Theodore G. Williams v. William Meyer

OBERDORFER, District Judges; Circuit Judge.* D.J., OBERDORFER, delivered court, in of the opinion DAUGHTREY, J., BOGGS, (p. joined. J. 617), dissenting separate delivered opinion.

OPINION

OBERDORFER, Judge. District Williams, ap- petitioner,

Theodore G. denying his court’s order peals * lumbia, Oberdorfer, designation. sitting by United F. Louis The Honorable of Co- Judge for District States District motion for relief from judgment. (section The dis- provisions sons. Under those 7 of trict court entered denying enacted), the Act as a person in custody petition relief, for habeas “shall be discharged only after there are timely Williams failed to file grounds reasonable to believe that such magistrate’s report and recommenda- person has recovered from such psychopa- tion. Williams has demonstrated that his thy degree to a that he will not be a timely failure to file his was the menace to others.” Comp. Mich. Laws. neglect,” result him entitling (West 1968). §Ann. 780.507 Accordingly, relief. we reverse and re- mand. Michigan’s 2. Mental Health Code

I. BACKGROUND With the exception of persons commit- pursuant ted to the Sexual Psychopath Statutory A. Relevant Provisions Act, Michigan’s Mental Health Code gov- Michigan’s Psy- Criminal Sexual erns the commitment discharge of per- chopath Act sons the custody of Michigan De- partment of Mental Health. Mich. Comp. its repeal, 1,1968, Until effective August 330.2050(5) (West § 2003). Laws Ann. Michigan’s Criminal Psychopath Sexual Code, Under the Mental Health person a (the Act”), Act Psychopath “Sexual Mich. must discharged be patient’s when “the (West Comp. §§ Laws Ann. 780.501-.509 mental condition is such that he or 1968), she no repealed by 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts longer meets the criteria person of a 1,1968), re- (Aug. provided that a criminal quiring 330.1476(2). § treatment.” Id. A defendant in who was designated “person requiring treatment” is defined as a “criminal psychopathic sexual person” an individual “who has mental illness” would be committed to the custody of the (1) who aas result of that illness can hospital state commission to be confined reasonably expected be an within the appropriate near institution. Id. § future to intentionally A or unintentionally 780.505. criminal psychopathic sexual seriously injure person was himself or “[a]ny defined as herself or an- person who is (2) individual; suffering who from mental as a disorder and is not result of that feeble-minded, illness is unable to attend mental disorder to his or her coupled physical with basic propensities necessary criminal needs to avoid (3) future; commission of serious harm in sexual offenses.”1 the near Id. § 780.501. After judgment whose is so Psychopath impaired Sexual that he or Act repealed, was Michigan Supreme she is unable to understand the need for Court ordered that discharge per- treatment and whose continued behavior sons in custody pursuant to the Act would can reasonably expected, be on the basis of governed continue to be the Act’s dis- competent opinion, clinical sig- to result in charge provisions until legislative further physical nificant harm to himself or herself 1969-4, clarification. Admin. Order § 382 or others. Id. 330.1401.Mental illness is Mich, (1969). xxix As no such clarification defined as “a substantial disorder or occurred, ever the Act’s discharge provi- thought or mood significantly impairs sions have continued apply behavior, to such per- capacity to recognize Act, 1. Under Psychopath the Sexual either the tion. state or the designa- defendant could seek this History ordinary C. Procedural cope with ability to

