90 U.S. 165 | SCOTUS | 1875
THE SEA GULL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*169 Messrs. S.T. Wallis and J.H. Thomas, for the owners of the schooner.
Messrs. J.H.B. Latrobe and I.N. Steele, contra, for the steamer.
*173 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Until within a recent period the sailing regulations founded in ancient usage, sometimes called sea laws, sanctioned by the decisions of the admiralty courts, furnished the principal rules of navigation in such emergencies, aided by the adjudications of the prize courts, whose practice conforms in some respects to the law of nations. Recently Congress has enacted regulations upon the subject, and those regulations are obligatory upon our commercial marine in all cases where they apply, but inasmuch as the act of *174 Congress does not profess to regulate the whole subject of sailing-rules it cannot be understood as superseding the prior established usages of navigation which are not embraced in the sailing-rules contained in the Congressional enactment.
Signal lights of a prescribed character are required to be carried by steam-vessels when under way, and sailing-ships under way are required to carry similar lights, with the exception of the white masthead lights, which they shall never carry. Such a requirement, however, is of very little or no value unless the lights are properly displayed and kept burning brightly, nor is it then of any value as a precaution unless those in charge of the other vessel use the means to see the approaching lights before it is too late to adopt the proper measures to prevent a collision.
Lookouts are also required by the usages of navigation, but the object of the requirement will never be accomplished in case the lookout fails to perform the duty which the requirement contemplates. Nautical lookouts must be properly stationed, and should be vigilant in the performance of their duty, and if they are incompetent or inattentive, and the collision occurs in consequence of their neglect, the vessel to which the lookout is attached must be held responsible for the injury resulting to the other vessel.
Steamers approaching a sail-ship in such a direction as to involve risk of collision are required to keep out of the way of the sail-ship, but the sail-ship is required to keep her course unless the circumstances are such as to render a departure from the rule necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
Vessels with sails being required to keep their course the duty of adopting the necessary measures of precaution to keep out of the way is devolved upon the steamer, subject only to the condition that the sail-ship shall keep her course and do no act to embarrass the steamer in her efforts to perform her duty. Doubtless the steamer may go to the right or left if she can keep out of the way, but if not, and the approach is such as to involve risk of collision, she is required *175 to slacken her speed, or if necessary stop and reverse, and if she fails to perform her duty as required by the rules of navigation she is responsible for the consequences if the sail-ship is without fault, unless the steamer can show that the collision was the result of causes which could not be foreseen or prevented, or of inevitable accident.
In the case before us both vessels had proper signal lights and both had lookouts, but the better opinion is that the lookout of the steamer was not as vigilant as he should have been in the performance of his duty. Strong support to that view is derived from the fact that the lights of the steamer were seen by the lookout of the schooner when the vessels were three or four miles apart, but those in charge of the steamer saw nothing of the schooner until the two vessels were within a half-mile of each other, and then saw at first only the sails of the schooner and those indistinctly.
Where the emergency is great the order to the helmsman should undoubtedly be prompt, but under the circumstances of this case it was a rash act of the second mate to direct the man at the wheel to starboard the helm, as he did, before he had employed any available means to ascertain the course of the schooner. He admits that he had not seen the lights of the approaching vessel and the lookout admits the same thing. They both say that they saw the sails, but they admit that they could not distinguish one sail from another, and it may be that it was the shadow of the sails and not the sails themselves which was present to their sight at that moment.
Evidently the order was an injudicious one, which is sufficiently shown by the testimony of the officer who gave it, as he admits that in a short time he found it to be advisable to countermand the order and to direct the wheelsman to put the helm hard to port. Well-founded doubt cannot be entertained that if that order had been given in the first place the collision would never have taken place. Probably it was too late then, as the steamer had fallen off three or four points before the second order could be fully executed, *176 and it appears that the collision occurred before the steame could be brought back under the second order to the course she was pursuing antecedent to the first change made in her course.
These repugnant orders manifestly put the steamer upon a zigzag course, that is, first to the left and then to the right, and afford plenary proof that the officer in charge of the deck was in great doubt what to do, in which event it was his plain duty to slacken his speed, or, if necessary, as it plainly was, to stop and reverse, but he did nothing of the kind in season to render any such precaution effectual.
