary injunction, the All Writs Act is not available because other, adequate
remedies at law exist, namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, which provides for temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See Fla. Med. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the district court’s grant of injunction under the All Writs Act because “Rule 65
provides sufficient protection for the jurisdiction of the district court”); Klay, 376
F.3d at 1101 n.13.
In Klay, we explained that the injunction sought in Florida Medical
Association was a “textbook” example of a preliminary injunction because “[i]t was issued to preserve the status quo and prevent allegedly irreparable injury until
the court had the opportunity to decide whether to issue a permanent injunction.”
Klay, 376 F.3d at 1101 n.13. The injunction being sought by the plaintiffs is
another textbook example of an effort to use the All Writs Act in order to
circumvent the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. Granting the
injunctive relief would “confer[] the same legal rights upon plaintiffs and impose[]
the same legal duties upon defendants as would a preliminary injunction.” Fla.
Med. Ass’n, 601 F.2d at 202; id. (the All Writs Act “does not authorize a district court to promulgate an ad hoc procedural code”). Under our circuit law, the All
Writs Act cannot be used to evade the requirements for preliminary injunctions.
Klay, 376 F.3d at 1101 n.13.
There is no denying the absolute tragedy that has befallen Mrs. Schiavo. As
the Florida Second District Court of Appeals has observed, we all have our own
family, our own loved ones, and our own children. However, we are called upon
to make a collective, objective decision concerning a question of law. In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, ___ So. 2d ___, 2005 WL 600377, at *4 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 16, 2005). In the end, and no matter how much we wish Mrs. Schiavo had
never suffered such a horrible accident, we are a nation of laws, and if we are to
continue to be so, the pre-existing and well-established federal law governing
injunctions as well as Pub. L. No. 109-3 must be applied to her case. While the
position of our dissenting colleague has emotional appeal, we as judges must
decide this case on the law.
AFFIRMED; PETITION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DENIED. 6 WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I strongly dissent from the majority’s decision to deny the request for an
injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act and the request for a preliminary
injunction. First, Plaintiffs have demonstrated their entitlement to a preliminary
injunction. Second, the denial of Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction frustrates
Congress’s intent, which is to maintain the status quo by keeping Theresa Schiavo
alive until the federal courts have a new and adequate opportunity to consider the
constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs. The entire purpose for the statute was to
give the federal courts an opportunity to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’
constitutional claims with a fresh set of eyes. Denial of Plaintiffs’ petition cuts
sharply against that intent, which is evident to me from the language of the statute,
as well as the swift and unprecedented manner of its enactment. Theresa
Schiavo’s death, which is imminent, effectively ends the litigation without a fair
opportunity to fully consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
We should, at minimum, grant Plaintiffs’ All Writs Petition for emergency
injunctive relief. First, I note that there is no precedent that prohibits our granting
of this petition. Second, mindful of equitable principles, the extraordinary
circumstances presented by this appeal require that we grant the petition to
preserve federal jurisdiction and permit the opportunity to give Plaintiffs’ claims
the full and meaningful review they deserve.
In considering this extraordinary case, I am mindful that “[t]he essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity
has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims.”
Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ
., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (citations omitted). Keeping
those principles firmly in mind, “mercy and practicality” compel us to grant the
relief requested.
I. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651
The All Writs Act provides: “The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28
U.S.C. § 1651. Federal courts have “both the inherent power and the
constitutional obligation
to protect their jurisdiction . . . to carry out Article III
functions.”
Procup v. Strickland , 792 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(emphasis added). Toward that end, the All Writs Act permits federal courts to
protect their jurisdiction with regards to “not only ongoing proceedings, but
potential future proceedings.”
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc. , 376 F.3d 1092,
1099 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted);
ITT Comm. Devel. Corp. v. 1 Barton , 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 n.19 (5th Cir. 1978) (“When potential jurisdiction
exists, a federal court may issue status quo orders to ensure that once its
jurisdiction is shown to exist, the court will be in a position to exercise it.”).
Although the Act does not create any substantive federal jurisdiction, it empowers
federal courts “to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction previously acquired on some
other independent ground,”
see Brittingham v. Comm’r , 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th
Cir. 1971), and codifies the “federal courts’ traditional, inherent power to protect
the jurisdiction they already have.”
Klay , 376 F.3d at 1099.
An injunction under the All Writs Act is an extraordinary remedy, one that
“invests a court with a power that is essentially equitable, and as such, not
generally available.”
Clinton v. Goldsmith , 526 U.S. 529, 537, 119 S. Ct 1538,
1543 (1999). A federal court’s power under the Act, while limited, is broad
enough that “[a] court may grant a writ under this act whenever it is ‘calculated [in
the court’s] sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it.”