reality, or 330.1400(g). §Id. life.” demands Proceedings 1. State Facts B. peti began action present Williams, the 1967, Theodore In October on Sep filed discharge Williams tion in Mich- plea guilty entered petitioner, seeking addition to In tember degree first charge state court igan the Sexual section 7 discharge under sentencing, Williams Prior murder. Act, contended Psychopath psycho- a “criminal designated sexual was violated of section application Sexual then-applicable under path,” process due rights to constitutional cus- Act, to the and committed Psychopath 29, 1993, the July On equal protection. hospital. He was a mental tody of state con rejected court Williams’ circuit 1973, but discharged September in initially (People JA 77-100 challenges. stitutional 1979, follow- custody in to he was returned Williams, (Allegan FY No. 67-4411 v. Michigan Su- by the ing a determination 1993)). 29, July On Cir. Ct. County, Mich. improperly had been he Court preme that 13, 1994, of a series at the conclusion Williams, June People v. See released.2 orally denied evidentiary hearings, it (1979). until the From then Mich. 909 custody in A written subsequent the petition. remained he has present, of Mental Department Michigan was established that “it order stated peti- filed a number He has Health. evidence that de convincing clear 7 of to section discharge pursuant tions for his crimi not recovered from fendant has Act, Psychopath all of repealed Sexual that he degree to psychopathy nal sexual Today, he is denied. which have been 103. to JA not be a menace others.” will custody of in the remaining only person Appeals Michigan af- The Court of Mental Department Michigan ruled that the constitutional firmed. It under, and who committed Health was and that the without merit challenges were by, the Sexu- governed discharge whose in deny- erred clearly had not circuit court Act. Psychopath al custody returned transpired ordered be- Williams series of events 2. A convoluted on Department Health of Mental in 1973 and his re- release tween Williams’ "improperly re- he had ground been that Williams custody in When 1979. turn to Williams, 406 People v. 1967, in leased” charged he been in had pleaded guilty (1979). remanded to The case was Mich. 990 seven-year-old rape and murder with the permit Williams to to court the state circuit Michigan. County, After his girl Allegan in discharge. People v. petition new for file a release, ap- not Allegan County, for reasons Williams, (1979). 407 Mich. 912 record, charges new parent filed from 1973, rape and murder. same on based Shortly his release in Williams after pleaded guilty, this time again rape Williams with the charged was also arrested murder, was sentenced degree thirteen-year-old girl second he Ne of a and murder citing appealed, prison. County, Michigan, a crime he had waygo to life in Psychopath Act. Sec- to when Sexual he section 8 of the committed in 1966 confessed provided was immune was unsuc that a defendant in 1967. Williams tion was arrested charges attempt prosecution get offense those "the cessful his 8, they were charged, or convict- as not originally stood section he dismissed under Nonetheless, Comp. Mich. his conviction. prior commitment. the basis for ed” record, 1968). (West apparent from the those § The Mich- reasons not Laws Ann. 780.508 charges dismissed en Appeals held that section were igan Court of guilty Allegan plea of his conviction. tered second applied and reversed Williams’ affirmed, County. Supreme but Court ing discharge. See JA 105-111 (People v. claim rested comparison on a between the Williams, 546, Mich.App. 580 N.W.2d standard for discharge under section 7 and 438, (1998)). 441-44 24, On November the standard for discharge under the Men- 1998, the Michigan Supreme Court denied tal latter, Health Code. The claimed, he application appeal. leave to was easier satisfy, resulting in his being Williams, See People 914, 459 Mich. 589 treated differently than similarly sit- (1998). N.W.2d 287 persons uated held under the Mental Health Code. The district court referred Proceedings Federal Collateral the case magistrate to a judge on January After the state circuit rejected court his 16, 2001. constitutional claims Williams filed 7, 2001, On March the magistrate judge petition in federal district seeking court issued report recommendation, § habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. On concluding that the petition habeas should 5, 1995, January district dis- be denied. JA 145-173. Williams had ten missed petition, pending final resolu- days to file objections to report. tion of the See state court proceedings. The 636(b)(1). § 28 U.S.C. 16, 2001, On reopened case was March on January Williams after the filed a Supreme consent motion for Court denied an enlargement time, application for of appeal. asking leave to the district The district appointed court court for an counsel to re- additional thirty days to file view, and amend as objections necessary, Williams’ because “the issues are novel petition. Williams filed an peti- amended complex, and the voluminous, record 13, tion 2000, on October claiming that already matters