Undoubtedly it was the privilege of the steamer to go to the right or left if in so doing she could, with reasonable certainty, keep out of the way; but if not, it became her imperative duty to slacken her speed and, if necessary, to stop and reverse.
Corresponding conclusions were reached by the district judge, except that he did not find that the lookout of the steamer failed to see the lights of the approaching schooner as soon as he might have done if he had performed his duty. Much reason exists to conclude that the first error of the officer in charge of the deck was occasioned by that omission of the lookout, and that the excitement induced when he discovered that his first order was an improper one had more or less influence in promoting the subsequent errors. Subject to that qualification the views expressed by the district judge in respect to the conduct of the officer in charge of the deck of the steamer appear to be correct.
Cases arise unquestionably in which the want of a lookout, or his failure to perform his duty, will not be imputed to a vessel as a culpable fault, as where it appears that the other vessel was seen by the officer in charge of the deck in season to adopt every needful precaution, and that the want of a lookout or his failure to perform his duty as such did not and could not have contributed to the disaster, but it is very doubtful, in view of the circumstances, whether the case before the court falls within the first condition, and it is quite clear that the evidence will not support the conclusion that *177 the negligence of the lookout did not materially contribute to the subsequent mistakes and vacillating conduct of the officer in charge of the deck of the steamer.[*]
Approaching, as the two vessels were, on converging lines, it would clearly seem that the lookout of the steamer ought to have seen the schooner much earlier, as the evidence is full to the point that her signal lights were burning brightly, and if he had, it is not doubted that the collision would have been avoided, as the officer in charge of the deck of the steamer would, in all probability, have acted with more deliberation, in which event it may well be supposed he would not have given the direction that the course of the steamer should be changed before he had ascertained the course of the approaching vessel.
Considering the proximity of the vessels it may be admitted that prompt action was required, but it is plain that it was bad seamanship to change the course of the steamer before it had been ascertained whether the effect of the change directed would be to diminish or increase the danger to be apprehended from the impending peril. They, the two vessels, were still a half a mile apart, and time enough remained to adopt the proper precautions to prevent a collision, nor is it any valid excuse for the error committed to say that the officer in command of the deck was ignorant of the course of the schooner when he gave the order to starboard the helm, as in that event he should have waited a moment for that information, or, if the peril was impending and the danger too immediate to justify any delay on the occasion, then he should have slackened his speed, or, if necessary, stopped and reversed, as required by the sixteenth sailing-rule.
Beyond all doubt the order to starboard, under the circumstances, was an error, and the evidence warrants the inference that the officer who gave it came to the same conclusion as soon as he saw the red light of the schooner, which he admits he did see in a very short time after he gave the *178 erroneous order. Sufficient appears to satisfy the court that the order to starboard was given without due reflection, and that the attempt to correct the error by directing the wheelsman to port the helm was not given in season to prevent the disaster, as the steamer in the meantime had fallen off more than three points.
By the sailing-rules the steamer was bound to keep out of the way, and the whole evidence shows that she did not comply with that requirement, and the rule of decision in such case is that, primâ facie, the steamer is in fault; nor does the case rest merely upon that presumption, for several reasons: (1.) Because the evidence shows affirmatively that the order to starboard given by the officer in charge of the deck was an improper order. (2.) Because the lookout of the steamer was negligent in the performance of his duty. (3.) Because the steamer did not slacken her speed nor stop and reverse in season to accomplish the object contemplated by the enactment containing that requirement.
II. Attempt is made in argument to show that the schooner also was in fault, and that the case falls within the rule which requires that the damages shall be divided.
Support to that charge is attempted to be drawn from the assumed fact that the schooner changed her course in violation of the rule of navigation which requires the sail-ship to keep her course, as a correlative duty to that of the steamer whenever the latter is required to keep out of the way. Such undoubtedly is the general rule of navigation, but it is subject to the qualification that it does not apply in such a case when a departure from it is necessary to avoid immediate danger.[*]
Two answers are made by the libellants to that defence, either of which if found to be true is sufficient to exonerate the schooner from the consequences of the accusation, if proved to be well founded: (1.) That the evidence invoked for the purpose does not establish the charge. (2.) That the schooner made no change in her course until the collision *179 was inevitable, nor until it became indispensably necessary in order to avoid immediate danger caused by the fault of the steamer.