Klay ,
376 F.3d at 1100 (citing
Adams v. United States , 317 U.S. 269, 273, 63 S. Ct. 236,
239 (1942)).
I am careful to stress that equitable relief under the All Writs Act is not to
be confused with a traditional injunction, which is “predicated upon some cause of
action.”
Klay , 376 F.3d at 1100. An injunction entered pursuant to the All Writs
Act is not a substitute for traditional injunctive relief. The All Writs Act
injunction is distinguished from a traditional injunction not by its effect, but by its
purpose. To obtain relief under the All Writs Act, Plaintiffs need not satisfy the
traditional four-part test associated with traditional injunctions “because a court’s
traditional power to protect its jurisdiction, codified by the act, is grounded in
entirely separate concerns.”
Id. However, Plaintiffs must show that “some
ongoing proceeding . . . is being threatened by someone else’s action or behavior.”
Id.
Relief pursuant to the All Writs Act should only be granted in extraordinary
circumstances where inaction would prevent a federal court from exercising its
proper Article III jurisdiction. 2
As an appellate court, we may grant All Writs Act relief to preserve our
“potential jurisdiction . . . where an appeal is not then pending but may be later
perfected.”
F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co. , 384 U.S. 597, 603, 86 S. Ct. 1738, 1742
(1966). In
Dean Foods , the Supreme Court sustained the entry of a preliminary
injunction that prevented the consummation of a merger of two corporations. The
Supreme Court held that the use of an All Writs Act injunction was particularly
appropriate in a situation where “an effective remedial order . . . would otherwise
be virtually impossible.”
Id . at 605. That is precisely the case here.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the issuance of an injunction is essential to
preserve the federal courts’ ability to “bring the litigation to a natural conclusion.” Klay
, 376 F.3d at 1102. By failing to issue an injunction requiring the reinsertion
of Theresa Schiavo’s feeding tube, we virtually guarantee that the merits of
Plaintiffs’ claims will never be litigated in federal court. That outcome would not
only result in manifest injustice, but it would thwart Congress’s clearly expressed
command that Plaintiffs’ claims be given
de novo review by a federal court.
Given the extraordinary circumstances of this case, we are fully within our
power to issue an injunction “in aid of [our] jurisdiction” pursuant to the All Writs
Act. Under the Act, “[a] court may enjoin almost any conduct ‘which, left
unchecked, would have . . . the practical effect of diminishing the court’s power to
bring the litigation to a natural conclusion.”
Klay , 376 F.3d at 1102 (citing
Barton
, 569 F.2d at 1359). Federal courts may “compel acts necessary to promote
the resolution of issues in a case properly before it” including “issu[ing] orders to
aid in conducting factual inquiries.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted).
The issuance of an All Writs Act injunction is, as mentioned earlier, an
extraordinary remedy. However, this case is clearly extraordinary. Furthermore,
entry of an All Writs Act injunction is necessary to preserve federal jurisdiction to
hear Plaintiffs’ claims. My research has not revealed any precedent which clearly
prohibits the entry of an All Writs Act injunction in a situation where a few days’
delay is “necessary or appropriate in aid of” federal court jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
1651. In contrast, refusing to grant the equitable relief would, through Theresa
Schiavo’s death, moot the case and eliminate federal jurisdiction.
This deprivation would directly contravene Congress’s recent enactment
granting jurisdiction in this case. An Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3 § 2 (Mar. 21, 2005). The first step in statutory
interpretation requires that courts apply the plain meaning of the statutory
language unless it is ambiguous.
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249,
253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992);
United States v. Fisher , 289 F.3d 1329,
1337-38 (11th Cir. 2002). Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's text
should we apply canons of statutory interpretation, such as the canon of
constitutional avoidance.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker , 535 U.S. 125,
134, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 1235 (2002).
Because the language of the statute is clear, the majority’s reliance on
legislative history is unwarranted and incorrect. As originally proposed, the Act
mandated a stay of proceedings while the district court considered Plaintiffs’
claims. A later version changed the language from “shall” (mandating a stay) to
“may” (authorizing a stay).
See 151 Cong. Rec. 3099, 3100 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
2005) (statement of Sen. Levin). Although the final version of the Act did not
contain any stay provision, we should not read this to mean that Congress intended
to deny this Court the power to issue a stay. The reason that Congress deleted the
stay provision is that “this bill does not change current law under which a stay is
discretionary.”
Id. (statement of Sen. Frist). In short, the legislation did not need
an explicit stay provision because, given the already-existing discretionary power
of federal courts to issue injunctions in aid of jurisdiction, it would have been
redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the majority’s assertion that the text of the
statute limits or eliminates our power to enter an injunction is misplaced.
