The State v. BaxterThe State v. Baxter
Case Information
*1 D OYLE , Chief Judge.
This case presents an issue of first impression concerning the application of
On February 4, 2014, Baxter was arrested and taken into custody for one count
of aggravated sexual battery. Although he was 16 years old at the time , the superior
court had exclusive original jurisdiction over his case pursuant to
On March 17, 2014, the day Baxter’s case was scheduled to go before the grand jury, Baxter’s counsel filed a “Waiver of Statutory Right to Indictment Within 180 Days,” which stated:
Comes now the defendant in the above-styled case and being confined in the Claxton RYDC, waives his right to indictment in said case by a grand jury during the March 17, 2014 term within 180 days of his arrest in return for additional time for investigation by both the State and Defense.
As a result, Baxter’s case was not presented to the grand jury.
*3
On October 15, 2014, Baxter filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile
court pursuant to
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction
of the superior court, as provided in Code
(b) If the grand jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title 15.
In response, on October 16, 2014, the State filed a motion for an extension of time to
present the case to the grand jury pursuant to
The superior court granted Baxter’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court
because the time limit set forth in
Initially, we note that the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal. [2]
In interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the legislature’s intention, looking diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy. To determine the legislative intent of a statute, we begin with the literal text; where the literal text of a statute is plain and does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, we apply the statute as written without further inquiry. The language of a statute is given its most natural and obvious import, without resorting to forced or subtle interpretations to either expand or limit the statute’s operation. We interpret a statute to give effect to the real legislative intent and meaning, however, and not so strictly as to defeat the legislative purpose. [3]
The plain language of
Here, Baxter’s case was not presented to the grand jury within 180 days of his detention. Under the plain language of the statute, it was therefore mandatory that the case be transferred to the juvenile court. In addition, the State’s motion for an extension of time was untimely because it was filed more than 180 days after Baxter was detained. An extension of the 180-day time limit must be sought and granted before the time limit expires or the superior court loses jurisdiction over the case. [7]
We now consider whether the waiver of the 180-day time limit, which was filed before the time limit expired, was valid. We conclude that it was not.
The statute sets forth the time limitations for presenting the case to the grand
jury and the appropriate procedure to follow if additional time is needed. The
extension of time is limited to one extension of an additional 90 days, not the
potentially unlimited extension that would occur if the waiver was enforced.
Although the case law interpreting
Our holding is in keeping with the general rule that parties may not create subject matter jurisdiction in a court by consent. [11] Although the superior court had exclusive original jurisdiction over Baxter’s case, it could not unilaterally extend that jurisdiction indefinitely, contravening the plain language of the statute.
The State contends that the 180-day requirement found in
[a] defendant may waive rights which exist for his own benefit, but he
may not waive those which belong to the public generally. . . . As the
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protection afforded by statutes of limitation is statutory in origin, does
not affect the court’s jurisdiction, and is personal to an individual
defendant, it is comparable to the speedy trial provisions of
The crucial distinction here is that the 180-day requirement does affect the court’s jurisdiction – if the State does not present a juvenile’s case to the grand jury within the time limit or obtain a timely extension to do so, the superior court loses jurisdiction.
The State also contends that it detrimentally relied on the waiver, causing it to forbear in bringing the case before the grand jury, and that Baxter potentially acted in bad faith by agreeing to the waiver and then seeking a transfer to juvenile court. Although we are sympathetic to the State’s position in this case, the State was well aware of the mandatory time limitations set forth in the statute and was not precluded from seeking an extension of time to present the case to the grand jury. Further, there is no evidence in the record of bad faith by Baxter.
Judgment affirmed. Phipps, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur .
Notes
[1] Pursuant to
[2]
Spivey v. State
,
[3] (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Hill v. State
,
[4] Emphasis supplied.
[5] Emphasis supplied.
[6] See id. at 533-534.
[7] See
Nunnally v. State
,
[8] See
Edwards v. State
,
[9] See
In the Interest of C. B.
,
[10] See
Edwards
,
[11] See
[12] See generally
In the Interest of D. B.
,
[13] (Punctuation omitted.)
Vaughn v. State
,