129 F. 462 | D. Wash. | 1904
(after stating the facts as above). From the evidence, I find the facts of the case to be as follows: The place of the collision was about four miles north of Tacoma, and one-fourth of a mile off shore, opposite the south side of Dash Point. There was ample room for the two vessels to have passed each other in safety, there being proximately three miles of open water between the shore of the mainland and Maury Island, and the vessels were not embarrassed by the presence of other craft. The time of the collision was about 6:20 p. m., October 28, 1902. The sky was overcast and cloudy, so that it was quite dark; otherwise it was a fine evening — that is to say, it was calm, and there was no fog or rain to obstruct the vision. The Trader was going to Tacoma, carrying a cargo of salted fish in boxes. She passed Point Robinson at about 5:3o p. m., and was then so far out towards midchannel that another steamer, going northward to Seattle, passed between her and Point Robinson. At that time the captain relieved the mate and took sole control of her movements, and changed her course so as to head south by west a quarter west by her compass. The distance from Point Robinson to Dash Point is proximately five miles, the tide was ebbing, and the Trader’s speed was about 5 yi statute miles per hour. At that rate of speed, with the tide against her, and on that course, in the 50 minutes which intervened between the time of passing Point Robinson and the time of the collision, the Trader would have crossed Puget Sound on an oblique line, and would have come to the place of the collision above indicated, which is proximately one-quarter of a mile off the southerly side of Dash Point.
The accompanying outline map is an accurate representation of the shore lines and points referred to and the course of the Trader, indicated by an arrow 1,000 feet off Point Robinson, and shows proximately the location of the collision, indicated by a cross one-fourth of a mile off Dash Point, and proximately the courses of the Capital City before and after turning Brown’s Point.
The Capital City is a passenger steamboat, and was employed on a route between Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia. Compared with the Trader, she is a fast boat, her ordinary speed being 12^ miles per hour. She left Tacoma at 6 p. m. on' her run northward to Seattle, and passed Brown’s Point 15 minutes later, and then steered a course to-the place of the collision above indicated, so that for a period of about S minutes the two steamers were on opposite courses, and approaching each other head on, or nearly so. Each of them carried the regulation masthead light and side lights, all of their lights were burning brightly,
In arriving at a conclusion with respect to the facts of the case, I have been guided mainly by the evidence of unimpeached witnesses, and by the indisputable facts with respect to the time and place of the collision. I have been obliged to reject as untrue the testimony given by the captain of the Trader, to the effect that only the green light of the Capital City was visible to him when he blew the second signal for a starboard passing.. It is a peculiar feature of this case that the two captains agree in their testimony with respect to the course steered by the Capital City. Her captain puts her on a course from Brown’s
The testimony of the captain of the Capital City is muddled and contradictory, and inconsistent with well-established facts. He claims to have been in the'pilot house, and on watch from the time his steamer left Tacoma; that he heard only one signal from the Trader; that he responded to that signal, notwithstanding the fact that he was unable to see the Trader’s lights, or to locate her position, until the vessels were so near to each other that the collision could not be avoided; that at first he saw only her red light, which was four points off the Capital City’s port bow; and that the two vessels were in that position (that is to say, very near to each other, and the Trader bearing four points off the Capital City’s port bow, and showing only her red light) when he put his helm hard aport. He attempts to excuse himself for not seeing the Trader’s lights by saying that it was raining and the weather was thick, and yet he claims that he did see the lights on Point Robinson, more than five miles distant. He pretends, also, that at the time of answering the signal he gave an order to the man who was steering the Capital City to change her course one point to port, and that he does not know now, and did not at the time observe, whether said order was obeyed or not; and, further, it appears by his testimony that he was first apprised of danger by hearing some one — he does not know who — say, “There is going to be a collision.” He did not then give any signal to his engineer, and attempts to excuse that failure by saying that he was standing in the pilot house in a position where he could not reach the handle of the engine-room signal bell. If this is a true exposure of his conduct, we have an instance of a captain of a passenger steamboat, running in the nighttime at a high rate of speed, placing himself in a position where he could not communicate with his engineer, and remaining in that position after hearing a passing signal from a
It is entirely plain to me that the collision could not have happened, under the circumstances which existed, without the concurrence of. negligence and mismanagement on the part of both captains. The collision did occur as a consequence of the obstinancy of a British captain in disregarding the plain mandate of the law that two steamers on opposite courses, approaching each other head to head, shall each give way sufficiently to pass each other port side, to port side. The first signal for a starboard passing was given when the Capital City was at least one mile distant from the Trader, and when she was turning a point, and in this there was a violation of law — the passing signal should not be given by one vessel until the course of the other vessel has been ascertained. His error in signaling prematurely gave the captain no right whatever to insist upon passing on the starboard side, when the conditions were such as to require adherence 'to the rule requiring both vessels to give way to starboard so as to pass on the port side. The Capital City carried good lights, and it is reasonably certain that the captain of the Trader saw her red light before repeating the signal for a starboard passing; therefore an inexcusable fault on his part was committed in repeating that signal, and steering a course to pass on the starboard hand. If he did not see the Capital City’s red light at the time of repeating the signal, he certainly was not attending to his business, and was guilty of a fault as serious as the other. The conduct of the Capital City in running at a high rate of speed so as to meet the Trader head on after she had signaled, without responding to the signal, was a sufficient indication of danger to make it the imperative duty of the captain of the Trader to stop his vessel and sound an alarm, and his failure to do so was another violation of law, and a serious fault.