Here, we have Congress’s clear mandate requiring the federal courts to
consider the actual merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Congress intended for this case to
be reviewed with a fresh set of eyes. We are not called upon to consider the
wisdom of this legislation. In granting this injunction we would merely effectuate
Congress’s intent.
If Congress had intended that federal review of the issues raised by
Plaintiffs be given customary and ordinary treatment, that review would be
confined to consideration of the denial of the motion for a writ of habeas corpus in
Case No. 05-11517. There, consideration of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims
would be limited by the substantial deference that is afforded to previous state
court determinations. Yet, Congress went to great lengths to remove many of
those limitations. First, the legislation eliminates any “standing” barriers to the
commencement of an action by Plaintiffs. Secondly, the legislation gives the
Middle District of Florida entirely new consideration over any claim of a violation
of Theresa Schiavo’s constitutional rights, without respect to “any prior state court
determination and regardless of whether such a claim has previously been raised,
considered, or decided in state court proceedings.” The legislation goes even
further to eliminate any exhaustion requirements. Congress obviously intended
that this case be considered by federal courts without the customary limitations.
Today, we are not called upon to second-guess the wisdom of Congress, but to
apply the law it has passed.
II. Preliminary Injunction
At first glance, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction does not appear as strong
as their claim pursuant to the All Writs Act. However, I believe that an injunction
is appropriate and, at the very least, we should issue an injunction to permit the
district court to review Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.
To prevail on their request for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must demonstrate
the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) threatened injury to the movant outweighs
the potential damage that the proposed injunction may cause the defendants; and
(4) the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest.
See All Care Nursing
Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc.
, 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted). The issuance of an injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and
the moving party “bears the burden to clearly establish the four prerequisites.”
Café 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County
, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993).
It is clear from our cases that proof of a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits is an indispensable prerequisite to a preliminary injunction.
All Care
Nursing Serv.,
887 F.2d at 1537. However, the movant must demonstrate a
“substantial likelihood,” not a substantial certainty. To require more undermines
the purpose of even considering the other three prerequisites. Thus, instead, “the
movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal
question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in
favor of granting the [preliminary injunction].”
Ruiz v. Estelle , 650 F.2d 555, 565
(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
see Gonzalez v. Reno , No. 00-11424-D, 2000 WL
381901 at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000);
United States v. Hamilton , 963 F.2d 322,
323 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting ); Garcia-Mir v. Meese , 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th
Cir. 1986). The review “require[s] a delicate balancing of the probabilities of
ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable
injury which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief.”
Siegel v.
Lepore
, 234 F.3d 1163, 1178 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
As we stated in
Gonzalez , “where the balance of the equities weighs heavily
in favor of granting the [injunction], the movant need only show a substantial case
on the merits.”
Gonzalez, 2000 WL 381901 at *1 (internal citations omitted)
(alteration in original). In this case, the balance of the equities weighs heavily in
favor of granting the injunction. We determine the balance of the equities by
examining the three final factors required to grant a preliminary injunction.
Garcia-Mir
, 781 F.2d at1453.
“A showing of irreparable harm is the
sine qua non of injunctive relief.”
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville,
896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation
omitted). Here, the immediate irreparable injury is not only possible, it is
imminent. I am aware of no injury more irreparable than death. Clearly, the
threatened injury of death outweighs any harm the proposed injunction may cause,
i.e. reinserting the feeding tube. In fact, I fail to see any harm in reinstating the
feeding tube. On the other hand, a denial of the request for injunction will result
in the death of Theresa Schiavo. Finally, an injunction in this case clearly would
not be adverse to public interest, thus satisfying the fourth and final criteria
necessary to grant a preliminary injunction. Upon reviewing these three factors, it
is obvious that the equities weigh heavily in favor of granting the injunction.
I now consider the first prong, whether Plaintiffs presented a substantial
case on the merits. In the complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Theresa Schiavo’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated in that she was not
provided a fair and impartial trial, she was not given adequate procedural due
process, and she was not afforded equal protection of the laws. Further, Plaintiffs
contend that Theresa Schiavo’s First Amendment freedom to exercise her religion
has been burdened by the state court’s order to remove the feeding tube. Plaintiffs
also allege a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
The establishment of a “substantial likelihood for success on the merits” is a
heavy burden, but not an insurmountable one. A movant need not establish that he
can hit a home run, only that he can get on base, with a possibility of scoring later.
In fact, our circuit jurisprudence establishes that the movant need not establish a
“probability” of success, taking all things into consideration. The merits of
Plaintiffs’ substantial claims warrant a more complete review. I do not mean to
suggest that Plaintiffs will definitely prevail on the merits, but merely that she has
presented a sufficient case on the merits. She raises legal issues necessitating the
grant of the preliminary injunction and should be afforded an opportunity to
defend the merits of her claims. Adjudication on the merits is impossible if we do
not grant the injunction.