scheduled [for coun- him requiring to seek discharge under sec- sel] when the Report and Recommendation tion deprived 7 him of his constitutional was received will occupy a significant rights to due process equal protection. amount of [counsel’s] time the next cou- His process due claim had compo- two of ple weeks.” JA 189-90. The district First, nents. he claimed that section 7 granted motion, court the giving Williams satisfy failed to requirements the of consti- 25, 2001, until April objections. to file JA process tutional due because it only re- 191. quired the prove to a predisposition state 24, 2001, April On Williams filed a sec- toward, of, not a “likelihood” future dan- ond motion enlargement time, for of ask- gerousness, in conflict with the due pro- ing for an twenty-one additional days, until principles cess Supreme established 17, 2001, May objections. to file Court in JA 192- Hendricks, Kansas v. 521 U.S. 346, 93. The 2072, 117 motion stated that S.Ct. counsel need- 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), ed the extra time account upholding “[o]n decision of recent the standard for illnesses and his commitment Kansas’ trial Sexually Vio- schedule” and to Next, lent Predator Act. review the implications he claimed that of the Supreme even if section 2, did not Court’s April 7 on its face 2001 grant violate of certiorari in process, Crane, due his continued 957, detention Kansas v. did U.S. S.Ct. 1483, because even under section (2001), 7 there was L.Ed.2d a case coun- insufficient evidence to support thought sel potential had the to alter the circuit court’s conclusion that he guiding was not principles constitutional of involun- entitled to equal His protection release. tary hospitalization.3 JA 193. Williams’ what, 3. presented The issue in Crane was any, showing if impairment of volitional a state to file undersigned [William’s] for with Williams speak to unable was counsel enlargement of within objections in- he request, but this making to prior initially given. time “con- that he court was the district formed object. 193. JA potential not respect would fident” Williams JA 198. With if 2001, Crane, court denied that argued Williams of April On relevance counsel decide motion, “Petitioner’s were to stating: Supreme Court time, requires of extension the Constitution already one had Crane has prove impairment certiorari grant showing of volitional Court’s Supreme support would dangerousness, affect unlikely to future ... Kansas v. Crane proof quantum claim that That Williams’ JA 194. case.” this the merits of under the Sexu- required dangerousness accepted day, the district same satisfy constitu- did not Psychopath Act al recommendation report magistrate’s Finally, JA process. due tional for habeas petition denied if the district out that pointed 195-96. relief. JA from for relief motion court denied the Federal 11, 2001, pursuant May On any barred from would be he judgment, 60(b), Williams Procedure Rule of Civil JA on the merits. appeal for for relief filed a motion de- district court June On denying his the order reconsideration judg- for relief from nied Williams’ motion time, enlargement of an second motion ment, order de- for reconsideration objections, which he to file and for leave enlargement the second motion nying grounds As 197-211. attached. JA time, file and for leave his failure relief, argued that ruled The court 174-75. instanter. JA ne- objections was timely file illnesses, “recent that Williams’ counsel’s 60(b). Williams’ motion Rule glect” under to potential the need schedule and his trial the reasons detail greater in described Supreme Court” a case before review objections file to had failed why counsel neglect to to “excusable did not amount time allotted: within the 60(b).” under Rule justify granting relief the Court informs counsel undersigned JA 175. separate occasions fell ill on two that he Appeal of timely Notice Williams filed a first and his second time between 11, 2002, the 3, January July 2001. On on result, As a enlargement. motions Ap- a Certificate Circuit issued Sixth Moreover, days work. he lost several issue of to “the sole pealability, limited came time a close friend during also this denied court properly whether illness, a terminal stage final into the judgment for relief from motion atten- undersigned’s required mag- to leave file representa- personal tion both a recommendation.” report and istrate’s in a additional resulting tive capacity, from the office. being time diverted II. DISCUSSION events, combined unexpected Those Principles Legal A. (in- hearings schedule heavy an already trial) time, Rule of part, In Federal this relevant during a cluding 60(b)(1) “on provides unexpected Civil Procedure further with combined just, as are such terms upon motion impossible made it development, Crane behavior, to make dangerous but does need committing sexual a civilly must before make 534 of a lack of control. that a some determination Ultimately, Court held offender. 867, 407, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 122 S.Ct. prove the U.S. offender’s not need does control over complete lack of total or (2002).

