Theresa L. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, Incorporated, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus CuriaeTheresa L. Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, Incorporated, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae
Lead Opinion
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
This appeal requires us to examine the district court’s award of attorney’s fees in a mixed-motive employment discrimination case. Appellee Theresa L. Sheppard prevailed in a mixed-motive claim against appellant Riverview Nursing Center (“River-view”), but Riverview established that it would have reached the same decision even absent any discrimination. In such eases, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that a court “may” grant attorney’s fees.
The district court granted Sheppard declaratory relief, costs of $167.02, and attorney’s fees in the amount of $40,000. River-view appeals the fee award. Because the district court failed to appreciate its full discretion under the statute regarding whether to grant attorney’s fees, and because we believe that certain concerns of proportional!
I.
In September 1993, Sheppard filed a gender discrimination claim against Riverview under Title VII, alleging that she was laid off because of her pregnancy.
Following trial, the district court instructed the jury in accordance with the standards applicable to mixed-motive claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The jury answered both questions in the affirmative, determining that discrimination had motivated Riverview’s decision, but that Sheppard would have been laid off for legitimate reasons. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, such a finding would have insulated Riverview from liability. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation undersection 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim undersection 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Pursuant to these provisions, the district court awarded Sheppard a declaratory judgment, but denied injunctive relief because it found insufficient danger of a continuing violation.
Sheppard then filed a motion requesting attorney’s fees of $40,000 and costs of $4,509.74.
Riverview also challenged the fee award under
II.
The district court apparently believed that an award of attorney’s fees was mandatory in mixed-motive cases, and that Farrar v. Hobby ’s concerns with the relationship between the fees and the degree of success achieved in the underlying litigation had no application here. To the contrary, we believe that the award of fees is discretionary under
A.
The statute under which the attorney’s fees were awarded in this case,
Here, the district court appeared to misperceive the discretionary nature of its inquiry, assuming instead that an award of attorney’s fees was essentially mandatory. Its analysis of Sheppard’s motion for attorney’s fees dealt primarily with whether the amount of fees requested was reasonable, not with whether fees should be granted in the first instance. In the court’s view, a “wholesale denial of fees ... is completely unjustified and flies in the face of the statute making such fees available.” Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Centre,
The decision whether to award fees under
B.
In Farrar v. Hobby,
The same logic should bar recovery of attorney’s fees here, Riverview asserts, because Sheppard only obtained declaratory relief. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that Farrar construed
When assessing whether to grant fees, Farrar requires that courts consider the relationship between the fees and the degree of the plaintiffs success. Farrar,
Factoring proportionality concerns into the analysis helps guard against this result. In appropriate cases, for instance, courts should consider the reasons why injunctive relief was or was not granted, or the extent and nature of any declaratory relief. Moreover, Farrar’s concern was not only with whether the extent of recovery accords with the amount of attorney’s fees. The decision suggested a more general proportionality consideration as well: whether the public purposes served by resolving the dispute justifies the recovery of fees. See Farrar,
Such an analysis should apply here. By definition, an illicit factor will have played some role in cases subject to
Factoring Farrar’s principles into the analysis under
III.
Riverview contends that under
The award of attorney’s fees in this case, however, was pursuant to
That
IV.
Our good colleague on this panel has written a fine dissenting opinion. We shall explain briefly why we disagree with it.
The dissent suggests, however, that “may” and “shall” can be synonymous. Infra at n. 2. Even young children would say otherwise. They learn early on that “may” is a wonderfully permissive word. “Shall,” by contrast, is more sternly mandatory. And whatever the merits of believing “may” means “shall,” they do not apply when Congress has employed the two different verbs in neighboring statutory passages. See Anderson v. Yungkau,
Alternatively, the dissent maintains, “may” only operates to show that district courts are under no obligation to grant injunctive relief under the statute. This suggestion, too, is disproved by the statutory language. The word “may” qualifies the award of all forms of relief, not just injunctive relief: According to
The dissent’s spin on the statute, moreover, entails an anomalous outcome: It places mixed-motive plaintiffs in a more favorable position than plaintiffs for whom discrimination is the sole cause of an adverse employment decision. In cases falling under
The dissent confuses eligibility for attorney’s fees with an entitlement to a lodestar award. The premise seemingly underlying the dissent’s interpretation of the statute is that, because mixed-motive plaintiffs are barred from receiving an award of money damages, they are entitled on that account to a grant of attorney’s fees. There is no indication in the statute, however, that Congress sought to take money from the pockets of plaintiffs solely to deposit it in the pockets of attorneys. Of course,
This does not mean, however, that
V.
