Thе TIMKEN COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES, Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd., Koyo Corporation of U.S.A., Inc., NSK, Ltd. and NSK Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 93-1312, 93-1455.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Sept. 27, 1994.
1470
Velta A. Melnbrencis, Asst. Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued, for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Asst. Atty. Gen. and David M. Cohen, Director. Also on the brief were Stephen J. Powell, Chief Counsel, Berniece A. Browne, Sr. Counsel, and Joan L. MacKenzie, Attorney-Advisor, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, of counsel.
James A. Geraghty, Donohue & Donohue, of New York City, argued, for defendants-appellees, NSK, Ltd. and NSK Corp., Joseph F. Donohue, Jr., and Kathleen C. Inguaggiato, of Donohue & Donohue were on the brief for defendants-appellees.
Peter O. Suchman, Susan P. Strommer, Robert Torresen, Jr., and Robert A. Calaff, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for defendants-appellees, Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. аnd KOYO Corp. of U.S.A., Inc.
Before ARCHER, Chief Judge *, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and RADER, Circuit Judge.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
The United States Court of International Trade affirmed the International Trade Administration‘s (ITA) imposition of dumping duties on tapered roller bearings four inches or less in diameter (TRBs) imported by
BACKGROUND
On October 31, 1973, the Timken Company (Timken) petitioned the Department of Treasury to impose antidumping duties on TRBs manufactured in Japan. Tapеred Roller Bearings From Japan; Antidumping Proceeding Notice, 38 Fed.Reg. 33,408 (Dep‘t Treas.1973). Under the Antidumping Act of 1921,
In 1980, the Department of Commerce replaced the Department of Treasury as the administering authority of the antidumping law. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131, 133 (1981), reprinted in
I. The 1974-80 entries
After a lengthy administrative process, ITA published its final determinations covеring the 1974-80 entries on June 1, 1990. Tapered Roller Bearings Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 55 Fed.Reg. 22,369 (Dep‘t Comm.1990) (Final Results for 1974-80 Entries). ITA set the dumping margins at 4.99% to 23.43% for NSK, and 18.81% to 35.89% for Koyo Seiko. Id. at 22,382. ITA required no interest payments under
ITA also declined to deduct the profits earned by the importers’ United States subsidiaries from ESP under
Timken appealed various aspects of ITA‘s Final Results for the 1974-80 Entries twice to the Court of International Trade. In its first appeal, Timken challenged ITA‘s decision not to impose interest under section 1677g(a) for duties owed on the 1974-80 entries. Timken Co. v. United States, 777 F.Supp. 20 (Ct.Int‘l Trade 1991) (Timken I). The Court of International Trade upheld the agency‘s interpretation of “amounts deposited” in section 1677g(a). Id. at 27. In support of this decision, the court noted that “the provision requiring cash deposits of estimated duties [
In the second appeal to the Court of Internatiоnal Trade, Timken challenged, inter alia, ITA‘s refusal to deduct the profits of the Japanese exporters’ domestic subsidiaries from ESP calculations. Timken Co. v. United States, 795 F.Supp. 438, 440 (Ct.Int‘l Trade 1992) (Timken II). Relying on previous Court of International Trade decisions rejecting Timken‘s interpretation of the term “commissions” in
II. The 1986-87 entries
In 1990, ITA published the final results for the 1986-87 entries. Tapered Roller Bearings Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter and Certain Components Thereof From Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Admin. Review, 55 Fed.Reg. 38,720 (1990) (Final Results for 1986-87 Entries). ITA set dumping margins at 52.17% for Koyo Seiko and 35.00% for NSK. Id. at 38,729. ITA again exempted the importers from interest payments under section 1677g(a). Id. at 38,726-27.
On November 25, 1992, the Court of International Trade affirmed ITA‘s interpretation of section 1677g(a) for the 1986-87 еntries. Timken Co. v. United States, 809 F.Supp. 121, 122-23 (Ct.Int‘l Trade 1992) (Timken III). The trial court relied in part on its earlier disposition of this issue in Timken I to reject Timken‘s interpretation of section 1677g(a) as requiring interest on duties owed by NSK and Koyo Seiko. Timken III, 809 F.Supp. at 122. The court also rejected Timken‘s attempt to distinguish Timken I on the ground that the entries covered in Timken I almost all occurred before the enactment of section 1677g(a). The 1986-87 entries, by contrast, occurred when the 1979 Act was in full effect. The trial court, however, noted that the statute unambiguously requires interest “only on deposits and not on bonds.” Timken III, 809 F.Supp. at 122. The court remanded only for correction of computer programming errors unrelated to this appeal. The Court of International Trade affirmed the remand results on June 8, 1993. NSK, Ltd. v. United States, Nos. 90-10-00543, -00546, -00548, 1993 WL 208797, 1993 Ct.Int‘l Trade, LEXIS 98 (June 8, 1993). In a separate appeal, Timken appealed this decision to this court. By order dated August 23, 1994, this court consolidated both appeals.