613 ... party timely the court relieve a from a tends that the failure may file ob mistake, ... judgment final for ... inad- jections was not the of culpable result vertence, surprise neglect.” or excusable conduct but of neglect.” A 60(b)(1). a party Fed.R.Civ.P. Where party’s if culpable conduct is it “dis a judgment,4 seeks relief from default Rule play[s] an judicial either intent to thwart 60(b)(1) be applied “equitably should and proceedings a disregard or reckless ... liberally jus- to achieve substantial the effect of its conduct proceedings.” on those tice.” v. United Coin Meter Seaboard Ind us. v. Ac Amernational (6th R.R., 839, Coastline 705 F.2d 844-45 Inc., tion-Tungsram, 925 F.2d 978 Cir.1983) (internal omitted). quotations In (6th Cir.1991) (quoting INVST Financial warranted, deciding whether relief is three Group, Inc. v. Systems, Chem-Nuclear (1) party factors are relevant: whether Inc., (6th Cir.1987)). F.2d 391 (2) culpable; is seeking relief whether the Moreover, although clients are held liable prejudiced; relief party opposing will be for the acts and omissions of their coun (3) the party seeking whether relief sel, see, e.g., Reyes, United States has a claim Id. meritorious or defense. at (6th Cir.2002), court, is F.3d Culpability specif- “framed” “this like rule; i.e., party ic language of dem- others, many extremely has been reluc culpability by onstrates a lack of demon- tant uphold of a dismissal case or “mistake, inadvertence, strating surprise, entering judgment default mere neglect.” Waifersong, excusable Ltd. v. ly to discipline an attorney errant be Vending, Classic Music F.2d 292 cause such deprives a sanction the client (6th Cir.1992). 60(b)(1) And Rule because court,” of his day see Buck v. United demonstration, “mandates” such “[i]t Dep’t Agriculture, States 960 F.2d only [party seeking when the can relief] (6th Cir.1992). carry permitted this burden he will be satisfy to demonstrate that he also can that in record establishes fail other two factors: the of a meri- existence ing to timely file neither Williams nor his torious defense and the absence sub- any counsel engaged culpable conduct. prejudice party].” stantial the [other First, timely objec failure to file Id.; v. see also Weiss St. Paul Fire & appear tions been does not to have “will Co., (6th Marine Ins. 283 F.3d ful” or the of “neg result “carelessness” or Cir.2002) (a party seeking relief “must Weiss, ligence.” at See 283 F.3d 795. He first and demonstrate foremost the time, timely enlargements asked of for and culpable default did not result from his conduct”). the requested extraordinary. time was not A district court’s denial of a 60(b)(1) Rule motion is for reviewed abuse His enlargement first motion for an Coin, discretion. United 705 F.2d at time, granted, timely which was was filed 843. sought merely thirty an additional days. timely The motion was also second Application B. filed for only and asked an additional Culpability Party Seeking 1. Re- Moreover, twenty-one days. length the