Farrar was designed to prevent a situation in which a client receives a pyrrhie victory and the lawyers take a pot of gold.
VACATED AND REMANDED
Notes
. Whether this case was properly submitted to the jury as a mixed-motive case is not at issue in this appeal. See Fuller v. Phipps,
. Sheppard actually claimed to have incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $80,899.50, but she voluntarily reduced her fee request to $40,-000 because of her failure to prove that she would not have been laid off absent any discrimination.
. We reject Riverview’s suggestion that either
. In this case, "the judgment finally obtained” by Sheppard was “not more favorable than” the $5,000 offer.
. Contrary to the dissent's implication, the Supreme Court did not suggest otherwise in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, - U.S. -,
. The district court echoed this very concern in quite humorous fashion, stating at the conclusion of its opinion:
On my office wall, there hangs a nineteenth century English print entitled The Lawsuit, showing two farmers fighting over a stationary cow — one pulling her by the horns and the other by the tail — while a bewigged barrister happily milks her. This case certainly demonstrates that nothing much has changed. The plaintiff and the defendant are right where they started, while the lawyers’ pails hold all the milk.
Sheppard,
. The majority makes no claim that either
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion completely frustrates the intent of Congress. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employer was immune from liability under Title VII in “mixed-motive” cases. That is, in cases where the plaintiff showed that an impermissible factor such as race or gender played a motivating role in an employment decision, the employer could still avoid liability by showing that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the impermissible factor. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
However, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress decided that a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case can in fact establish a violation of Title VII. In particular,
Except as otherwise provided in this sub-chapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
According to Congress, therefore, a plaintiff who proves a mixed-motive employment decision succeeds in winning her ease.
Yet, with her “win,” a plaintiff is only eligible for limited relief:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation undersection 2000e-2(m) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to he directly attributable only to the pur*1340 suit of a claim undersection 2000e-2(m) ; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
In this appeal, two questions are raised by a plain reading of
In answering these questions the majority simply misreads both
I.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar v. Hobby does not have any bearing on whether and to what extent a court should grant an award of attorney’s fees under
A.
In Farrar the Court was asked to decide whether a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages may still be deemed a prevailing party eligible for an award of attorney’s fees. The statute at issue there was the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, as amended,
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq. ], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
(Emphasis added.) After determining that a party who “wins” her ease yet recovers only nominal damages is in fact a “prevailing party” under
In this case, however, we are asked to interpret
Thus, when the statutory language of
Moreover, Congress’s use of the phrase “shall not” in subsection (ii) of
In light of the (pre-Farrar) case law existing at the time Congress enacted section 2000e — 5(g)(2)(B), Congress’s probable intent was that a court should grant attorney’s fees under almost all circumstances in which a plaintiff establishes a violation of
[S]ection [1988] states that the court “in its discretion ” may allow a fee, but that discretion is not without limit: the prevailing party “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”
Blanchard v. Bergeron,
The particular “special circumstance” that Congress evidently intended to exclude from a court’s consideration when it enacted
It goes without saying that, if the de minimis exclusion were to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining prevailing party status, fees would be denied. [Farrar, 506 U.S.] at 116 [113 S.Ct. at 575-76 ]. And if the de minimis victory exclusion is in fact part of the reasonableness inquiry, see [id.] at 114 [113 S.Ct. at 574 ], summary denial of fees is still appropriate. We have explained that even the prevailing plaintiff may be denied fees if “ ‘special circumstances would render [the] award unjust.’ ” Hensley v. Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424 , 429 [108 S.Ct. 1933 , 1937,76 L.Ed.2d 40 ] (1983) (citations omitted). While that exception to fee awards has often been articulated separately from the reasonableness inquiry, sometimes it is bound up with reasonableness: It serves as a short-hand way of saying that, even before calculating a lodestar or wading through all the reasonableness factors, it is clear that the reasonable fee is no fee at all. After all, where the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all.
Farrar,
Of course, no matter how much sense this approach makes, it would be wholly inappropriate to adopt if Congress had declared a contrary intent. When construing a statute, this Court is bound by the choices Congress has made, not the choices we might wish it had made....Section 1988 expressly grants district courts discretion to withhold attorney’s fees from prevailing parties in appropriate circumstances: It states that a court “may” award fees “in its discretion.”42 U.S.C. § 1988 .... [T]he occurrence of a purely technical or de minimis victory is such a circumstance. Chimerical accomplishments are simply not the kind of legal change that Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.