ANALYSIS
Under
I.
Under the 1921 Act, Treasury did not impose interest on underpayments of estimated duties. The 1979 Act gave Commerce authority for the first time to assess interest. The 1979 Act, sec. 101, § 778(a), 93 Stat. at 188 (current version at
Section 1677g(a) provides:
Interest shall be payable on overpayments and underpayments of amounts deposited on merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on and after—
(1) the date of publication of a countеrvailing or antidumping duty order under this subtitle or section 1303 of this title, or
(2) the date of a finding under the Antidumping Act, 1921.
In interpreting section 1677g(a), this court first consults the language of the statute itself. See Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1990). If the statute is clear on its face, then this court‘s review ends. Id. at 1101. If the statute is not clear on its face, then this court reviews ITA‘s interpretation to determine whether it is reasonable in light of the language, policies, and enactment history of the statute. Id. (citing Corning Glass Works v. United States Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed.Cir.1986)). This court accords ITA considerable deference in its interpretations of these statutory provisions. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Elec., Technical Salaried & Machine Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2672 (1994).
The language of section 1677g(a) imposes interest only on “amounts deposited.” Section 1677g(a) in isolation does not specify the meaning of “amounts deposited.” In the context of the rest of the statutory scheme set forth in the 1979 Act, however, the meaning of this language becomes apparent.
Title 19, Chapter 4, Subtitle IV, Part II of the United States Code—“Imposition of Antidumping Duties“—as a general rule links the word “deposit” to “cash.” For instance,
More important, the 1979 Act limits, with some exception, the use of bonds to the preduty order, investigative phase of antidumping proceedings.
requires the deposit of estimated antidumping duties pending liquidation of entries of merchandise at the same time as estimated normal customs duties on that merchandise are deposited.
The administering authority may permit, for not more than 90 days after the date of publication of an [antidumping duty] order ..., the posting of a bond or other security in lieu of the deposit of estimated antidumping duties required under [section 1673e(a)(3)]....
The enactment history of the 1979 Act further supports the distinction between cash and bonds. In explaining the bill, a House of Representatives committee reported:
The second major change is the requirement that merchandise subject to an antidumping order may be entered only upon the deposit of estimated antidumping duties. Under present practice such merchandise may enter under bond. The Committee feels strongly that this practice does not sufficiently deter dumping.... The Committee believes that the requirement of сash deposits will ensure that complete information will be submitted to the Authority in a timely manner.
H.R.Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1979) (emphasis added). The House Committee on Ways and Means also noted:
The Committee recognizes the effect that the requirement of a cash deposit of estimated duties may have on importers, particularly small businesses, and does not wish to unduly burden those importers who have, in fact, taken steps to eliminate dumping.
[The] bill provides a limited exception tо the requirement of a deposit of estimated duties for importers.... Thus, for a three month period following the issuance of an antidumping order, the Authority may continue to permit entry of merchandise subject to the order under bond....
Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added). These passages underscore the 1979 Act‘s different treatment of cash deposits and bond amounts. Thus, the 1979 Act draws a clear distinction between a “deposit” in cash and a “bond or other security” with respect to estimated antidumping duties.
If the amount of a cash deposit collected as security for an estimated antidumping duty under section 1673b(d)(2) is different from the amount of the antidumping duty determined under an antidumping duty order ... then the difference shall be—
(1) disregarded, to the extent the cash deposit collected is lower than the duty under the order, or
(2) refunded, to the extent the cash deposit is higher than the duty under the order.
If the amount of an estimated antidumping duty deposited under section [1673e(a)] is different from the amount of the antidumping duty determined under an antidumping duty order.... then the difference shall be—
(1) collected, to the extent that the deposit under section 1673e(a)(3) is lower than the duty determined under the order, or
(2) refunded, to the extent that the deposit under section 1673e(a)(3) is higher than the duty determined under the order,
together with interest as provided by section 1677g of this title.
Title 19 contains similar provisions pertaining to countervailing duties.
If the amount of a cash deposit, or the amount оf any bond or other security, required as security for an estimated countervailing duty under section 1671b(d)(2) is different from the amount of the countervailing duty determined under a countervailing duty order issued under section 1671e ... then the difference shall be—
(1) disregarded, to the extent that the cash deposit, bond, or other security is lower than the duty under the order, or
(2) refunded or released, to the extent that the cash deposit, bond, or other security is higher than the duty under the order.