lief lapsed appointment time that between the start, filing of Williams’ and the of the must, counsel by as We we consid irrelevant, ering culpability. petition, Williams eon- amended while not sume, Although principles agree, approach 4. these come from cases and we that the same parties involving judgments, govern present should the default the as- case. not to file are objections seeks Williams for sufficient the need obviate not does original petition. of his repetitions mere re- magistrate’s receiving the time circumstances, Williams’ fail- these Given to review and recommendation port the result timely file was ure to ob- responsive prepare report actual culpable not con- neglect,” jections. duct. give for fail to reasons Nor did Williams See, v. e.g., Wilson time. needing additional Party Prejudice Prevailing (In B.R. 531 Cassidy), 273 re Cassidy granting concedes respondent The 2002). (Bankr.N.D.Ohio In both the sec preju- cause it no will requested relief of time and enlargement motion for an ond dice. from motion relief of reasons cited a number De- or Meritoriousness Claim illness, time, including needing additional fense obligations, professional preexisting is the final factor to consider The certiorari grant of Supreme Court’s party claim of the of the meritoriousness Crane, complexity of the v.

Kansas case, the meritori relief—in this seeking record, issues, of the magnitude mag objections to ousness of Williams’ on caselaw reliance magistrate’s A recommendation. report istrate’s events of these jurisdictions. All “meritorious,” if “there claim or defense is beyond counsel’s entirely mostly or were that the outcome of the possibility is some any control, evidence that contrary there is no will be suit after a full trial frivo- default.” INVST were false or achieved reasons result of the claimed Systems, 815 penalize Financial Chem-Nuclear asks us respondent The lous. (6th Cir.1987) (internal F.2d 398-99 district failing provide omitted) added); see quotations (emphasis his coun- details of specific court with the Indus. v. Action- also Amernational schedule, but we do not trial sel’s illness or (6th Inc., F.2d Tungsram, of cul- finding supports that fact believe Cir.1991). The test of meritoriousness where, here, he was never as pability success,” merely but not “likelihood of and the veraci- asked for such information “good defense is at whether the claim or chal- has not been ty of the information Coin, 705 F.2d at 845. Am law.” United contends, also as respondent The lenged. must be biguous disputed facts con ruled, that Crane had no the district court most favorable to the fight “in the strued disagree. case. We relevance to Williams’ Amernational, party].” [defaulted Crane, present- grant of certiorari we must Accordingly, F.2d at 977. decide (and the issue of ultimately resolving) ing fifing of Williams’ permitting whether a requires federal what the Constitution objections, opens up possibility to a respect with to demonstrate state merits, creates “some appeal of an on the control, clearly sexual offender’s lack outcome. possibility” Apply of a different relevant potential to be had below, standard, explained as we ing this claims. Williams’ objections of his are believe that several seeking delay not Finally, Williams did meritorious. his objections. He filed fifing