Finally, I note that awarding an injunction is an equitable decision. We
have broad powers to fashion a remedy in equity. We are required to balance the
equities, and when we do, we should find that the gravity of the irreparable injury
Theresa Schiavo would suffer could not weigh more heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor.
In contrast, there is little or no harm to be found in granting this motion for a
temporary injunction and deciding the full merits of the dispute.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Page 22
APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
THERESA M ARIE SCHINDLER SCHIAVO, Incapacitated ex rel., ROBERT
SCHINDLER and M ARY SCHINDLER, her Parents and Next Friends, Plaintiffs, vs. M ICHAEL SCHIAVO, JUDGE GEORGE W. GREER and THE HOSPICE OF THE FLORIDA SUNCOAST, INC., Defendants. Case No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE M IDDLE DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA, TAM PA DIVISION
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4265 M arch 22, 2005, Decided
COUNSEL: [*1] For Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, J. Felos, Felos & Felos, P.A., Dunedin, FL; Iris Bennett, incapacitated ex rel, Robert Schindler and Mary Schindler, Jenner & Block LLC, W ashington, DC; Randall C. her parents and next friends, Plaintiff: David C. Gibbs, III, Marshall, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Gibbs Law Firm, Seminole, FL; George E. Tragos, Law Florida, Inc., Miami, FL; Rebecca H. Steele, ACLU Office of George E. Tragos, Clearwater, FL; Robert A. Foundation of Florida, Inc., W est Central Florida Office, Destro, Columbus School Of Law, W ashington, DC. Tampa, FL; Robert M. Portman, Jenner & Block,
W ashington, DC; Thomas J. Perrelli, Jenner & Block, For Michael Schiavo, as guardian of the person of Theresa W ashington, DC. Marie Schindler Schiavo, incapacitated, Defendant: George
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For The Hospice of the Florida Suncoast, Inc., Defendant:
ORDER
Gail Golman Holtzman, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC, BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs' M otion for Tampa, FL; John W . Campbell, Constangy, Brooks & Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 2). In their motion, Smith, LLC, Tampa, FL; Robin G. Midulla, Robin Greiwe Plaintiffs seek an order directing Defendants to Schiavo Midulla, P.A., Tampa, FL. and Hospice to transport Theresa Schiavo to Morton Plant Hospital for any necessary medical treatment to sustain her
For Liberty Counsel, Inc., Amicus: Erik W . Stanley, life and to reestablish her nutrition and hydration. This Liberty Counsel, Longwood, FL. action and Plaintiffs' motion were filed in response to an order of Pinellas County Probate Judge George W . Greer
For United States, Interested Party: Paul I. Perez, [*2] directing Defendant Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband U.S. Attorney's Office, M iddle District of Florida, Orlando, and plenary guardian, to discontinue her nutrition and FL; W arren A. Zimmerman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle hydration. District of Florida, Tampa, FL. The court [*3] conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion after notice to Defendants. Upon consideration, For Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., Victor E. Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is Gambone, M.D., M orton Plant M ease Primary Care, Inc., denied. Stanton P. Tripodis, M .D., Interested Parties: James Addison Martin, Jr., Macfarlane Ferguson & McM ullen,
Plaintiffs, the parents of Theresa Marie Schindler Clearwater, FL; Jeffrey W . Gibson, MacFarlane Ferguson Schiavo, brought this action pursuant to a Congressional & McMullen, Clearwater, FL. Act signed into law by the President during the early morning hours of March 21, 2005. n1 The Act, entitled "An
Gordon W ayne W atts, Interested Party, Pro se, Lakeland, Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo,"
FL.
provides that the: JUDGES: JAM ES D. W HITTEMORE, United States United States District Court for the Middle District Judge. District of Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on a
OPINIONBY:
JAMES D. W HITTEMORE suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of
OPINION:
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
any right of T heresa Marie Schiavo under
The issue confronting the court is whether temporary
the Constitution or laws of the United States injunctive relief is warranted. relating to the withholding or withdrawal of
Applicable Standards food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary W hile there may be substantial issues concerning [*5] to sustain life. the constitutionality of the Act, for purposes of considering temporary injunctive relief, the Act is presumed to be constitutional. Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1303
n1 Pub. L. No. 109-3 (March 21, 2005). (11th Cir. 2004). The purpose of a temporary restraining order, like a Jurisdiction and Standing preliminary injunction, is to protect against irreparable The federal district courts are courts of limited injury and preserve the status quo until the district court jurisdiction, "empowered [*4] to hear only those cases . . renders a meaningful decision on the merits. Canal Auth. of . which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. grant authorized by Congress." University of S. Ala. v. 1974). A district court may grant a preliminary injunction American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. only if the moving party shows that: 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). The plain language of the Act establishes (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success jurisdiction in this court to determine de novo "any claim of on the merits; a violation of any right of Theresa Schiavo within the scope of this Act." The Act expressly confers standing to (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless Plaintiffs as her parents to bring any such claims. There can the injunction issues; be no substantial question, therefore, that Plaintiffs may bring an action against a party to the state court (3) the threatened injury to the movant proceedings in this court for claimed constitutional outweighs whatever damage the proposed deprivations or violations of federal law occasioned on injunction may cause the opposing party; their daughter relating to the withholding or withdrawal of and food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life. W hether the Plaintiffs may bring claims in federal (4) if issued, the injunction would not be court is not the issue confronting the court today, however. adverse to the public interest.
