46 So. 712 | Miss. | 1908
delivered the opinion of the court
The petition under which this land was sold was manifestly bottomed on Code 1892, § 2205 (Code 1906, § 2122), and just as manifestly, was not brought under Code 1892, § 2191, (Code-1906, § 2113)., The petition itself expressly prays for process for three near relatives of the minors to be served under this-section 2205, naming the section. The allegations required to-be made under section 2113, to the effect that, if the personalty
Tbe record further discloses affirmatively that the land is really located in section 35, whereas tbe petition and the decree for tbe sale of tbe land both describe tbe land as in section 3. Tbe additional effort to fix tbe description by showing that the land commenced at tbe southwest corner of land owned by Morgan on the Gulf of Mexico is unavailing. There might have been a dozen such lots of that size beginning on the Gulf of Mexico. Nor is the matter helped by the reference to tbe land as being the same land conveyed by Tylor to Hollingsworth by deed dated August 25, 1813, and recorded in tbe record of deeds of said county in Book 8, page 211, for tbe obvious, reason that page 211 of Book 8 contains tbe record of no such deed. It thus appears that the record affirmatively discloses that tbe land actually belonging to the minors was not sold or conveyed at all. No
The brief filed by the learned counsel for the appellants announces a very familiar and elementary rule of law, that these innocent purchasers for value without notice would be protected as against any collateral attack on this decree for the sale of the lands, if such decree was merely voidable or irregular; but the other principle is equally well settled, to wit, that, where a decree is absolutely null and void, it is subject to attack anywhere, collaterally or otherwise. We have several times" pointed out the distinction between the jurisdiction of a cohrt over the subject-matter generally and the power of a court having jurisdiction over a subject-matter generally to exercise that jurisdiction in a particular way. See, for a full discussion of this subject, the opinion of this court in Chester Burden v. State, 92 Miss., 45 South. 1. Of course, the chancery court had jurisdiction generally to entertain petitions under Oode 1892, § 2205, to sell the lands of minors under the conditions prescribed by that statute; but the exercise of that general jurisdiction, in order to be valid, had to be in conformity with-the law as announced in section 2205. Three of the near relatives had to be cited and the court had no power to make a sede at all without conforming to this requirement, and the decree of sale, -therefore, when the record itself affirmatively discloses the fact that there was no compliance whatever with this requirement, was a decree beyond the power of the court to enter. It was absolutely null and void; not merely irregular. And so, also, the decree of the court to sell land that did not belong to these minors passed no title whatever, and, for that reason, also, the decree was void. The distinction, as
Affirmed.