The State v. Samantha G. WattsThe State v. Samantha G. Watts
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge
AFFIRMED
James Lynch, pro se.
Christina Catoe Bigelow, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: James Lynch, pro se, appeals the Administrative Law Court‘s (ALC‘s) orders granting the South Carolina Department of Corrections‘s (SCDC‘s) motions to dismiss Lynch‘s appeal of his disciplinary convictions for sexual assault and hostage taking. Lynch argues (1) his disciplinary hearings were held two years and four months after being formally charged in violation of SCDC policy, (2) Lynch‘s accuser did not write an incident report in violation of SCDC policy, and
We hold the ALC did not err by summarily dismissing Lynch‘s appeals because Lynch‘s claims did not implicate a state-created liberty interest such that they invoked the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. See
SCDC‘s delay in conducting Lynch‘s disciplinary hearing and failure to require the observing employee to write the incident report did not impose an “atypical or significant hardship” on Lynch “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sullivan v. S.C. Dep‘t of Corr., 355 S.C. 437, 442, 586 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2003) (“[S]tates may create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause, but . . . ‘these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.‘” (third alteration in original) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)), abrogated on other grounds by Allen, 439 S.C. at 169, 886 S.E.2d at 673; Skipper, 370 S.C. at 274, 633 S.E.2d at 914 (“Courts traditionally have adopted a ‘hands off’ doctrine regarding judicial involvement in prison disciplinary procedures and other internal prison matters, although they must intercede when infringements complained of by an inmate reach constitutional dimensions.” (quoting Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757)); id. (“[A]n inmate‘s complaint must encompass an infringement of a liberty interest that imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate to trigger due process guarantees and judicial review.“). Moreover, the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits does not implicate a state-created liberty interest. See Howard v. S.C. Dep‘t of Corr., 399 S.C. 618, 630, 733 S.E.2d 211, 218 (2012) (“[T]he ALC may summarily dismiss an inmate appeal that involves only the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits. However, a matter is reviewable by the ALC where an inmate‘s appeal also implicates a state-created liberty or property interest, such as the loss of accrued sentence-related credits.“).
Further, Lynch‘s argument that his continued incarceration in the SCDC supermax unit beyond his sentence of time served constitutes an atypical and significant hardship is not preserved for appellate review because it was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the ALC. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [ALC] to be preserved for appellate review.“); see also I‘On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (“[T]he losing party generally must both present his issues and arguments to the lower court and obtain a ruling before an appellate court will review those issues and arguments.“).
WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.