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
essential that Plaintiffs establish a substantial likelihood of
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097 success on the merits, which the court finds they have not (11th Cir. 2004); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., done. 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). A preliminary
The first of the four prerequisites to temporary injunction is "an extraordinary [*6] and drastic remedy" injunctive relief is generally the most important. Gonzalez and is "not to be granted unless the movant 'clearly v. Reno, No. 00-11424- D, 2000 WL 381901 at *1 (11th Cir. established the burden of persuasion' as to the four April 19, 2000). The necessary level or degree of prerequisites." United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d possibility of success on the merits will vary according to 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Canal Auth. of State the court's assessment of the other factors. Ruiz v. Estelle, of Florida, 489 F.2d at 573). n2 650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing with auth. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm 'n v. Holiday
n2 The Act does not address the traditional Tours, Inc., 182 U.S. App. D.C. 220, 559 F.2d 841, 843 requirements for temporary injunctive relief. (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Accordingly, these standards control whether
A substantial likelihood of success on the merits temporary injunctive relief is warranted, requires a showing of only likely or probable, rather than notwithstanding Congress' intent that the federal certain, success. Home Oil Company, Inc. v. Sam's East, courts determine de novo the merits of Theresa Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002) Schiavo's claimed constitutional deprivations. (emphasis in original); see also Ruiz, 650 F.2d at 565. "W here the 'balance [*8] of the equities weighs heavily in
It is apparent that Theresa Schiavo will die unless favor of granting the [injunction],' the movant need only temporary injunctive relief is granted. This circumstance show a 'substantial case on the merits.'" Garcia-Mir v. satisfies the requirement of irreparable injury. Moreover, Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Ruiz, that threatened injury outweighs any harm the proposed 650 F.2d at 565). injunction would cause. To the extent Defendants urge that
This court has carefully considered the Act and is Theresa Schiavo would be harmed by the invasive mindful of Congress' intent that Plaintiffs have an procedure reinserting the feeding tube, this court finds [*7] opportunity to litigate any deprivation of Theresa Schiavo's that death outweighs any such harm. Finally, the court is federal rights. The Court is likewise mindful of Congress' satisfied that an injunction would not be adverse to the directive that a de novo determination be made public interest. Notwithstanding these findings, it is "notwithstanding any prior State court determination." In
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resolving Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial
Order, however, the court is limited to a consideration of was violated, contending that the presiding judge "became the constitutional and statutory deprivations alleged by Terri's health care surrogate" and "also purported to act as Plaintiffs in their Complaint and motion. Because Plaintiffs an impartial trial judge in the same proceeding." (Dkt. 1, urge due process violations are premised primarily on the PP 47-48). They [*10] allege that once he "became an procedures followed and orders entered by Judge Greer in advocate for Terri's death, it became impossible for Judge his official capacity as the presiding judge in the dispute Greer to maintain his role as an impartial judge in order to between Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs, their Complaint review his own decision that Terri would want to die." necessarily requires a consideration of the procedural (Dkt. 1, P 49). Finally, they allege that "Judge Greer's dual history of the state court case to determine whether there is and simultaneous role as judge and health-care surrogate a showing of any due process [*9] violations. On the face denied Terri a fair and impartial trial." (Dkt. 1, P 50). of these pleadings, Plaintiffs have asserted five These contentions are without merit. constitutional and statutory claims. To obtain temporary
Florida's statutory scheme, set forth in Chapter 765, injunctive relief, they must show a substantial likelihood of contemplates a process for designation of a proxy in the success on at least one claim. n3 absence of an executed advance directive and provides for judicial resolution of disputes arising concerning decisions made by the proxy. See Fla. Stat. § 765.401(1). W here a
n3 Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits of health decision by the proxy is challenged by the patient's other care professionals regarding Theresa's medical family members, it is appropriate for the parties to seek status, treatment techniques and therapies which are "expedited judicial intervention." Fla. Slat. § 765.105. available and their opinions regarding how and Applying this statutory scheme, the state court appointed whether these treatments might improve Theresa's Michael Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband, as plenary condition. Plaintiffs have not, however, discussed guardian and proxy for Theresa. Thereafter, a dispute arose these affidavits in their papers and how they relate between M ichael Schiavo and Plaintiffs concerning to the claimed constitutional deprivations. whether to continue Theresa on artificial life support, and Judge Greer, the presiding [*11] judge, was called upon to
A. Count I - Violation of Fourteenth Amendment resolve that dispute. Due Process Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial Florida's statutory scheme contemplates a judicial Plaintiffs allege in Count I that Theresa Schiavo's resolution of these competing contentions. See In re
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
Stat.
