THE STATE v. WILLIAMS
A18A0853
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
August 14, 2018
RICKMAN, Judge.
FIFTH DIVISION. MCFADDEN, P. J., RAY and RICKMAN, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk‘s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
This issue presented in this case is whether Georgia‘s statute governing the possession and control of child pornography,
Williams filed a demurrer seeking to dismiss counts two through 48 of the indictment, arguing that they were multiplicitous of the first count. The trial court agreed, concluding that the legislature‘s use of the phrase “any material” in
“Multiplicity is the charging of the same crime in several counts of a charging document.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 433 (7) (349 SE2d 717) (1986). Because “it is the task of the legislature, not the courts, to define crimes and set the range of sentences,” the determination of whether a course of conduct can result in multiple violations of the same statute is a matter of statutory interpretation. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 6 (3) (690 SE2d 804) (2010); see Sanabria v. U. S., 437 U.S. 54, 69 II (B) (98 SCt 2170, 57 LEd2d 43) (1978) (noting that “[f]ew, if any, limitations are imposed by the Double Jeopardy Clause on the legislative power to define offenses“). Thus, when faced with a multiplicity challenge, we are required to ascertain “the ‘unit of prosecution,’ or the precise act or conduct that is being criminalized under the statute.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383, 384 (589 SE2d 69) (2003); see Sanabria, 437 U. S. at 70 II (B) (“Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute depends on [the allowable unit of prosecution prescribed by the legislature].“) (footnote omitted).
We begin our analysis by recognizing that “[a] statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dubois v. Brantley, 297 Ga. 575, 579 (2) (775 SE2d 512) (2015). To that end, “[t]he common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. “For context, we may look to the other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law-constitutional, statutory, and common law alike-that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.
In its entirety,
(b) (1) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any minor to engage in or assist any other person to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual medium depicting such conduct.
(2) It is unlawful for any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control of a minor knowingly to permit the minor to engage in or to assist any other person to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual medium depicting such conduct.
(3) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice,
or coerce any minor to engage in or assist any other person to engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of any performance.
(4) It is unlawful for any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control of a minor knowingly to permit the minor to engage in or to assist any other person to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of any performance.
(5) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to create, reproduce, publish, promote, sell, distribute, give, exhibit, or possess with intent to sell or distribute any visual medium which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor‘s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.
(6) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to advertise, sell, purchase, barter, or exchange any medium which provides information as to where any visual medium which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor‘s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct can be found or purchased.
(7) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to bring or cause to be brought into this state any material which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor‘s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.
(8) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess or control any material which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor‘s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.
A violation of any of the above provisions is a felony2 and is punishable by a prison sentence ranging from five to 20 years. See
We have previously recognized that
Reading the statute within the context of these objectives, we have little trouble concluding that the subsection (b) (8) criminalizes each individual act of possessing or controlling an image depicting child pornography. The legislature‘s frequent use of the word “any” throughout the statute suggests a lack of restriction or limitation with respect to the statute‘s intended scope. In subsection (b) (8) specifically, the term
“any material” is qualified by the singular form of the noun “minor” - “a minor or a portion of a minor‘s body” - indicating that each depiction of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct constitutes a separate and distinct violation of that statutory provision. See Coates v. State, 342 Ga. App. 148, 151-152 (802 SE2d 65) (2017) (holding that a statute prohibiting a felony first offender from possessing “any firearm,” when read in conjunction with the sentencing provision‘s later use of “a firearm,” “expresses an unambiguous ... intent to make each firearm a unit of prosecution“).
Judgment reversed. McFadden, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