relief or his Analy- Objection to a. Meritorious attached, relief, with motion Process Claim sis of First Due immediately almost process claim is enlargement first due that the second motion denied it because section 7 is unconstitutional judgment. And the of time and entered 615 of future conclusion require proof by pointing does not sufficient out that the Michi Specifically, he claims dangerousness. gan Appeals opinion Court stated in its interpreted as that under section and that claim failed “because the courts, by Michigan the State can applied proved, required by as the [Sexual merely a prevent discharge proving Act], Psychopath that would [Williams] 'predisposition dangerous- toward future pose an actual threat of danger to others if ness, Supreme whereas the Court’s deci- he were release[d] his detention.” Hendricks, upholding sion in Kansas v. Williams, JA 162-63 (quoting 228 Mich. Act, Sexually Kansas’ Violent Predator es- (JA 109)). App. at 580 N.W.2d 438 tablished that continued confinement re- Relying on this language, he concluded quires proof of a likelihood of future dan- that the “menace language to others” gerousness. 7 section serves the purpose same as the Hendricks, in resolving

In the course of “likelihood of such conduct” language it, statute, specific Supreme namely, issues before Kansas to insure that Court observed that civil commitment stat- continued commitment is based on a find generally satisfy process utes due when ing of a dangerousness. likelihood of future “they coupled proof dangerousness have objects magistrate’s reli factor, proof of some additional ance on the Michigan Court of Appeals’ or abnor- such as mental illness mental opinion as the basis for his conclusion that mality.” It then concluded that Kansas’ section requires finding 7 a likelihood of Sexually Act Violent Predator satisfied future dangerousness. 207. He JA con required this standard because it “evi- opinion tends that does clearly not sexually past dence of violent behavior and impose requirement, such a as it also de present mental condition that creates required scribes the finding terms of a such if likelihood conduct future predisposition or propensity toward future person incapacitated.”5 is not Williams, dangerousness. (citing Id. 357-58, at (emphasis U.S. S.Ct. 2072 (JA 554-555, Mich.App. at 580 N.W.2d 438 added). 109)). The magistrate judge agreed that Hen- agree. opinion, We In its process dricks established due re- Michigan Appeals Court of states that quires proof of a likelihood of future dan- an poses “actual threat of dan gerousness, rejected but Williams’ claim ger,” but it also describes section 7 as proof. that section 7 does not require such requiring the prove pro state to “criminal He acknowledged language that the of sec- offenses,” pensities to commit future sex tion 7 differs language from the of Kan- Act, predisposes or a “mental disorder that him Sexually sas’s Predator Violent but to commit future found those differences as the sex offenses.” JA 109 immaterial view, (Williams, courts, 554-555, Mich.App. at applied his had 438). 7 in a conflicting language section manner “mirrors the N.W.2d This justified question magistrate’s Kansas statute.” JA 162. He calls into conelu- disorder, (3) Sexually abnormality personality 5. Kansas’ Violent Predator Act is an similar, identical, Michigan's person likely engage act but not to which makes the to Psychopath pro- predatory person Sexual The Act. Kansas Act acts of sexual violence. A if, "sexually discharged vides for the civil commitment under of a held this statute must be (1) time, predator,” person any longer satisfy violent defined as a at the state can no its of, with, charged sexually proving beyond convicted vio- burden of these facts a rea- offense, (2) lent from a who suffers mental sonable doubt. As Mental Health Code. JA 210. by der the clearly established has been sion that it recognized, Michigan requires magistrate that section 7 courts finding that the Mental dangerous- Appeals’ of future likelihood Court proof of a “largely mirror” that Williams’ ob- and section us Health Code persuades ness and of state law each other is construction jection is meritorious. Howev- binding on a federal court. that is Objections Equal to Meritorious b. pos- er, finding preclude does not that Analysis Protection might nonethe- sibility that federal there are differences claim is that conclude that equal protection less Williams’ and that those because it sub- the two schemes 7 is unconstitutional between section different, constitutionally significant. more difficult him a and differences are jects to than that analysis for release does not address satisfy, magistrate’s to standard The detainees, Moreover, in- involuntary claim other Williams’ applied possibility. this identical, committed that cluding sexual offenders are not that the burdens mentally ill or not but being guilty found release under it is more difficult to obtain insanity, who are cov- guilty by testimony reason supported is section Code. by the Mental Health (describing ered expert. at least one See JA Fettman). Mark Accord- testimony of Dr. rejected equal Williams’ magistrate objection that this ingly, persuaded we are grounds. claim on several protection meritorious. is First, Michigan Court relying on the again that he concluded Appeals’ opinion, objects mag to the also Mental discharge in the standards any difference be istrate’s conclusion that “largely mir- in section 7 Health Code and 7 and his treatment under section tween therefore, and, ror” each offenders the treatment of other sexual any not show constitutional- Williams could is constitu under the Mental Health Code his treat- ly significant difference between it results tionally insignificant because other involun- ment the treatment of “substantial” interest from the state’s the Mental Health tary detainees under justice, sentencing improving its criminal ruled, Moreover, if even he Code. JA health schemes. He contends and mental different, equal pro- are standards he magistrate that the erred because failed “[improvement fails because tection claim apply scrutiny, requires strict justice, sentencing, in the criminal compel interests be government’s that the of a state are sub- mental health schemes ling. agree. Any We difference treat interests, and a stantial governmental subject is involuntary ment of detainees equal protection by not violate does Louisiana, scrutiny. strict See Foucha persons who applying different schemes 71, 85-86, 504 U.S. S.Ct. at different times.” committed their crimes (1992). magistrate’s L.Ed.2d 437 As JA 169. standard, analysis apply fails to this objects mag to the first objection magis second imposes that section 7 istrate’s conclusion protection analysis is also equal trate’s Health the same as the Mental burden meritorious. the definition of He argues Code. in the Mental Health dangerousness future III. CONCLUSION narrow,” while the “specific Code gener weigh As all three Coin factors definition in 7 is “broad section favor, al,” court should un- making it easier to obtain release relief to rule granted have Williams’ motion for on the motion. The circumstances permitted here, and him to file judgment from at issue while certainly trying, in are objections. Accordingly, and for the way no the ordinary legal out of for prac- reasons, above stated the district court’s tice. professional personal Other denying Williams’ motion for relief commitments, order which did not arise at the from for reconsideration of the moment, part parcel last are of doing denying enlargement order a second lawyer. business as a The reasons relied for time to file leave to file by my colleagues on for finding this ne- objections is The district REVERSED. glect excusable present very would be April denying court’s 2001 order the many By waiting cases before our court. enlargement second motion for of time is until the period end of the extended to file REVERSED; ac- April its 2001 order extension, a request yet for another coun- magistrate cepting judge’s report and sel insured that judge would have no and denying ap- recommendation Williams’ case, dismissing choice between plication corpus for the writ of habeas is consequences the harsh are noted VACATED; April judg- and its opinion, and acceding to counsel’s re- respondent ment favor of the quest, whatever its merits. Under these against the petitioner VACATED. The circumstances, I would hold that the test case is REMANDED with for instructions of United Coin Meter and of Weiss has objec- accept the district court to been met and that counsel’s actions show filing, tions to issue decision on negligence carelessness in dealing and/or after consideration of all petition given with the time him the court’s objections.6 of his initial extension of time. I BOGGS, respectfully therefore dissent. Judge, dissenting. Circuit I respectfully my dissent col- holding that

leagues’ counsel committed neglect” objec- in failing to file magistrate judge’s tions report this case. Counsel had asked for an exten- thirty days

sion of beyond time the ten- day period objections. prescribed for such actually The court granted an additional thirty-nine days, to April 25.

Counsel, having forty-nine days now had filing since the of the magistrate judge’s COMPANY, BE&K CONSTRUCTION report, until forty-eighth day waited Cross-Respondent, Petitioner twenty-one day ask for an additional ex- tension. circumstances, waiting these

Under until NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent day next to the last to file the exten- Cross- Petitioner, virtually defying right sion was the judge’s petition discharge 6. A determination on remand that reconsider his deprived right been has of his constitutional guided by ruling court’s final on the federal process equal protection to due does not the merits. release, entitle him to but to have a state

Case Details

Case Name: Theodore G. Williams v. William Meyer

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 25, 2003

Citation: 346 F.3d 607

Docket Number: 01-1951

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.