§ 744.309(1)(b). Contrary to Plaintiffs'
As the Florida Second District Court of Appeal explained, argument, § 744.309 merely prohibits a judge from where two "suitable surrogate decision-maker[s] . . .could acting as a guardian except under certain specified not agree on the proper decision, ..." the guardian may familial circumstances. invoke "the trial court's jurisdiction to allow the trial court to serve as the surrogate decision-maker." In re
Plaintiffs' argument effectively ignores the role of the Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. presiding judge as judicial fact-finder and decision-maker Ct. App. 2001) ("Schiavo I"). Pursuant to Florida law, under the Florida statutory scheme. By fulfilling his therefore, Judge Greer, as the presiding judge, had a statutory judicial responsibilities, the judge was not statutory obligation to resolve the competing contentions transformed into an advocate merely because his rulings are between Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs. Fla. Stat. § unfavorable to a litigant. Plaintiffs' contention that the 765.105. statutory [*13] scheme followed by Judge Greer deprived Plaintiffs offer no authority for their contention that Theresa Schiavo of an impartial trial is accordingly without Judge Greer compromised the fairness of the proceeding or merit. Defendant is correct that no federal constitutional the impartiality of the court by following Florida law and right is implicated when a judge merely grants relief to a fulfilling his statutory responsibilities under Chapter 765 as litigant in accordance with the law he is sworn to uphold presiding judge and decision-maker. n4 Plaintiffs' argument and follow. This Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot is that Judge Greer could not fulfill his judicial duties establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of impartially while at [*12] the same time fulfilling his Count I. statutory duty to resolve the competing contentions of the
B. Count II - Violation of Fourteenth Amendment parties as surrogate or proxy "to make decisions about life- Procedural Due Process Rights prolonging procedures." In re Guardianship of Schiavo, In Count II, Plaintiffs contend that Theresa Schiavo's No. 2 D05-968, 2005 WL 600377 at *4 (Fl. Ct. App. March Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were 16, 2005) ("Schiavo VI"). violated by Judge Greer's (1) failure to appoint a guardian ad litem (D kt. 1, P 53), (2) failure to appoint an
n4 During argument, Plaintiffs' counsel independent attorney to represent Theresa Schiavo's legal explained their criticism of Judge Greer's official rights (Dkt. 1, P 54) and (3) denial of what Plaintiffs actions as Judge Greer having exceeded his lawful describe as "access to court" by his "failure to ever meet authority by acting as a guardian contrary to Fla. Terri personally" and failure to "personally assess Terri's
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
level of cognition and her responsiveness" (Dkt. 1, P 55).
