30 Del. Ch. 269 | New York Court of Chancery | 1948
The question is whether the Unemployment Compensation Commission is a proper party plaintiff in this proceeding. The bill for an accounting was originally filed by Theisen, as administrator d.b.n. of Alice Boyle Hoey, deceased, against Edward F. Hoey and Anne M. Hoey Leary, former administrators, who had been removed from their office, and the surety on their bond. The Unemployment Compensation Commission subsequently intervened. The bill alleges that on the death of the intestate
The Unemployment Compensation Commission Law, Chap. 258, VoL 41, Laws of Del., approved April 30, 1937, as amended by Chapts. 281 and 280, Vol. 43, Laws of Del. provides, in part:
“Sec. 2.
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“(g) ‘Employing unit’ means any individual or type of organization, including any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance company, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor thereof, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to January 1, 1936, had in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it within this State.
“Sec. 14.
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“(d) The contributions, penalties and interest due from the employer under the provisions of this chapter, from the time they shall become due, shall be a debt of the employer to the unemployment compensation fund. Such debt, whether sued upon or not, shall be a lien on all the property of the debtor for a period of 2 years and shall be given preference as a first lien in any distribution of the assets of the employer, whether in bankruptcy, insolvency, execution process, in the distribution of the estate of any employer, or otherwise. * * *
*272 “(e) As an additional or alternative remedy the Commission may issue, under its seal and the hand of its Executive Director, to the Prothonotary of the Superior Court in and for any county of the State of Delaware, a certificate that any employer is indebted under the provisions of this chapter in an amount which shall be stated in such certificate ; and thereupon the Prothonotary to whom such certificate shall have been issued shall immediately enter upon his record of docketed judgments the name of such employer, the name of the Commission, the amount of the debt so certified, a brief description of the said employer’s liability under this chapter, and the date of making such entries. The making of such entries shall have the same force and effect in all respects as the entries of docketed judgment in the office of such prothonotary, and the Commission shall have all the remedies and may take all the proceedings for the collection of the said debt which could be had or taken upon a judgment in an action of law upon debt or contract, but without prejudice to the said employer’s right of appeal.”
It is conceded that all compensation contributions which accrued during the lifetime of Alice Boyle Hoey have been paid. On July 26, 1939, when the letters of administration were granted, the original administrators executed the required statutory bond in the office of the Register of Wills, for New Castle County, for $45,000, with Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, a corporation of the State of Massachusetts, as surety. The condition of that bond among other things provides that it shall be void if Edward F. Hoey and Anne M. Hoey (now Anne M. Hoey Leary)
“* * * shall well and faithfully administer according to law all the goods and chattels, rights and credits of the deceased, which shall have come to the possession or knowledge of the said Edward F. Hoey and Anne M. Hoey and shall render a just and true account of such administration by the Twenty-sixth day of July next, and shall distribute and pay all the residue of said goods and chattels, rights and credits, after all demands and charges to which they are subject are deducted, to the person or persons entitled to receive the same.”
The action is based on that instrument. The question raised by the defendants’ petition is, therefore, whether unpaid compensation contributions, which accrued after the death of the deceased and while the prior administrators of her estate were operating the laundry business which
The obligations of the principals as administrators and of the surety on their bond are wholly contractual and are measured by its provisions when read in connection with the powers and duties imposed by law on executors or administrators in settling estates. 21 Amer. Jur. 791; 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, § 956, p. 1175; Restatement, Security, 471; Campbell v. American Bond Co., 172 Ala. 458, 55 So. 308. In administering an estate according to law, in general it is the duty of personal representatives to collect any debts due the deceased, to convert other personal property into cash, and after the payment of the debts of the deceased and the deduction of all other proper charges and expenses, to pay any balance there may be to the person or persons entitled thereto. Theisen, Adm’r. d.b.n., v. Hoey, et al., supra. When administrators have been removed from office, they have certain obligations to their successor with respect to the delivery of assets in hand for final distribution. Id.
It appears from the bill that the individual defendants purporting to act as administrators, had operated a business owned and conducted by the deceased during her lifetime, for more than four years after her death, and in disposing of a demurrer this court held that that was neither a part
In Smolka v. Chandler & Son, Inc., supra, the court said:
“Burial expenses, in their very nature, are not an indebtedness of the decedent, for they accrue after his death. Strictly, they constitute a preferred charge on the assets in the hands of the personal representative, rather than a debt against the estate.”
No reference was made to the statute making them preferred claims, Bev. Code 1935, § 3'837, but the court doubtless had it in mind. If the claim of the Commission is a debt of the decedent’s estate, it would be a charge on assets; but that is the question to be determined. The provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Statute are based on public policy, but in the absence of clear and ex
“The making of such entries shall have the same force and effect in all respects as the entries of docketed judgment [sic] in the office of such prothonotary * *
It further provides
“* * * and the Commission shall have all the remedies and may take all the proceedings for the collection of the said debt which could be had or taken upon a judgment in an action of law upon debt or contract, but without prejudice to the said employer’s right of appeal.”
No appeal from the determination of the Commission was taken, but it is unnecessary to consider whether the alleged ex parte record entries would have conclusively established debts against the decedent’s estate had the statute been fully complied with.
The provision that the so-called judgment records should contain “a brief description of the said employer’s liability under this chapter” was disregarded, and their invalidity, therefore, appears. See Hendrix v. Kelley, 4 W. W. Harr. (34 Del.) 120, 143 A. 460. In addition to the names of the defendants and the subsequent descriptive words, the only material record entry in each case is: “And Now To Wit * * * judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant” for a specified sum of money “and interest, besides costs, etc.” The order permitting the Unemployment
An order will be entered accordingly.