The charge made against the Trader, that she did not have the regulation lights, or that, if she did have lights, they were defective, is shown to be untrue by ample evidence. The errors committed by the captain of the Capital City are glaring and inexcusable. He knew that his vessel was running at a high rate of speed, and that for safety it was necessary for him to keep a vigilant lookout, and especially so when turning Brown’s Point. He either neglected that important duty, or actually saw the lights of the Trader when she was one mile distant, and made no timely effort to keep out.of her way. His failure to see the Trader, if he did not see her in ample time, and his failure to keep out of her way, constitute the first fault of which I find him guilty. Having assented to the. Trader’s second signal for a starboard passing, he was bound to act accordingly, and should have changed the course of the Capital City by going to port, so as
“Q. Did you get any order from the captain, from Capt. Edwards, as soon as yon saw the Trader? A. He took the wheel himself to throw her hard over, and tried to clear the boat, and the other boat turned right around and hit us. Q. Oh, I see. Then, as soon as you saw the Trader, you put your helm hard aport? A. The helm hard astarboard. Q. You put your helm hard astarboard when you saw the Trader; is that right? A. I mean hard aport, to try to get away from her again, to make a starboard passing. Q. I want to know just what you do mean. When you first saw the Trader, did you put your helm hard astarboard or hard aport? A. Put the helm hard astarboard —I mean hard aport — to try to get away from him; we were making a starboard passing. Q. Then when you put your helm hard aport — ■ A. Hard astarboard. Q. Hard astarboard. Then as a matter of fact you put your helm hard astarboard, did you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who told you to do that? A. Well, the captain took the wheel then himself. Q. He took the lever? A. Yes, sir. Q. Well, he did not change the course any after he took it, did he? A. Well, he put the wheel hard astarboard. Q. You put it hard astarboard, and then he took the lever? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, Mr. Simdars, why did the captain take the lever away from you? A. Well, he seen there was going to be a collision, and he tried to get out the best way he could. He took it himself to try to get out of it. Q. Did not he take your lever away from you because he told you to put your helm hard aport and you put it hard astarboard, as you testified? A. No, sir. Q. What did he say to you when he took the lever away from you? A. He did not say anything; he just— I let him have the wheel, and he took the wheel and done the best he could to try to get away from her.”
In the light of such testimony, given by one of the most important witnesses for the libelant, the conclusion that the Capital City was in control of a blunderer is unavoidable, and it is useless to conjecture as to whether it was the helmsman, or the captain himself, who blundered.
The proctor for the libelant and intervening libelant has unreasoná
In the argument, but not in the pleadings, the Trader is charged with failure to render assistance in rescuing the passengers and crew of the Capital City, and it is insisted that under the act of Congress of September 4, 1890, c. 875, § 1, 26 U. S. Stat. 425 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2902], the collision must be deemed to have been caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or fault of the Trader. I find, however, that- she did stand by until the Capital City was beached, and then proceeded to Tacoma, and her captain was prompt in reporting the disaster, and procured a steamtug to go to the relief of the Capital City, and returned to her with said tug. Considering the comparative safety of the people on the Capital City after she was beached, and the unknown extent of the damages to the Trader, it would have been imprudent to have attempted to take the passengers on board the Trader. Therefore the statute cited is not applicable to this case.
The intervening libelant has no standing in a court of admiralty, for the reason that the evidence proves affirmatively that he has no interest in any of the matters in controversy. He paid nothing to either of the
From consideration of the evidence, the court finds that the Trader was seriously injured by the collision, and that $2,500 is a reasonable estimate of the damages for said injury. The total amount of damages caused by the collision, with interest thereon, computed at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, from the 1st day of January, 1903, to the 1st day of April, 1904, amounts to the sum of $11,825, and tlie amount fox which the Trader is liable, after deducting $2,500 and interest thereon, amounts to the sum of $3,225, to which will be added one-half of all the taxable costs; and by the decree it will be directed that the owners of the Trader pay into court said amount plus one-half of the taxable costs, out of which will be paid the total amount of the taxable costs, and the residue will be paid to the libelant