guardian
ad litem,
there would be no constitutional
deprivation here because three guardians ad litem were Initially, the Court finds no authority recognizing as a appointed to represent Theresa Schiavo's interests over the matter of federal constitutional or statutory right that a state course of the litigation. trial judge is required to "personally assess" a ward's "level of cognition [*14] and ...responsiveness." Fla. Stat. § 744.3725, on which Plaintiffs rely, is applicable to an
n5 The record also reveals that attorney John action seeking to commit the ward to a facility and other H. Pecarek was appointed as guardian ad litem circumstances not relevant to this case. Plaintiffs' early in the proceedings. In re Guardianship of conclusory allegation that Judge Greer denied Theresa Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas Cty. Circ. Schiavo access to court by not requiring her presence is Ct., Feb. 17, 1994). Late in the litigation, at the without merit. request of Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Pinellas W ith respect to Plaintiffs' contention that Judge Greer County Chief Judge David Demers also appointed violated Theresa Schiavo's procedural due process rights by attorney Jay W olfson, M.D. as guardian ad litem. failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the record belies this Schiavo VI, 2005 WL 600377 at *1, n. 2. contention. In June, 1998, Judge Rives sua sponte appointed Richard L. Pearse, Jr., Esq. as guardian ad litem
Plaintiffs' last contention is that Theresa Schiavo's "for the purpose of reviewing the request for termination of procedural due process rights were violated by Judge life support on behalf of the wards [sic]." In re Greer's refusal to appoint an independent attorney to Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas represent her interests. The due process clause is [*16] Cty. Circ. Ct., June 11, 1998). The record reflects that implicated when there is a "deprivation of life, liberty or attorney Pearse "fully complied with his June 11, 1998 property at the hands of the government." Grayden v. Court Order of appointment" and was accordingly Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). If one or discharged on June 16, 1999 by Judge Boyer of the Pinellas more of these constitutionally protected interests is at stake, County Circuit Court. Pearse served as guardian ad litem as they undoubtedly are in this case, the due process clause for one year and ultimately testified as a witness in the trial requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id. "It is . before Judge Greer. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, [*15] . . fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to N o. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas Cty. Circ. Ct., Feb. 28, be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 2000). n5 Accordingly, assuming Fourteenth Amendment meaningful manner." Fuentes v. Cortes, 407 U.S. 67, 80 procedural due process requires the appointment of a (1972). Unquestionably, in some circumstances, a
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
meaningful opportunity to be heard includes the right to be
by another "extensive hearing at which many highly
represented by counsel. However, "due process is a flexible qualified physicians testified" to reconfirm that no concept that varies with the particular circumstances of meaningful treatment [*18] was available, and six appeals. each case, and to determine the requirements of due process As the Florida Second District Court of Appeal stated, in a particular situation we must apply the balancing test "few, if any, similar cases have ever been afforded this articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. heightened level of process." Schiavo VI, 2005 WL 600377 2d 18 (1976). " Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232-33. at *3.
The Mathews balancing test requires consideration of Throughout the proceedings, the parties, represented three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be by able counsel, advanced what they believed to be Theresa affected by the official [*17] action; second, the risk of an Schiavo's intentions concerning artificial life support. In erroneous deprivation of such interest through the Florida, counsel for M ichael Schiavo as Theresa Schiavo's procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of guardian owed a duty of care to Theresa Schiavo in his additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, representation. Op. Atty. Gen. 96-94 (November 20, 1996). the Government's interest, including the function involved Finally, with respect to presenting the opposing perspective and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional on Theresa Schiavo's wishes, the Court cannot envision or substitute procedural requirement would entail." more effective advocates than her parents and their able Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. counsel. Plaintiffs have not shown how an additional
lawyer appointed by the court could have reduced the risk The first factor weighs the interest at stake. Plaintiffs of erroneous rulings. urge that Theresa Schiavo's life is at stake, while Defendant argues that her liberty to exercise her right to refuse W ith regard to the third factor, without question the medical treatment is the interest being adjudicated. In either state of Florida has an interest in the welfare of its citizens case, a fundamental and important interest is implicated in and in the legal process for adjudicating disputed claims the court proceedings determining the removal of artificial such as were presented to Judge Greer in this case, as life support. evidenced by Florida's well defined statutory scheme. The
court's inherent authority to appoint [*19] a guardian ad The second Mathews factor requires consideration of litem, consult independent experts or appoint an attorney if the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used warranted protects the state's interest. and the probable value of the additional protections urged by the Plaintiffs. Theresa Schiavo's case has been Balancing the three factors, this court concludes that exhaustively litigated, including an extensive trial, followed Theresa Schiavo's life and liberty interests were adequately
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
protected by the extensive process provided in the state
Schiavo's right to exercise her religion has been burdened
courts. Defendant M ichael Schiavo and Plaintiffs, assisted by the state court's order to remove the feeding tube. W ith by counsel, thoroughly advocated their competing respect to Count IV of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a perspectives on Theresa Schiavo's wishes. Another lawyer claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized appointed by the court could not have offered more Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1), claiming that her protection of Theresa Schiavo's interests. Accordingly, rights to free exercise of her religion have been burdened Plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of by the state court's order authorizing removal of her feeding success on the merits on Count II. tube in that removal of the feeding tube "imposes a
substantial burden on Terry's religious free exercise." That C. Count Three - Violation of Fourteenth statute expressly requires, however, that "no government Amendment Right to Equal Protection of the Law shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise For the same reasons relief under Count I was not of [*21] a person . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (a) (emphasis appropriate, the relief sought in Count III via the equal added). protection clause is without merit. Plaintiff has not In Count V, Plaintiffs make a similar contention under established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the free exercise clause, alleging of the claims set forth in Count III. See Cruzan v. Missouri that "Terry's religious beliefs are burdened" by execution of Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 order "in that Terry is being forced to engage in an activity (1990) ("The differences between the choice made by a contrary to the tenets of her Roman Catholic faith . . . ." competent person to refuse [*20] medical treatment, and Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have a constitutional duty the choice made for an incompetent person by someone to accommodate "Terry's sincerely-held religious beliefs." else to refuse medical treatment, are so obviously different that the State is warranted in establishing rigorous Undoubtedly, Terry Schiavo enjoys, by virtue of 42 procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply U.S.C. § 2000 -cc(a), a statutorily protected right not to to the former class.") (emphasis in original). have substantial burdens placed on her religious exercise by
the government. The plain language of the statute prohibits D. Counts IV and V - Violation of Religious Land government from imposing a substantial burden on the Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and religious exercise of an individual such as Theresa Schiavo. Violation of First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause contained in the First Clause Amendment of the Constitution expressly protects the Plaintiffs bring Counts IV and V alleging that Theresa exercise of religion. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege
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APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION
that the state court's order imposes a substantial burden on
appeal.");
see also Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 281 (5th
Theresa Schiavo's free exercise of religion. (Complaint, P Cir. 1980). 67).