Farrar,
Of course, in the light of the statutory language contained in
In sum, if Congress had meant for a plaintiff’s proportional degree of success, over and above establishing a violation of
I turn then to the first of the two questions raised by a plain reading of
B.
Suppose I am wrong to conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar v. Hobby has nothing to do with a court’s consideration of whether to grant attorney’s fees under
To be eligible to recover attorney’s fees under
In this case, however, Sheppard has not failed to prove an essential element of her claim for monetary relief under
[W]ithin [the] category of [mixed-motive] cases, there are large differences. Some mixed-motive cases will evidence a widespread or intolerable animus on the part of a defendant; others will illustrate primarily the plaintiffs unacceptable conduct which, by definition, will have justified the action taken by the defendant. The statute allows district courts to distinguish*1346 among cases that are in reality quite different.
Id. at 1337.
While the majority’s analysis has superficial appeal, it is based on a faulty premise. That is, the majority evidently believes that simply establishing liability in a common mixed-motive ease serves few public goals. Whether that is true is not for us to decide. By enacting
The Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse severely undermines protections against intentional discrimination by allowing such discrimination to escape sanction completely under Title VII. Under this holding, even if a court finds that a Title VII defendant has clearly engaged in intentional discrimination, that court is powerless to end that abuse if the particular plaintiff who brought the case would have suffered the disputed employment action for some alternative, legitimate reason.
The impact of this decision is particularly profound because the factual situation at issue in Price Waterhouse is a common one. As the Justice Department observed, “virtually every Title VII disparate treatment case will to some degree entail multiple motives.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 6.
If Title VU’s ban on discrimination is to be meaningful, proven victims of intentional discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of discrimination must be liable for their actions.
H.R.Rept. 102-40(11) at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711; see H.R.Rept. No. 102-40(1), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586 (“the Committee endorses and intends Section 203 of the legislation to restore the decisional law in effect in many of the federal circuits prior to the decision in Price Waterhouse ”).
Moreover, by enacting
What is most disturbing about the majority’s approach is its failure to appreciate that the mere fact of establishing liability in any mixed-motive ease serves a number of public goals, the most important of which is the eradication of discrimination in employment decisions. Because Congress expressly provides that discrimination in a mixed-motive case is still actionable discrimination, Congress recognizes that the successful eradication of discrimination depends in part on plaintiffs having the ability to bring Title VII claims, including Title VII claims that eventually evolve into mixed-motive cases.
The workplace is no place for discrimination, and the fact that an individual plaintiff may not recover monetary damages in a mixed-motive case does not undercut the deterrent value of allowing a plaintiff to establish liability in a mixed-motive case, especially when an employer faces the prospect of having to pay attorney’s fees. Likewise, a grant of attorney’s fees helps to eliminate
C.
A jury determined that Riverview discriminated against Sheppard in violation of
II.
I turn now to the second question posed by a plain reading of
In particular, the issue of proportionality, which was paramount to the Supreme
The district court in this case followed the statutory directive and took great care in awarding a fee that was directly attributable only to the
III.
Finally, the majority holds that a defendant’s offer of judgment under
Because
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a cost-shifting rule designed to encourage settlement of disputes without the burden of costly litigation. To invoke the rule, the defendant in an action may offer “to allow judgment to be taken against [the defendant]” in a specified amount with costs “then accrued.” If the plaintiff does not accept this offer of judgment and “[i]f the judgment finally obtained by the [plaintiff] is not more favorable than the offer, the [plaintiff] must pay the costs incurred after making the offer.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 _
The central issue to be resolved is whether theRule 68 shifting of post-offer “costs” should include plaintiffs post-offer attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in a related context in Marek v. Chesny,473 U.S. 1 ,105 S.Ct. 3012 ,87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Under Marek, the language of the underlying statute authorizing recovery of attorney’s fees will determine whether attorney’s fees are part of “costs” forRule 68 purposes.473 U.S. at 9 ,105 S.Ct. at 3016 . The statute at issue in Marek,42 U.S.C. § 1988 , clearly*1349 made available to a prevailing party “ ‘attorney’s fees as part of the costs.’ ” Id. (quoting42 U.S.C. § 1988 ) (emphasis added). Based on this clear and unambiguous language, the Supreme Court directed that, in an action for attorney’s fees under42 U.S.C. § 1988 , “costs” forRule 68 purposes should include attorney’s fees. Id.