1. All must admit that the burden to establish the charge is upon the claimants. They examined witnesses belonging to the steamer to support the theory of the defence, but the remark is applicable to them all that their cross-examination showed that they had no actual knowledge upon the subject, that they inferred that the charge was true from the fact that the two vessels collided, and from the manner in which they came together.
On the other hand all the persons on the deck of the schooner were examined by the libellants, and they testify, with one accord, that the schooner did not change her course as alleged by the claimants. Two of those, to wit, the wheelsman and the master who stood by his side, must know what did take place in that regard, and unless they have wilfully stated what they know to be false their statements must be correct; nor can it be denied that they state in the most positive terms that the charge is untrue. They were on the deck of the schooner and had the opportunity to know everything which occurred around them, nor can they well be mistaken in respect to the matter in question, but the witnesses on the steamer only infer what transpired on the deck of the schooner, and of course their statements are in the nature of opinions, and are certainly entitled to much less credit than such as are founded in actual knowledge of what did take place.
Mere inference from the circumstances of the collision is not reliable, since it is fully proved that the steamer attempted in the first place to go to the left and then ported her helm and attempted to go to the right; nor is it correct to suppose that the angle of the steamer when she struck the port side of the schooner was towards the stem of the schooner, as the proof is quite satisfactory that it was towards the stern.
Some of the witnesses state that the steamer struck the schooner at right angles, but the better opinion is that it was *180 with a slight angle in the opposite direction from that found by the district judge, if his opinion is correctly exhibited in the record. Strong confirmation of that view is derived from the conceded fact that it was the port side of the stem of the steamer that was injured by the concussion. She cut three or four feet into the schooner just forward of her main rigging, and being herself injured on the port side of her stem the inference is a reasonable one that she was heading somewhat towards the stern of the schooner.
2. Be that as it may, it still is insisted by the claimants that the schooner changed her course and violated the sailing-rule which forbids it, but the evidence is not sufficient to establish the charge nor to render it probable that anything of the kind occurred, unless perhaps at the moment before the collision, when the master, seeing that the peril was impending, took the wheel from the helmsman and gave the order "let go her gaff-topsail sheet and lower the peak," but the order was not obeyed, as there was no time to execute it before the steamer struck the schooner.
Rules of navigation continue to be applicable as long as the means and opportunity remain to avoid the danger, but they do not apply to a vessel required to keep her course after the wrongful approach of the opposite vessel is so near that the collision is inevitable. Steamers under the rule that they shall keep out of the way must of necessity determine for themselves and upon their own responsibility, independent of the sailing-vessel, whether it is safer to go to the right or left or to slacken their speed or stop and reverse, and in order that the steamer may not be deprived of the means of determining the matter wisely, and that she may not be defeated or baffled in the attempt to perform her duty in the emergency, it is required that the sailing-vessel shall keep her course and allow the steamer to pass either on the right or left, or to adopt such other measures of precaution as she may deem best suited to enable her to perform her duty and fulfil the requirement to keep out of the way.
These rules of navigation are of great importance, but *181 they do not apply to the vessel required to keep her course after the wrongful approach of the steamer is so near that the collision is inevitable, nor will an error committed by the sail-vessel under such circumstances of peril, if she is otherwise without fault, impair the right of the sail-vessel to recover for the injuries occasioned by the collision, for the plain reason that those who produced the peril and put the sail-vessel in that situation are chargeable with the error and must answer for the consequences.[*]
Subject to that exception the sail-vessel must keep her course, but the case before the court, if any change was made in the course of the schooner, falls within the exception, and it follows that the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in favor of the libellants for the whole value of the schooner, her freight, and cargo.
DECREE REVERSED.
NOTES
[*] The Farragut, 10 Wallace, 337; The Dexter, supra, 69.
[*] 13 Stat. at Large, 61.
[*] Steamship Co. v. Rumball, 21 Howard, 383.