If the amount of an estimated countervailing duty deposited under section 1671e(a)(3) is different from the amount of the countervailing duty determined under a countervailing duty order then the difference shall be—
(1) collected, to the extent that the deposit is lower than the duty determined under the order, or
(2) refunded, to the extent that the deposit is higher than the duty determined under the order,
together with interest as provided by section 1677g of this title.
The “amounts deposited” term of section 1677g(a) thus refers to a deposit of estimated duties.
Contrary to Timken‘s assertion, recent amendments to section 1677g(a) did not alter the limitation of “amounts deposited” to cash payments. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-573, sec. 621, § 778, 98 Stat. 3039 (1984) (1984 Act), merely changed the moment from which interest accrues. Instead of imposing interest from the date of an аffirmative final determination under the 1979 Act, the 1984 Act amended section 1677g(a) to count interest from the date of either publication of a duty order under the 1979 Act or a dumping finding under the 1921 Act. This amendment, while altering the date from which interest would accrue, did not abolish the requirement of depositing estimated duties before exporters would be liable for interest under section 1677g(a).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-514, sec. 1886, § 708, 100 Stat. 2922, 2923 (1986), specified that merchandise not liquidated by November 4, 1984, was subject to interest payments under section 1677g(a). Again, this enactment did not disturb the
This court‘s recent decision in Daewoo does not compel a different result. In Daewoo, this court upheld ITA‘s decision to treat bonds and cash deposits similarly in the context of the cap on duties in
More important, however, section 1673f(a) is very different from section 1673f(b), which expressly provides for interest under section 1677g(a).
Furthermore, ITA‘s interpretation of section 1673f(a) is consistent with the corresponding countervailing duty provision, section 1671f(a).
In sum, the requirement to make cash deposits of estimated duties, under the duty order, triggers the interest provision. Without the duty order, the importer has no obligation to make a cash deposit and consequently no obligation to pay interest. The Court of International Trade did not err in upholding ITA‘s determination that NSK and Koyo Seiko are not liable for interest under section 1677g(a).
Finally, this court declines to impose interest in equity. This court will not act in a manner contrary to a statutory provision dealing with the precise issue. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1993).
II.
Title 19 provides for calculation of the ESP in
For purposes of this section, the term “exporter‘s sales price” means the price at which merchandise is sold or agreed to be sold in the United States, before or after the time of importation, by or for the account of the exporter, as adjusted under subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
For purposes of this section, the exporter‘s sales price shall also be adjusted by being reduced by the amount, if any, of—
(1) commissions for selling in the United States the particular merchandise under consideration....
The 1979 Act does not expressly define the term “commissions.” Again this сourt begins with the statutory language. See Chaparral Steel, 901 F.2d at 1100-01. The usual and customary meaning of the word “commissions” does not include profits. For instance, Random House defines “commission” as “a sum or percentage allowed to agents, sales representatives, etc., for their services.” Random House Unabridged Dictionary 412 (2nd ed. 1993). Thus, the meaning of the language itself forecloses a deduction for profits.
The enactment history supports the meaning of the statutory language. In a report on the antidumping bill, the Senate Committee on Finance stated that “the definition of ‘exporter‘s sales price’ requires the deduction of any amount included in such price attributable to (1) any costs, charges, United States import duties, and expenses ... [and] (2) any commissions for selling the particular merchandise in the United States.” S.Rep. No. 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921) (emphasis added). This explanation of ESP does not refer to profits or contravene the conventional meaning of “commissiоns.” In sum, the record shows no error in the trial court‘s reading of
CONCLUSION
The Court of International Trade correctly interpreted
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED.
ARCHER, Chief Judge *, concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the majority. To the extent this opinion holds, on both issues, that the International Trade Administration‘s interpretation of the relevant statute is a reasonable one, I join the opinion.
ALLIANCE OF DESCENDANTS OF TEXAS LAND GRANTS (for themselves and a class of other individuals similarly situated, totalling 1064), and Blanca Rosa Villarreal Aguirre (for thеmselves and a class of other individuals similarly situated, totalling 200), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 93-5140, 93-5141.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
Oct. 6, 1994.
Rehearing Denied; Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Declined Dec. 7, 1994.
* Judge Archer assumed the position of Chief Judge on March 18, 1994.
Notes
Title 19 also distinguishes cash deposits from bonds in the context of estimated customs duties.
(a) Deposit of estimated duties
Unless merchandise is entered ... under bond, the importer of record shall deposit ... the amount of duties estimated by such customs officer to be payable thereon.
(b) Collection or refund
The appropriate customs officer shall collect any increased or additional duties due or refund any excess of duties deposited as determined on a liquidation or reliquidation.