The statutory provision governing recovery of attorney’s fees in this case,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) , is unlike the statute at issue in Marek. Instead, it provides that the court may grant “attorney’s fees and costs.”42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) . In light of the emphasis on the “plain language” of the underlying statute, the words “attorney’s fees and costs” insection 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) assume critical importance and contrast sharply with the statute at issue in Marek, in which attorney’s fees were specifically described “as part of’ costs....
When it enacted 42 U.S.C. § [2000e-]5(g)(2)(B), Congress was well-aware of the Marek decision and the importance which the Supreme Court attributed to the distinction between the phrases “attorney’s fees and costs” and “attorney’s fees as part of costs.” Indeed, the committee reports accompanying the 1991 Act include sharp criticism of the Marek opinion, speak of the need to “address” and “overrule” Marek, and disprove of the Supreme Court’s reliance on “small and probably inadvertent differences in phrasing” and “an accident in legislative drafting.” H.R.Rept. No. 102-40(1), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 82 & n. 77 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 620; H.R.Rept. 102-40(11), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696, 724....
In sum, the Marek decision, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, familiar principles of statutory construction, and the public interest in vigorous enforcement of Title VII together direct that attorney’s fees under42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) must be considered separate from costs in the operation ofRule 68 .
Sheppard,
There should be no disputing this analysis. No doubt Congress chose to allow a mixed-motive plaintiff “attorney’s fees and costs” because (1) a mixed-motive plaintiff cannot recover money damages and (2) a mixed-motive case generally evolves into one as the litigation progresses. Thus, an offer of judgment under
The majority’s rewrite of
. Although X do not rely on it, there is certainly an argument that Congress intended the word "may” to mean "shall” in the context of an award of attorney's fees under
. I am not suggesting that Congress authorized in
. The majority's holding is especially ironic because the majority makes clear that "we are not at liberty to place in [Congress's] mouth words which are not there." See ante at 1337. Yet, by reading the "in its discretion” and "reasonable” language into
. As for "special circumstances” that a court "may” still consider under
. The district court recognized this fact when it rejected Riverview's argument that Farrar precluded altogether an award of attorney's fees:
[Riverview's] position ignores the plain language of42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) . Congress has spoken clearly, and the 1991 Act is quite explicit: the court "may grant ... attorney’s fees” in cases in which a defendant is adjudged to have discriminated but proves that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the illegal motivating factor.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) . Denying recovery of attorney's fees in this situation on the rationale of "lack of success” would render the statute ineffective and practically meaningless. Cf. 2A Norman Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”); United States Army Eng. Ctr. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,762 F.2d 409 , 416-17 (4th Cir.1985); Uptagrafft v. United States,315 F.2d 200 , 204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,375 U.S. 818 ,84 S.Ct. 54 ,11 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963). A wholesale denial of fees in this case is completely unjustified and flies in the face of the statute making such fees available.
Sheppard,
. In Farrar the plaintiff brought his complaint under
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided that the recovery of nominal damages did not justify the award of any fees. Id. at 114-16,
. In this case, which is one of first impression in this circuit, the EEOC continues to recognize the paramount importance that private plaintiffs have in enforcing Title VII. The EEOC has, accordingly, filed an amicus brief advocating that the district court's decision granting attorney’s fees be upheld. As the EEOC says:
Private actions play an important role in effectuating the purpose of Title VII. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,415 U.S. 36 , 45,94 S.Ct. 1011 , 1018,39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). To encourage private actions, Congress has authorized the award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs who successfully prove a Title VII violation. See42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)(sic). In this appeal, a defendant is challenging the district court’s award of fees to a Title VII plaintiff on grounds, which if generally applied, would make it unlikely that plaintiffs would recover their fees in most cases involving mixed motives. Because the result urged by the defendant is not supported by the applicable statutory language and would significantly diminish the incentive Congress provided to victims of discrimination to vindicate their rights under Title VII, we offer our views to the Court.
EEOC Br. at 1-2. Without doubt, these important public goals are seriously undermined by the court’s decision today.
. The majority’s attempt to refute this conclusion is unavailing. The majority claims that it is anomalous for the proportionality considerations of Farrar to apply to plaintiffs for whom discrimination is the sole cause of an adverse employment decision and, at the same time, fail to apply these same considerations to mixed-motive plaintiffs. Ante at 1338-1339. What, of course, the majority does not recognize is that a plaintiff who establishes that discrimination is the sole cause for an adverse employment decision will have little, if any, difficulty overcoming Farrar's proportionality hurdle. Thus, if there is an anomaly here, it is one in theoiy, not in fact.
Likewise, the majority's attempt to buttress its anomaly is equally unavailing. The majority lists several hypothetical circumstances that might render an award of fees unjust under