This court appreciates the gravity of the consequences In order [*22] to succeed on either claim, however, of denying injunctive relief. Even under these difficult and Plaintiffs must establish that the Defendants were state time strained circumstances, however, and notwithstanding actors. Plaintiffs' claims fail because neither Defendant Congress' expressed interest in the welfare of Theresa Schiavo nor Defendant Hospice are state actors. Moreover, Schiavo, [*23] this court is constrained to apply the law to the fact that the claims were adjudicated by a state court the issues before it. As Plaintiffs have not established a judge does not provide the requisite state action for substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs' purposes of the statute or the Fourteenth Amendment. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 2) must be Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (11th Cir. DENIED. 1992) ("Use of the courts by private parties does not
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers this 22nd day constitute an act under color of state law."); Torres v. First of March, 2005. State Bank of Sierra County, 588 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (10th
JAM ES D. W HITTEM ORE
Cir. 1978) ("W e do not think that the 'color of law' reference United States District Judge in § 1983 was intended to encompass a case such as this one, where the only infirmities are the excesses of the court order itself, . . . subject to the normal processes of
NOTES
[1] Our dissenting colleague says that “the denial of Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction frustrates Congress’s intent, which is to maintain the status quo.” Dissenting Op. at __. The status quo is that Mrs. Schiavo is not receiving nutrition and hydration. The plaintiffs do not want the status quo maintained. They want this Court or the district court to issue an injunction affirmatively requiring the respondents to change the status quo by bringing about the surgical procedure necessary to reinsert the feeding tube into Mrs. Schiavo.
[2] The dissent bemoans the fact that the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims will never be litigated in federal court. The district court’s finding regarding the first-prong injunctive relief factor reflects that those claims lack merit, or at least that the possibility of any merit is too low to justify preliminary injunctive relief.
[3] Part II of the dissent argues that we should grant an injunction and discusses the four factors as though this Court were making the decision in the first instance. We are not. We are an appellate court reviewing the district court’s decision. There is no occasion for us to decide whether to issue an injunction pending appeal, because the only appeal we have before us is from the district court’s denial of a temporary restraining order, and we are deciding that appeal now.
[4] In arguing that an injunction should be issued, the dissent refers to “a situation where a few days’ delay” is all that is necessary. That is not this situation. To afford the plaintiffs the pretrial discovery and full jury trial of all issues they demand would require a delay of many months, if not longer.
[5] Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not believe that the text of the Act limits or eliminates a court’s power to grant temporary or preliminary relief. Exactly the contrary. Our position is that the Act, which does not mention that subject, and which was amended to remove a provision that would have changed the law, does not affect it at all. The district court applied settled law and so do we.
[6] A petition for rehearing or suggestion for rehearing en banc is not, of course, required before a petition for certiorari may be filed in the United States Supreme Court. If, however, a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is to be filed, it must be filed by 10:00 a.m. ET, March 23, 2005. See Fed.R.App.P. 35(c) & Fed.R.App.P. 40(a)(1).
[1] In Bonner v. Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
[2] The majority opinion holds that the All Writs Act is not appropriate in this case because “where the relief sought is in essence a preliminary injunction, the All Writs Act is not available because other, adequate remedies at law exist, namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, which provides for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions” Maj. Opn. at * 7-8. I do not argue with that point. However, in this case, the relief Plaintiffs seek is not a preliminary injunction by another name. Rather, the purpose for which Plaintiffs ask that we reinsert Theresa Schiavo’s feeding tube is to permit a federal court to have time within which to exercise its jurisdiction and fully entertain Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the purpose of entering an injunction in this case is limited to the narrow goal of aiding the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claim is precisely the one and only type of situation in which an All Writs Act injunction is appropriate and for which there is no other adequate remedy at law.