Case Information
*1 SECOND DIVISION
ANDREWS, P. J.,
MILLER, P. J., and BRANCH, J. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
March 9, 2016 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A15A1858. THE STATE v. WILLIAMS.
B RANCH , Judge.
The State appeals the trial court’s decision granting Michael Lloyd Williams’s motion to suppress the admission of a statement he provided after his arrest for obstruction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
At the hearing on the admissibility of Williams’s statements, Deputy Wesley Aaron, the only witness at the hearing, testified that on March 9, 2014, he was dispatched to investigate a forced entry and burglary of a metal shop owned by Angie and Travis Wilkerson. Aaron spoke to Travis Wilkerson and learned that several items had been taken from the shop, including “chains and chain bucks.” Wilkerson told Aaron that a person had told him that Williams had some chains and bucks that supposedly had been stolen from Wilkerson at a property not far from Wilkerson’s *2 shop. On cross examination, Aaron was asked, “So basically, Mr. Wilkerson heard some gossip or some talk that Mr. Williams might have information about this case, and you went out there to talk to him about it?” Aaron replied, “Not exactly at that time. I talked to the source that he got his information from before –“ At that point, defense counsel interrupted Aaron and moved on to another point. On redirect examination, the State did not ask any follow-up questions about the source of the information.
Aaron proceeded to Williams’s mother’s residence to look for Williams, whom Aaron knew. There, Aaron told Williams that Williams was a suspect in the burglary. Aaron admitted that Williams was not in custody or under arrest. Aaron testified that as he asked questions, Williams became “very agitated and fidgety,” and as the conversation continued, Williams suddenly “took off running.” When Williams fled, Aaron demanded that Williams stop, which he did not, and Aaron then tased Williams and arrested him for misdemeanor obstruction of an officer for hindering the investigation. Aaron explained to Williams his rights under Miranda and transported Williams back to the sheriff’s office. There, Aaron reread the Miranda warnings, and Williams agreed to make a statement, which is the subject of his motion to suppress. *3 Following the hearing on Williams’s motion, the trial court issued an order stating that after considering the facts and the law, the court found that Williams
fled a first-tier encounter,[ ] something [ ] the Defendant was permitted to do under Georgia law, thus his subsequent arrest for obstruction was illegal and without probable [cause,] thereby making any statement made after his arrest inadmissible.
The State appeals.
Generally, on review of a ruling on a motion to suppress the trial judge’s
findings of fact should not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them;
determinations of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and
the evidence must be construed in favor of the trial court’s findings and judgment.
Tate v. State
,
1. The trial court’s ruling that Williams fled a first-tier encounter means that the trial court made one or both of two findings: either Aaron did not have enough information to make a second-tier stop, [3] Aaron did not seize Williams so as to effect *5 a second-tier stop, or both. Construed in favor of the trial court’s decision, we conclude that the trial court necessarily made both of these findings, and we conclude that both findings are supported by the record.
As for the first finding, the State failed to elicit testimony from Aaron to show
that the source of the information implicating Williams was a concerned citizen as
opposed to one or more anonymous witnesses; at best, the tip came from an informant
of unknown reliability. See
Dukes
,
As for the second finding, the evidence shows that Aaron did not place
Williams in custody or under arrest at the time that Williams fled. Although Aaron
told Williams that he was a suspect in the robbery, the trial court was authorized to
find that prior to Williams’s flight, the State failed to carry its burden of showing that
Aaron made a show of authority sufficient to seize Williams or that Williams had
submitted to Aaron’s authority. See
Chamblee v. State
,
2. Nevertheless, “[f]light in connection with other circumstances may be
sufficient probable cause to uphold a warrantless arrest or search,”
State v. Smalls
,
Here, “other circumstances” than flight exist. Aaron had just told Williams
about the stolen chains and stated that Williams was a suspect when Williams took
off in headlong flight. Aaron was therefore authorized to briefly detain Williams for
an investigative stop. See
McClary v. State
,
Judgment reversed. Andrews, P. J., concurs. Miller, P. J., concurs in judgment only .
Notes
[1] “The United States Supreme Court has sculpted out three tiers of encounters
between the police and citizens: (1) communication between police and citizens
involving no coercion or detention, (2) brief seizures that must be supported by
reasonable suspicion, and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable
cause.”
State v. Dukes
,
[2] The categorization of a police-citizen encounter into one of the three tiers
established by case law interpreting the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is a
mixed question of law and fact.
State v. Fisher
,
[3] See
Stafford v. State
,
[4] “A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of
movement.”
Brendlin v. California
,
[5] “[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor.” OCGA § 16-10-24 (a).